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Preface
The first draft of this book was written through the medium of a five day 
‘Book Sprint’, using the Book Sprints method1 which took place from 7  
to 11 September 2018 in Berlin, Germany. Several additions and revisions 
have been made to complete the final book presented here.
Footnotes
1 Book Sprints Ltd - booksprints.net
4 Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action Preface
Contents
Preface 3
Executive summary 6
Introduction 10
Three stories 10
Open Scholarship 12
Three fundamental changes 12
The Knowledge Exchange Open Scholarship Framework 15
A focus on the economic arena 16
Conclusion – economics, markets and collective action. Frames for analysis 16
Terminology 17
Actors, their interests and powers 20
Defining the levels of granularity: micro, macro, and meso 20
Micro-level actors 21
Meso-level actors 22
Macro-level actors 23
Interactions between the levels 24
Conclusion – the meso-level is required for a transition to Open Scholarship 25
The shaping and organisation of research 27
The history of disciplines and research communities 27
Supporting communications: publishers and publishing 30
Universities and the emergence of an academic job market 33
Conclusion – history has shaped a complex system 35
When values and motives clash 37
Responsibility clashes: who does what work and where? 38
Revenue clashes: who pays, who gets paid, and how much? 40
Conclusion – understanding the interactions of institutions is crucial 42
5Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action Preface
Analysing scholarship with economic models 45
The changing nature of the scholarly environment 45
The exchange of goods in markets 47
The interaction between market conditions and the goods they can produce 48
Examples of scholarly goods and markets 50
Analysing action at the community level 60
Public good features of digital knowledge goods 60
Network externalities and capital 62
Rebuilding institutional capital 63
Examples of market competition failures and network effects 64
Hidden goods. Markets and exchange beyond money 67
Conclusion – disruption is an opportunity to build and rebuild institutional capital 68
Institutions and collective action 70
Networks and capital. A short recap 71
Gravitational hubs and the accumulation of capital 71
Institutional capital and the governance of hubs 74
The governance of scholarly common pool resources 76
Managing for change 78
Consequences for stakeholders 79
Plan S through the lens of collective action 84
Conclusion 86
Understanding the landscape 89
Where next? 91
References 93
6 Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action Executive summary
Aim and background
Background and rationale
The aim of this book is to enhance community 
understanding of the mechanisms and processes that 
can enable Open Scholarship to reach its full potential. 
The book is the result of a Knowledge Exchange (KE) 
(knowledge-exchange.info/about-us) activity to 
explore the economy of Open Scholarship across six 
European countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands and the UK) and beyond. 
In September 2018, Knowledge Exchange brought 
together eleven experts from across these countries. 
These experts are all currently involved in exploring the 
development of Open Scholarship, and include 
researchers, policy makers and information systems 
providers. Through the medium of a five day ‘book 
sprint’ we prepared a first draft of the released document, 
combining our different perspectives and experiences 
into a coherent text that could aid progress. 
The discussions and findings in this book are inspired 
by KE's Open Scholarship Framework2. It models Open 
Scholarship as a combination of levels (micro-, meso- 
and macro-level actors), arenas (political, economic, 
social, technical) and research phases (discovery, 
planning, project phase, dissemination), in order to 
better understand the challenges to make scholarship 
more open.
A focus on the economic arena and on  
meso-level actors
Many of the challenges in navigating the transition to 
Open Scholarship are economic, either in the sense of 
being directly financial, or in the sense of being related 
to incentives. We therefore focus on the economic arena. 
Our conclusion is that it is challenging to capture the full 
details of the economy of Open Scholarship in terms of 
existing models. Application of economic theory and 
analysis techniques to Open Scholarship needs further 
exploration and development. 
An important aspect of the scholarly landscape and the 
transition to Open Scholarship is the diversity of actors 
involved. These can be described as ‘micro’ (individuals 
such as researchers, or support staff, users of research 
or employees of service providers), ‘meso’ (groups, 
communities or organisations such as universities, 
disciplines, scholarly societies or publishers) and ‘macro’ 
(‘system-spanning’ actors that provide structure to 
whole countries or regions, such as funders and 
governments). Insufficient attention has been paid to 
the incentives, actions and influences of meso-actors, 
and therefore a major focus of this book is on meso-
actors. We conclude that the key to making progress  
is to better understand and overcome challenges of 
collective action.3
Executive summary
Footnotes
2  knowledge-exchange.info/event/os-framework
3  A variety of publications on (aspects of) community and 
collective action have been published, this book refers to 
several of them. In general, collective action refers to action 
taken together by a group of people whose goal is to enhance 
their status and achieve a common objective (see Wikipedia:  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_action).
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The shaping and organisation of research
Our systems of disciplinary organisation, research 
communications and publishing, as well as of 
organisations that house scholarship, evolved together 
with many significant developments taking place in the 
18th and 19th centuries. The legacy of this history is a 
complex system of values with significant 
interdependencies between a diverse set of meso-
actors. Open Scholarship introduces new values that 
challenge the roles, responsibilities, motives and 
ambitions of these actors.
When values and motives clash
Meso-actors will clash when their individual incentives 
do not align with one another. This may be due to a 
division of responsibilities, particularly when new work 
and roles are needed (eg who will be responsible and 
gets credit for curation and review of digital data 
resources), or it may be due to differing financial 
incentives or revenue sources (eg in debates over the 
appropriate costs of scholarly publishing and who 
should pay these). Our analysis of changes in practice 
and culture towards Open Scholarship indicates that 
clashes are an inevitable part of change, so 
understanding them is crucial.
Analysing scholarship with economic models
Many of the changes in scholarship are driven by the 
shift from physical determined prints to digital available 
information. This has changed the nature of scholarly 
‘goods’ generally making them less exclusive and 
therefore more like ‘public goods’ (which are neither 
exclusive nor rivalrous). The development of shared 
digital repositories and the persistent identifiers that 
support them are an example of this shift in the nature 
of goods. Competitive markets are not predicted to 
provide such goods; to achieve change we need to find 
new economic models.
Analysing action at the community level
Community and collective action provides one such model 
for the provision of ‘public-like’ and collective goods. 
Institutions that support such collective action are a form of 
‘community capital’. The current disruption is an opportunity 
to rebuild community capital. To do so we have to recognise 
the much broader sets of exchange, goods and capital in 
play including prestige, reputation and trust.
Institutions and collective action
By default, network effects and returns to capital will drive 
the creation of ‘gravitational hubs’ like Google, or 
Facebook4. To counter these we need to build (or rebuild) 
our own community institutions that have their own network 
effects and hub-characteristics. The key to distinguishing 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ gravitational hubs will be 
standards of governance.
Footnotes
4  In 2005 Lorcan Dempsey in a blog on ‘Systems in the network 
world’ made this observation about public platforms such as 
Google, Amazon and eBay: “They make data work hard: they 
extract as much intelligence as possible from growing 
reservoirs of data, and their services adapt reflexively based on 
accumulated data about users. They are massive gravitational 
hubs for consumers. http://orweblog.oclc.org/systems-in-the-
network-world/
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The literature on collective action includes Ostrom’s 
principles on the community governance of collective goods 
(including community capital and ‘hubs’) and Olson’s guide 
to how the challenge of collective action for change can be 
organised. By applying these principles we can outline a set 
of consequences for key stakeholders including:
 ` The need for more effective community organisation 
and development of nested hierarchies of 
community governance, particularly for  
scholarly communities 
 ` A need to distinguish clearly which members of the 
scholarly community are subject to rules and which 
are not (such as commercial service providers), and 
the appropriate forms of relations with such outside 
actors. For instance, there is a need to define 
carefully which parts of the publishing process are 
community activities, which are appropriate to be  
left to a market of service providers, and what the 
relationship between those should be
 `  A critical role for funders as the main actors in a 
position to drive change in response to societal 
demands, but also for that position to be supported 
by trust from the communities that are being subject 
to the changes
The key to understanding change is that it is meso- 
level actors, communities and groups, and their 
responsibilities, interactions and output that ultimately 
bring change about.
 ` For change to be sustained it requires both 
community institutions that support the new status 
quo (establishing clear definitions of requirements, 
clarity on the process for selection, and transparency 
and trust), and communities themselves (eg 
funders, research performing organisations, and 
scholarly communities) that suppport change - not 
only in statements but through actions   
 ` A supportive infrastructure, both technical and 
social, is key to ensuring long term sustainability and 
also to enabling communities to engage in the shift 
This book is meant to help increase our understanding 
of research moving towards Open Scholarship. For a 
successful transition, collective action approaches and 
establishment of a supportive infrastructure are 
important. These conclusions are explained in more 
depth and detail in the following chapters. We hope the 
book will inspire all involved in research to contribute to 
realising the full potential of Open Scholarship. 
Chapter 1
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Three stories
What are the assets? Glossa and Lingua
Once upon a time, a group of academics walked out of 
their agreement to edit Lingua, a journal owned by a 
large publishing corporation. They set up a new journal 
of their own, on an Open Access platform. Much has 
been written about the disagreements that led to the 
creation of Glossa, the new journal in this story. The 
creation of a new, and highly successful Open Access 
journal is described from some perspectives as a heroic 
triumph for scholarly sharing and openness in the face 
of profiteering big publishers. But from another 
perspective, that of the original publisher, it did little to 
change the fundamentals of the journal and its viability. 
The original journal, Lingua, still exists. A new editorial 
team has been recruited and submissions keep coming 
in. Libraries keep paying subscriptions and, perhaps 
most importantly, relatively few other journal editorial 
boards have followed Glossa’s example.
The purpose of telling this story is to highlight two 
different perspectives on the value of scholarly journals. 
Is a journal a mechanism through which like-minded 
scholars share their research and expertise, creating a 
sense of community? Or is it an income stream for the 
organisation that owns it, an operation that should be 
treated like a business? Academics who serve as the 
editorial team, and those who submit their work for 
publication, provide the prestige and scholarly expertise 
corporation. But is that more or less valuable than 
ownership of the title, the trademarks, the accrued 
citation metrics and the banner? An important part of the 
Glossa story was the availability of a low-cost technical 
platform and a funding mechanism that could provide 
longer term sustainability through the Open Library of 
Humanities (openlibhums.org) (for more information on 
OLH see also our report Insights into the Economy of 
Open Scholarship: A Collection of Interviews 
(repository.jisc.ac.uk/7296/11/KE_Insights_into_the_
Economy_of_Open_Scholarship_A_collection_of_
Interviews_June_2019.pdf)). 
This story is not just about the difference between 
scholarly and business perspectives, but of the many 
varying perspectives within the scholarly community 
and those that provide services to it. The original 
editorial board cared enough about Open Access to set 
up a new journal using a different business model, but 
there is sufficient perceived value in being an editor that 
the original publisher was able to find other academics 
within the same broad field to keep the original journal 
going and there are enough researchers producing 
papers for both journals to have submissions. It seems 
relatively clear that a publisher’s interests will differ from 
those of the scholarly community, but which group of 
academic editors can be said to represent the scholarly 
community? If this form of transition is desirable as a 
policy goal then where might it succeed, and where 
might it fail? And what measures would we apply to 
determine success or failure?
Who is responsible for transparency? 
Reproducibility and software
An increasing amount of modern research depends on 
software and computational power. It is a long time 
since most computer hardware was built directly by 
universities. Both personal computers and supercomputers 
are more easily bought from external providers. 
Researchers also use a wide range of software provided 
by commercial suppliers. Sometimes, commercial 
software becomes deeply embedded in the work  
of a discipline. Examples include SPSS5 in the social 
sciences, MATLAB6 in areas of engineering, and a 
substantial proportion of the software that underpins 
computational chemistry. 
Introduction
Footnotes
5  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPSS
6  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MATLAB
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Is this good, because the providers of this software 
produce high quality products efficiently and keep 
developing their products? Is it bad, because the 
proprietary nature of the software makes testing and 
criticising results harder? What guarantees are there that 
critical software will continue to be available and updated 
to run on modern hardware, or that the organisations 
providing them will continue to exist? 
Some academic communities have become increasingly 
critical of work involving cutting-edge analysis that cannot 
be critically assessed as it is ‘black boxed’ in a proprietary 
system. For some disciplines direct access to the source 
code of any analysis is becoming a requirement of 
publication. A number of Open Source and free software 
tools are becoming popular, including Python  
(python.org) with its ecosystem of Jupyter, pandas, 
and related tools and the Open Source statistical 
environment R (r-project.org). These systems and tools 
can provide greater transparency in terms of the code, 
but does that make the scholarship itself more 
transparent? If Open Source is the best way forward 
then how should it be funded? Software platforms of 
this kind are infrastructure, providing a stable platform 
that others can work on, and like other infrastructures 
they struggle to find sustainability models (Egbahl, 
2016)7. If we had funding mechanisms to support 
infrastructural software, what would be the appropriate 
level of investment? How could we tell which software 
needed continuing investment and tension that against 
new efforts that are worthy of support and funding?
What platforms can we trust? Consumer services 
and the scholarly community
If we choose to support Open Source and free 
software, on what platforms should that software be 
developed and shared? Researchers are increasingly 
using GitHub for sharing and archiving specialised 
research software as well as for data. Should the fact 
that GitHub is now owned by Microsoft raise worries 
about long-term availability? Is GitLab (gitlab.com), an 
Open Source and non-commercial competitor to 
GitHub (github.com), a better fit for the academic 
community, or should we be concerned about its 
sustainability? Is Microsoft’s stewardship of GitHub 
more reliable? Is the larger community of users at 
GitHub the deciding factor?
Similar questions might be raised with a comparison  
of Zenodo (zenodo.org), the data and content sharing 
platform hosted by the European Organisation  
for Nuclear Research (CERN), and Figshare  
(figshare.com), a for-profit offering based within Digital 
Science. Zenodo is run by an organisation in the 
academic community but has no dedicated sustainability 
plan or guarantees. Figshare has a sustainability model 
and revenue sources due to its for-profit nature, and 
has additionally made preservation arrangements.8 The 
question remains as to whether free is a sustainable 
price point for these services, particularly if it operates 
as a loss-leader, not asking the market-bearing price as 
a strategy to attract increased future business. Once 
data no longer has current value for reuse or sharing, it 
is unlikely to have any money-making potential – thus, 
there will be no interest from commercial players in its 
long-term preservation. 
Footnotes
7 The work of Egbahl showed that for many pieces of important 
consumer software infrastructures (languages such as Python, 
Matplotlib, OpenSSL) support was patchy and unreliable. In the 
sciences key pieces of infrastructure including Matplotlib, 
NumPy and pandas may be reliant on the (inconsistently 
funded) work of between three and six people.
8 More on the various business models of platforms and services 
in this area are described in Knowledge Exchange publication 
Insights into the Economy of Open Scholarship: A Collection of 
Interviews http://repository.jisc.ac.uk/7296/11/KE_Insights_
into_the_Economy_of_Open_Scholarship_A_collection_of_
Interviews_June_2019.pdf
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This is why the long-term preservation of physical 
research objects and data has traditionally been 
provided by archives, museums and libraries supported 
by public funds and with a clear mission of preservation 
and not one of profit-orientation. Early digital archives 
followed a similar model, such as the UK Arts and 
Humanities Data Service, which was supported by 
public funds.
From one perspective it is good news that the market 
has caught up. The entry of third-party actors shows a 
maturity in the markets, and the opportunity for external 
investment in the parts of our scholarship that are no 
longer core intellectual activities. But what control are 
we giving up? Have these services actually reduced the 
long-term need for publicly funded archives? How do 
we decide on a case by case basis that we can rely on 
external service providers? Who is the ‘we’ who would 
make that decision? What risks are there for the future 
and how will we handle them? What if we discover 
crucial pieces of software, data or communication have 
been irretrievably lost?
Open Scholarship
Open Scholarship is variously viewed as an external 
policy agenda imposed by funders or governments, as 
an ethical imperative to change the practice of our 
scholarship to align with changing societal needs, or as 
a simple re-assertion of the core values of our scholarly 
institutions to advance and disseminate knowledge. It is 
defined in many places in different ways, encompassing 
activities as broad as: Open Access and data sharing; 
the production and sharing of software and systems for 
the open annotation of texts; the involvement of patient 
representatives on grant awarding panels; and the direct 
engagement of wider publics in research activities.
In this book we will not seek to define Open Scholarship 
(or Open Science). Instead we observe that the various 
agendas being taken forward under this banner have in 
common systems, practices, services and platforms 
that support or depend on the wider sharing of research 
outputs, greater engagement with those outputs by 
more diverse communities and the coordination of that 
engagement across broader networks. We start from 
the motivation that these shifts are desirable, but that 
the changes involved are challenging for scholars, their 
communities, their institutions and the providers of 
services that support them. We will see that the central 
challenge is coordinating collective action amongst these 
many different, and differently motivated, actors. 
The aim of this book is therefore to enhance our 
understanding of the mechanisms and processes that will 
enable Open Scholarship to reach its full potential. As 
illustrated by the stories above, there is a need to analyse 
our current practices and systems through different lenses. 
We need to be able to analyse the differing perspectives of 
the wide range of actors to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the landscape of Open Scholarship. To 
achieve this we will need to identify and discuss theory. We 
will also need to go beyond that theory to encourage 
actors in the academic system to tackle challenges 
through organising collective action.
Three fundamental changes
Why is this discussion important now? Some of the 
reasons will become clearer as we move through this 
book. Issues of connectivity and scale are changing the 
economics of scholarship itself. These changes are part of 
a broader set of social, economic and technological shifts 
affecting societies globally. Many of these shifts are beyond 
the control of actors within the academic system. 
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They must therefore be understood by, but cannot be 
circumvented by, academia itself. In the following section 
we will examine three of these shifts that are important for 
the development of Open Scholarship: globalisation, 
digital technologies and ownership.
Globalisation is a term used to describe the increasingly 
global interaction and integration of individuals, 
organisations and governments, and the financial and 
knowledge flows between them. It is driven by advances 
in transport and communication (which is arguably a 
form of transport) which in turn are driven by changes in 
the technologies and infrastructures that support them. 
Increasing global interactions have driven changes in 
international trade, cultural exchange and even creativity. 
Globalisation is characterised at the highest level of 
granularity as primarily an economic process with 
positive consequences for efficiency and capacity, and 
opportunities for the free flow of goods, services, capital 
and knowledge. 
However, globalisation has also led to new social 
challenges and exacerbated others, including poverty, 
climate change, global health and the issues of migration 
that accompany each of these. Globalisation is of 
particular importance for the scientific system in two 
respects. First, the reasons for globalisation, and its 
effects, are issues for study themselves. Many of these 
are central social and technical issues of our time and 
many can only be tackled effectively if studied at the 
global level. Secondly, although modern scholarship has 
always been international in its scope, it is slowly 
becoming a truly global endeavour. However, scholarly 
institutions, organisations, funding and infrastructures 
are still organised at the national level and frequently 
lack coordination at the global level.
Digital technologies includes all types of electronic 
equipment and applications that use information in the 
form of numeric code. The application of computers, 
and of the communications networks they have enabled, 
has profoundly changed society. One of the key drivers, 
and also a contributor to globalisation, is the development 
of communication networks on a vast scale, with the 
main example being the World Wide Web (‘the web’). 
Digital technology has had a profound effect on the 
academic system, in a first wave through our capacity 
for data gathering, analysis and modelling, and more 
recently through being caught up in wider changes in 
the dissemination of knowledge. There are significant 
opportunities to accelerate scholarly work, but these 
require changes in deeply embedded systems and 
processes such as the conduct of peer review, the 
financing of publication and the processes of data 
sharing. Making publications, data and software findable, 
accessible, interoperable and reusable (FAIR)9 is another 
challenge in and of itself, entailing further complex politics, 
legal issues and technological hurdles. Building the 
infrastructure and services for this is costly and challenging.
Ownership is an exclusive right over property. In a 
world of physical objects the concept of ownership 
bundled up several sets of rights: the right to use, the 
right to sell, the right to control. The shift to online and 
digital goods and the rise of the service economy has 
added substantially to this complexity with ownership 
and control becoming separated. It is possible to be the 
legal owner of a digital artefact and to have little or no 
means of control over its use. The distinction is perhaps 
most starkly seen in the case of digital books 
‘purchased’ through libraries, where despite ‘owning’ a 
‘copy’ the end-user has no means of preventing the 
provider from deleting or otherwise removing their copy.
Footnotes
9 The FAIR Data principles were formulated and published in 
2016, by FORCE11, a community of scholars, librarians, 
archivists, publishers and research funders that has arisen 
organically to help facilitate the change toward improved 
knowledge creation and sharing. See: (force11.org/group/
fairgroup/fairprinciples)
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This shift from owning an object to something closer to 
renting access through an online platform has moved 
through content industries such as music and 
newspapers to the academic world with new models of 
access to scholarly content. ‘Ownership’ can be less 
important than control.
Similar challenges are rising with respect to data, both 
personal and organisational. The ownership of data 
about individuals is far from clear. Regulations such as 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
(eugdpr.com) in the European Union (and also in the 
UK even after it leaves the EU) are intended to provide 
protection to individuals against the mis-use of ‘their’ 
personal data. However, from a strict legal perspective 
the ‘ownership’ of specific content rights in data often 
lie with the creators. The claims that might be made by 
the subjects or the creators of such data turn out to be 
largely irrelevant in practice compared to an actor that 
aggregates and has control over data. Actors such as 
Facebook (facebook.com) or Cambridge Analytica10 
can act in secret and sometimes, it appears, beyond 
any legal framework, either of data protection or  
of ownership.
These issues are highly relevant to scholars and our 
organisations. The questions of data management, 
ownership, rights of participants and responsibilities 
should be far more at the centre of our practice than 
they are, and this needs more resources. On the other 
side the ownership of ‘our’ content in the hands of 
third-party providers raises questions about the rights 
we have to data about that content. Is bibliographic 
data about the scholarly record ‘ours’ or ‘theirs’ to 
control and own? The costs of ‘buying back’ access to 
academic publications and metadata by the academic 
system might in relative terms appear marginal. Yet, on 
an aggregated scale, the costs are quite significant.
Linking these three shifts is the concept of networks. 
Networks are drivers of globalisation, connecting 
people, organisations and content in new ways. These 
networks are technological and digital in their sources, 
and it is through the creation of networks at an 
unprecedented scale that the digital technology 
revolution is having its most profound effects. Finally, in 
a world where ownership is scattered and partial, and 
control is the central issue, what matters is how 
ownership and control are distributed over networks. 
Scholarly output is often described by its creators as a 
‘public good’ in the sense of being good for society. 
However, although the content is financed largely with 
public money, the content rights are not generally in 
public ownership. Even where they are, for instance 
where a publisher allows copyright retention by authors, 
the control over access to that content can be in the 
hands of other actors. While the scholarly code on 
GitHub (or the data in Figshare, or the content in Lingua 
or Glossa) may be owned by scholars, it is often within 
the power of other actors, in this case the publisher and 
intellectual property owner, to turn off or reduce access.
These networks, technical and legal, economic and 
even physical are complex. Over the last 70 years the 
processes and mechanics of ownership of scholarly 
output have seen steady increases in their complexity. 
That complexity is at the root of many of the debates 
about who is creating value, who ‘owns’ what, and 
what organisations should have control. It is the fact 
that these are complex networks that makes collective 
action both challenging and critical. To address the 
challenge we will require models and theory that can 
help us to manage the complexity of these systems.
Footnotes
10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Analytica
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The Knowledge Exchange Open 
Scholarship Framework
In 2017 the Knowledge Exchange initiative developed a 
framework to help understand the changes affecting the 
academic system (Knowledge Exchange 2017). The 
Knowledge Exchange Open Scholarship Framework 
(KE OS Framework, see Figure 1. below)11 helps to 
identify the actors and arenas of change across an 
idealised research lifecycle. The framework maps  
three dimensions. The first dimension represents the  
phases of a research lifecycle (Discovery, Planning,  
Project, Dissemination). 
The second dimension, drawn from the PEST 
framework12 used in business strategy analysis,  
divides the ‘arenas’ in which actions and interactions 
may take place into political (more specifically 
regulatory), economic, social and technical  
(ie PEST) arenas.
Footnotes
11 knowledge-exchange.info/event/os-framework
12 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PEST_analysis
Figure 1. The Knowledge Exchange Open Scholarship Framework
16 Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action Introduction
The third dimension is the ‘scale’ or ‘granularity’ at 
which analysis, or interventions, are occurring. This is 
divided into three levels; micro, meso, macro. ‘Micro’ 
refers to individual actors. ‘Macro’ to the system as a 
whole. ‘Meso’ occupies the space between, referring to 
groups, organisations and communities.
The framework is intended to help us to identify where a 
process of change might be hindered (or helped) by the 
behaviour and motives of different actors, and to guide 
us to the missing link between the motivations and 
goals of different stakeholders. For the purposes of this 
book, we are interested in the broad set of changes in 
practice, systems and organisations that have greater 
access and engagement with the outputs of research 
as a goal. This change towards openness, which is a 
political and social goal as well as being a response to 
economic drivers, has generally been regarded as slow, 
and as held back by inertia. This inertia arises  
because of the complexity of networked groups and 
organisations. We often refer to this as the challenge of 
‘culture change’.
Much of the commentary on the challenges of achieving 
Open Access or data sharing or public engagement has 
focused on issues of incentives, particularly the micro-
level economics of individuals and their actions. Most of 
the actions seeking to drive change, however, have 
been through policy mandates or funding initiatives. 
That is, action at the macro-level, by governments and 
funders. We have failed to focus sufficiently on how 
actors at the meso-level (ie groups, communities, 
organisations and institutions) structure the choices that 
individuals make. For example we have not rigorously 
examined how shared culture and norms of behaviour 
can override both policy mandates and incentives for 
individual scholars. A central part of our argument is 
that insufficient attention has been focused on the 
meso-level.
A focus on the economic arena
The problems we are seeking to address are complex 
issues of coordination. One means of addressing 
coordination issues is through the lens of economics. 
This is also useful given that the focus of many of our 
debates is resource allocation, or more crudely money, 
and economics provides a familiar, if imperfect framing 
to examine those issues. Therefore, much of this  
book will focus on the economic arena of the  
KE OS Framework.
We will make use of various perspectives to explain  
that the slowness of change is in part because of  
the complex range of actors and goods in play.  
Our economic market analysis will show how  
the interests of different players are in complex tension, 
particularly where there are imperfect (or completely 
non-functional) competitive markets as the main form of 
coordination. It should be obvious that the wide range 
of actors involved have different drivers. This raises 
challenges for the development and adoption of 
innovation. We need to move beyond naive application 
of simple market competition analogies to rigorous 
analysis of exchange, goods and communities.
Conclusion – economics, markets and 
collective action. Frames for analysis
In this introduction we have referred to a number of 
concepts from economics. In particular we have 
touched on both collective action and market 
economics without defining these concepts. At this 
point it is valuable to provide some specific introduction 
to each of these concepts (See list of terminology, page 17).
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Terminology:
Actor – we use the term ‘actor’ to refer in general  
to any of the large and diverse set of individuals, 
organisations, institutions or other players in the 
scholarly landscape. This will frequently be coupled 
with a description of the ‘granularity’ that we regard 
that specific actor as having. It is important to note 
that actors may not be individuals, and may in some 
cases not have clear definitions or boundaries.
Arena – we use the term ‘arena’ to refer to the category  
of actions or interventions being undertaken. From the 
Knowledge Exchange Open Scholarship Framework we 
take four of these, the economic, political (or regulatory), 
social and technological arenas. Our main focus is on the 
economic arena, but issues arising from the political, 
social and technological arenas all have a role to play.
Collective action – is  broadly speaking, any action 
that is agreed amongst a range of actors. More 
specifically, it is coordinated action by actors that 
seeks to generate or manage collective goods (ie 
non-private goods that are in some sense shared by 
a community).
Framework/model – we use the terms ‘framework’ 
and model to refer to theories and ways of 
categorising actors, interactions, systems or 
exchanges. In most cases we refer to broad 
frameworks as ways to organise our evidence, and 
models are more specific, often mathematical 
descriptions of specific processes. In most cases 
these will refer to economic theories.
Granularity/level – much of this book is focused on 
the economics of groups, organisations and 
communities, and how they interact. The KE OS 
Framework defines three levels of granularity, micro, 
meso, and macro. These are defined more fully in 
Chapter 2. We use the term ‘level’ to direct our 
attention to which of these categories we are addressing 
in our discussion of actors and interactions.
Institution – we use ‘institution’ as far as possible in 
the strict political economy sense of ‘any shared body 
of rules and systems that guides a set of shared 
activities’. There is some risk of confusion with the 
common use of the term to refer to research performing 
organisations (RPOs) or other related organisations.  
We generally try to use the term ‘university’ or ‘RPO’  
to refer to these for clarity.
Lens – we will quite often refer to using a specific 
theory or framework. To make it clear that these are 
‘ways of seeing’ and not necessarily a full picture of  
the reality of a situation we use the term ‘lens’ such  
as ‘seen through the lens of market competition…’.
Market – a market in the general sense is any system 
of exchange between actors (who may be individuals  
or groups). Often used more specifically to refer to 
systems of exchange involving the interaction of 
self-interested actors seeking to maximise their own 
gain. In this book we use ‘competitive markets’ or 
‘market competition’ where the latter meaning is 
intended.
Perspective – we use the term ‘perspective’ to  
refer to the views or motivations of a specific actor.
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Market economics focuses on the goods, their exchange 
and how characteristics of the market exchange system 
affect pricing and costs. Classical models tend to involve 
homogeneous or a small number of categories of actors 
and the question of whether they can act in coordination 
through individual actions and their incentives to 
coordinate exchange successfully. In the cases where 
these competitive markets are seen to be functioning 
analysis generally suggests that a need will be met and 
that some equilibrium will be found between pricing and 
costs. These models tend to break down where there are 
multiple goods in exchange, or a disagreement about 
what is actually being exchanged. The introductory  
story of Glossa illustrates this – the editors' view of  
what constituted the value behind the journal is quite 
different to that of the publisher.
Arguments from classical economics have been used 
(by others before us) to show that the market in 
scholarly communication – particularly in publishing – 
does not function effectively. While market competition 
analysis may have some value, we cannot expect 
competitive markets of self-interested actors alone to 
bring about more open forms of scholarship. The 
success of Open Scholarship depends on the academic 
system being better able to organise and coordinate the 
collective action of a wide range of stakeholders.
Collective action describes how groups coordinate their 
actions, both internally within a group and between 
groups. In economic terms collective action is particularly 
relevant to goods that are neither purely private, nor 
completely public in nature. There is a significant body of 
theory on collective action that can help us to understand 
which groups are able to choose to act together and 
which are not. One simple example is that smaller groups 
find collective action easier to achieve than larger groups 
do. In seeking to solve these problems for larger groups 
collective action theory can help us to understand what 
kinds of support mechanisms, often in the form of 
institutions, are needed to make collective action possible. 
In our stories, the Glossa editors were successful 
because they represented a relatively small and tightly 
linked community that could choose to act. In the second 
story where we have a more dispersed group writing 
software, collective action is more difficult to coordinate. 
In the third, GitHub provides an example of a coordinating 
institution that addresses this issue by centralising a point 
of interest for a broad set of users. Setting up a shared 
space specifically for research software might create new 
value but poses a collective action challenge. The 
tendency will be for users to gravitate towards existing 
well-networked providers who, as a result, have greater 
control over the system than may by ideal.
Beside market theory and collective action, other 
concepts and models such as business model theory  
or innovation management will also be referred to. The 
challenge for the course of the book is that – to our 
knowledge – no existing theory can provide a sufficiently 
complete picture to understand the dynamics at play. In 
the coming chapters, we will investigate the 
perspectives provided by market economics, collective 
action and other models, and show that a diversity of 
approaches is necessary to understand the scholarly 
landscape and chart a route towards openness.
We can benefit from applying these complementary 
lenses to analyse the landscape. We want to 
understand where markets are useful and what value 
commercial players provide. At the same time, we want 
strong institutions that enable us to manage interactions 
with commercial providers in a productive fashion. We 
want to understand which goods are better handled in 
our community spaces, which are better provided by 
the state, and which by the market. Ultimately, we wish 
to provide ourselves with insights and motivation to act 
effectively to address inertia and enable the transition to 
Open Scholarship.
Chapter 2
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While our focus is on economics at the meso-level, this only makes sense in 
the wider context. This chapter will map the sets of actors in scholarship and 
categorise them into the levels of granularity in the KE OS Framework. We 
want to understand the actors at all three levels (micro-meso-macro) and 
their motivations, as well as the levers they have available to motivate other 
actors. This is not an exhaustive analysis but rather a mapping of a set of 
relevant interactions, using efforts towards Open Scholarship as examples.
Actors, their interests and powers
Defining the levels of granularity: micro, 
macro, and meso
Defining the precise boundaries of the micro-meso-
macro model is not straightforward, particularly in the 
case of the scholarly community. It is useful, however, to 
have some examples (see Table 2.1) and a form of 
definition to work with. The micro-level is the simplest:
Micro-level actors are individuals, acting with free 
agency in their environment. They cannot be broken 
down into smaller actors.
The macro-level is more complicated. Strictly defined, it 
should only be applied to aspects of the ‘system’ we 
are considering as a whole. However, for our purposes, 
as is also common in many economic frameworks, it is 
helpful to consider those actors who have a role similar 
to the state in providing public goods or have sufficient 
reach that their policy statements or economic 
requirements will be adhered to. For our analysis, 
national-level funders will often fall into this group, 
particularly if there are few of them. It may, however, be 
useful at times to treat interactions between them as 
meso-level interactions. Governments and general legal 
frameworks with sufficient scope (such as the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation) can also be 
considered part of the macro category.
Macro-level actors are those whose policy statements 
and economics requirements will be adhered to or 
followed across the system of interest. They include any 
actors that can be seen as taking the role of ‘the state’ 
in some economic models.
The meso-level is everything in between. This means  
it is highly complex. It includes research groups, 
departments and universities (and groupings  
of universities), but also includes overlapping 
organisational groupings like disciplinary communities, 
scholarly societies, methodological groupings, 
professional societies and potentially other identity 
groups if they are relevant. Meso-level groupings  
can be formally organised with an institutional or 
organisational form, or can be entirely informal. 
Membership may be well defined or diffuse and shared 
culture and practices may be strong or unclear.
Meso-level actors are all those groups made up of 
micro-level actors or groupings of other meso-level 
actors that do not include the entire system. They may 
or may not be well defined groups and can overlap. 
Micro- and meso-level actors can be members of 
multiple non-overlapping meso-level groupings.
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The meso-level would also include groupings of those 
identified, ie scholarly societies as a group, whether that 
took the form of a formal organisation or a community 
that undertook some activities collectively.
Micro-level actors
At each level actors have different motivations and 
abilities to influence others. Even within levels, actors 
vary. For instance, there is a diversity of individuals 
whose primary motivation in our current context is  
to do, support, use or influence scholarship.  
Examples include:
 ` A researcher wants to discover new insights, 
contribute to social welfare, develop his or her 
career, and be rewarded and recognised for their 
work. They are primarily judged by the outputs 
carrying their name, though the ways in which this 
judgement occurs are heavily institutionalised, 
through recruitment and promotion practices, 
research indicator regimes and peer review. As 
individuals within institutions (universities, 
disciplines), researchers are able to influence  
both the formal and the informal ways that things  
are done
 ` A staff member in a research support function, such 
as a research software engineer or data steward. 
They may be integrated into research teams, and 
have similar motivations to researchers. However, 
their name will not in some cases be included on the 
outputs by which researchers are judged, and their 
career path is less well defined, despite considerable 
recent efforts to remedy that. They do, however, 
make significant and sometimes crucial contributions 
to the research process and output. They may have 
professional communities and cultures, but these are 
usually less influential within institutions than those  
of researchers
Table 2.1 Examples of actors at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels.
Level Examples of actors
Micro  ` An individual researcher
 ` Research support staff
 `  A member of the public
Meso  ` A university
 ` A publisher
 ` A disciplinary community
 ` A scholarly society
 `  A professional society
 `  A commercial service provider company
Macro  ` Government
 ` EU organisations
 ` (National and regional) funder
 ` General regulatory framework
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 ` A member of the public may be primarily interested 
in economic and social welfare arising from research. 
Some of them, for example a patient or amateur 
historian, might want (and be able) to engage more 
directly with scholarship, contribute to it as a citizen 
scientist, and influence its direction and priorities. 
This should not be underestimated; a 2014 UK 
survey found that nearly a third of the public  
want to be directly involved in decisions about 
science issues13
In addition, it is useful to remember that the staff 
involved in all organisations noted below may also  
have individual interests and powers outside of their 
roles purely as agents of those organisations, and this 
can explain otherwise puzzling effects. For example, 
university professional staff may also be researchers, 
and of course all will be members of various publics 
including that of taxpayers.
Meso-level actors
Here we encounter organisations and institutions, 
broadly defined, whose primary motivation is to 
coordinate research. Examples would include:
 ` Research-performing organisations (RPOs), 
including universities (which also undertake teaching) 
and research institutes, which have a discipline or 
topic focus. RPOs are usually geographically 
defined, though they may see themselves as 
oriented regionally, nationally or globally. While these 
organisations are often non-profits, they are still 
motivated by their own sustainability, as influenced 
by their income, costs, assets, reputation and 
relationships. RPOs have quite a strong ability to 
influence the researchers they employ, through the 
terms of that employment. They may influence those 
from whom they buy services, through procurement 
practices. Some of them, being responsible for the 
nation’s research capacity and perhaps working 
together, may influence national actors, including 
macro-actors through lobbying. Libraries within 
RPOs may themselves be institutions, especially 
where they combine into consortia to enable 
collective action, or where they manifest the 
professional culture of librarianship
 ` Information service providers, including publishers, 
are motivated by their sustainability and, especially  
in the case of for-profit providers, their economic 
sustainability and the creation of value for 
shareholders or owners. Publishers have a strong 
ability to influence researchers through their 
management of books and journals that carry 
researchers’ names and, therefore, affect their 
reputation. They are able to influence scholarly 
societies, where those societies depend on income 
from journals published by them. They are able to 
influence national actors based on lobbying, being 
responsible for disseminating the nation’s research 
outputs, and often being significant taxpayers  
and employers. Many journals may themselves  
be meso-actors, though perhaps with limited 
independence from their publisher. Likewise, well-
established conferences may be meso-level actors 
in some disciplines
Footnotes
 13 In March 2014, Ipsos MORI’s Social Research Institute in the 
UK published a report titled ‘Public Attitude to Science’, 
looking at attitudes to science, scientists and science policy 
among the UK public. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/348830/bis-14-p111-public-attitudes-to-science-2014-
main.pdf
23Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action Actors, their interests and powers
 ` It is helpful to consider scholarly communities or 
disciplines separately to the formally defined 
organisations that might represent them. These 
communities are self-defining and self-organising 
institutions of researchers, norms, practices and 
technologies that are motivated (and indeed 
constituted) by a common interest in curating the 
value of the discipline. They have a very strong 
influence on researchers, structuring their identity 
and community. Some communities are organised 
through scholarly societies and academies and 
some are informal. The degree of organisation may 
affect how much influence the community has on 
other actors
 
 ` In contrast, scholarly societies and national 
academies are the formal organisations whose main 
objective is to organise cooperation among 
researchers to promote their nation, discipline or 
subfield of research and pass on its culture to new 
generations. As organisations, they have an interest 
in their own sustainability. In many cases this is 
supported by publishing operations. They are able to 
influence researchers through their work to organise 
the discipline or scholarly community. They may be 
able to influence publishers, where publishers derive 
income from publishing a society journal. Being 
responsible for the nation’s research capability, they 
can influence national actors. Scholarly societies 
represent an institutional means of achieving 
coordination and collective action – including 
influencing other meso- and macro-actors – for 
scholarly communities. Professional societies have 
many similarities to scholarly societies, but differ in 
being organised around a technical skill, training or 
role, rather than a subject area. As a result they  
may hold less prestige in academic settings  
and institutions
 
 ` Commercial service providers in the form of start-
ups, multinational corporations, privately held  
and listed companies are all meso-actors. Their 
regulation and role can differ widely depending on 
location, sustainability models and product offerings
 
Macro-level actors
At the macro level, the entities might best be 
considered as ‘authorities’, whose primary motivation is 
to frame and mandate research. The instruments they 
typically have to achieve this are hard and soft policy 
(including regulation) and direct and indirect funding 
(including grants, loans and tax arrangements).  
For example:
 ` National governments play an important role in 
facilitating research in their countries. Their 
motivations for facilitating research vary according to 
the nation and in relation to political and economic 
circumstances. In many cases, an important reason 
is that they strive to enhance their populations' 
welfare. Increasingly, this motivation is articulated in 
terms of the role that research can play in national 
innovation systems, both through the direct 
commercialisation of research and through less 
direct approaches such as encouraging closer ties 
between research and national health organisations. 
Governments have strong economic and regulatory 
powers to affect the sustainability and operation  
of all organisations and individuals within  
their jurisdiction
 ` The organisations of the European Union (EU) share 
the interests of the national governments and have 
similar motivations and powers to those of national 
governments with respect to members of the EU 
(though noting the principle of subsidiarity), and are 
also able to influence national governments of 
non-members
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 ` Many research funding organisations are effectively 
agencies of national or EU authorities, set up to be 
motivated to ensure the health and sustainability of 
the research sector for which they are responsible, 
and for the value it produces. They are able to do 
this through financial instruments, the provision  
of non-financial resources and facilities, support  
for international collaboration, and associated 
convening power. As representatives of the  
sector they fund, they are often able to influence 
governments. They are also able to influence all 
organisations, institutions and individuals that are 
directly or indirectly recipients of funding, mainly 
through financial instruments and associated  
policies such as terms and conditions of grants
 ` Sufficiently general regulatory frameworks such  
as copyright, privacy and data protection regulation, 
antitrust law, and indeed the rule of law and 
contracts more generally, can be considered as  
part of the environment, and therefore to the extent 
that they act through specific agencies, might  
be considered part of the macro-level
Interactions between the levels
The KE OS Framework sets out levels according to their 
scale as well as the arenas that they work in (political, 
economic, social, technological). No framework 
describes the world perfectly and it is reasonable to 
disagree on the precise characterisation of a specific 
actor. Many actors operate across multiple arenas and it 
is not always clear at what level of granularity a specific 
actor most naturally sits. The KE OS Framework 
provides a way of categorising and articulating drivers, 
motives, requirements, incentives, stoppers and 
disincentives that operate between levels and arenas.
The main aim of the KE OS Framework is to help us to 
understand the interlinked rationales and actions of 
stakeholders between the three levels. An important 
aspect in understanding the actors at the macro-, 
meso- and micro-levels is to analyse what holds them 
back in realising their ambitions. For the actors at 
macro-level, blockers are mainly political and social 
factors, including the acceptability of new policies, or 
the degree of alignment with the realities of national 
politics. Macro-actors can seek to influence micro-
actors through regulation or economics.
Actors at the meso-level who seek to implement policy 
and strategic goals are most commonly dealing with 
organisational and technical change, that is in the social 
and technical arenas. Examples might include the social 
challenges of changing community practice around 
publishing or data sharing to optimally use a new 
technology. At the micro-level, it is largely social factors, 
particularly those involving group identity, that structure 
researchers’ opportunities to change practice and 
influence the other levels. Economic concerns are 
common to all levels. At the macro-level, actors are 
concerned with national and international economic 
performance, at the meso-level with organisational 
revenue, costs and sustainability, and at the micro-level 
with research grants and salaries.
The rationales at the different levels offer a logical basis 
for a course of action, but here can, of course, be 
conflicts of interest between them.The following 
examples highlight major conflicts of interest between 
actors towards Open Scholarship.
A first example concerns research data. A government 
may be convinced that open research data supports 
innovation and economic growth, and therefore obliges 
research projects to make their research data available. 
However, doing so meaningfully requires investments of 
various kinds. For example, investments in repositories 
and data skills at the meso-level. Where the investment 
instruments from funders are designed as research 
projects, RPOs and infrastructure providers struggle to 
guarantee the sustainability of data infrastructure  
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after the end of the funding period, and the research 
communities lack criteria to select which data should  
be stored long term. These conflicts at the meso-level 
break down to the micro-level where researchers are 
unsure about how to fulfil the demands of a Data 
Management Plan (DMP) in their funding proposal in  
the absence of either a cultural practice, clear  
technical systems and support, or any monitoring  
of policy compliance.
In a second example, we consider the macro-level and 
the political goal of achieving 100% Open Access to 
research publications, most recently articulated in  
Plan S (coalition-s.org). Governments and funders 
have made it clear that significant additional funding is 
not going to be available to support this transition, and 
have indicated that some of the meso-level 
arrangements whereby Open Access has been 
pursued, such as hybrid Open Access, are no longer 
acceptable. However, researchers’ incentives at the 
micro-level, and disciplinary cultures at the meso-level, 
remain geared to both publishing in and citing 
prestigious venues such as journals with high impact 
factors. This is why Plan S calls for these incentives to 
be addressed through a shift in the metrics used for 
research evaluation (an economic but also social 
change). In Plan S this is to be achieved through the 
implementation of the San Francisco Declaration on 
Research Assessment (DORA) (sfdora.org), which 
has a focus on a shift away from outlet-based metrics 
for research evaluation purposes. Plan S remains 
controversial. In part this is due to the challenges of 
addressing the meso-level, a challenge for all policy 
interventions which often seek to drive change through 
macro-level policy and funding. This clarifies why 
scholarly societies – particularly those dependent on 
publishing operations – are amongst the most 
significant opponents and blocks to achieving the  
goal of 100% Open Access in general and for  
Plan S specifically14.
The examples above are an illustration of the fact that 
the actors at the meso-level play an important role in 
organising the collective actions to make the necessary 
transactions that lead to Open Scholarship as well as 
being the main source of inertia and active opposition  
to change.
Conclusion – the meso-level is required  
for a transition to Open Scholarship
To date, there has been much discussion about policy 
interventions at the macro-level and about the 
difficulties of inertia and lack of support from individual 
researchers at the micro-level. There has been some 
discussion about how these levels relate to each other 
but, with some notable exceptions (for example, 
discussion of the politics and organisation of library-
publisher negotiations), relatively little about the 
interactions between meso-level actors. While actors  
at the micro-level lack the power to make the necessary 
changes, and the players at the macro-level can set the 
scene, they both need the actors at the meso-level to 
establish what is necessary for a transition to Open 
Scholarship. Among other things, these actors carry  
the cultures and traditions of scholarship and so, to 
understand the economic interactions between them,  
it is important to understand their histories. We set this 
out in the next chapter.
Footnotes
 14 Publishers are also a significant block for similar reasons. 
However, the commercial motivation for protecting existing 
revenue is a much more obvious reason for incumbent 
publishers to seek to block or slow down changes that  
threaten those revenue streams.
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Researchers work in groups and organisations. From the formal to the 
informal, and the large to the small, they define themselves by their relations 
to research groups, disciplinary communities, departments, scholarly 
societies, journals, conferences and academies. Key to understanding the 
political economy of research is to understand how these groups interact 
and how this affects the behaviour of researchers.
The shaping and organisation 
of research
In the Introduction, we examined the wider societal and 
global context, including how this has changed the 
underlying environment for scholarship. In this chapter, 
we focus on meso-level actors using disciplinary 
communities, publishers and publishing services, and 
universities as examples. In each case we first provide 
some history and background. We then examine that 
history through a broadly economic lens discussing the 
kind of ‘goods’ in play and what tools and models might 
be useful to analyse their interactions.
Our goal is to provide a rich understanding of how the 
history of group and organisational forms has a strong 
effect on the economic shape of our interactions. Many 
of our assumptions about how scholarship works are 
built on the accidents of history. This does not make the 
constraints within our systems any less. Understanding 
their histories and placing them in an economic context 
is intended to help us start to dissect what kinds of 
change are feasible. To do this we will examine three 
sets of meso-actors that dominate the landscape: 
research communities, publishers and the set of 
services around them, and universities in their role as 
research support organisations.
The history of disciplines and  
research communities
Scholarship was once a solitary activity but, from the 
17th century onwards, scholars have increasingly 
gathered in groups to share their findings and offer 
mutual support15. Such groupings ranged from informal 
correspondence networks stretching across Europe, to 
formal institutions whose members met in a particular 
town. From the 19th century, these scholarly groups 
increasingly coalesced around specific topics or fields  
of research. These became the disciplines.
The emergence of disciplines was associated with the 
creation of specialist scholarly societies and journals 
which provided means for sharing research orally and in 
print. By the late 19th century new disciplines such as 
chemistry, biology, modern history and anthropology 
joined the mediaeval professions of medicine, law and 
theology in the curricula of the universities. Universities 
provide the mechanism for initial training of new 
members of the discipline, who are then socialised into 
disciplinary norms by participation in the relevant 
national or international research community through 
conferences, societies and publishing.
Footnotes
15 This is in no sense a comprehensive history. Useful 
supplementary reading includes (Stichweh 2001; Tobin et al. 
n.d.; Krishnan 2009)
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Since World War II there has been massive expansion, 
specialisation and fragmentation of research16. New 
societies, associations and journals have been created 
to cater to these new areas, and some (though not all) 
have been formally incorporated into university teaching 
through the creation of new degree pathways. It is 
within disciplines that research identities, norms and 
values are formed. This includes definitions of ‘good 
research questions to ask’ and ‘appropriate methods  
to use’, as well as forming notions of appropriate 
behaviours for members of each discipline, ranging 
from the norms for attributing credit to co-authors, to 
the value placed on publishing books rather than  
journal articles.
The sustainability of these communities, and their 
increasingly formal organisation (through entities like 
journals and societies), is most clearly seen through the 
lens of collective action. Journals, conferences, 
research networks and formally organised clubs or 
societies all help to build a sense of membership within 
that disciplinary community. That identity and sense of 
community is a collective good for the group 
concerned. An important historical point is that the set 
of communities that define our current behaviours, 
including publishing venues (most obviously journals), 
scholarly societies and associations as formal 
organisational structures supporting disciplinary 
communities, and the disciplines found within the formal 
structures of research performing organisations, have 
their roots in the mid to late 19th century with their 
current forms largely defined in the period after World 
War II. The changes discussed below that arise in the 
second half of the 20th century have continued to 
strain, but not break, the structures that developed in 
that earlier period. Bioinformatics provides an example. 
Despite being a new ‘discipline’ the community still 
defines itself through scholarly societies, conferences 
and journals to a large extent. In both bioinformatics 
and in digital humanities the practices that are accepted 
as ‘research’ within a university setting map closely onto 
forms that are older, with their focus on traditional 
publications as the main output.
Increasing scale and collaborative research
One of the striking changes in research since 1945 has 
been the emergence of large-scale and collaborative 
research, sometimes referred to as ‘Big Science’17. This 
is research that involves large groups of people, often 
with complementary skill sets. As it scales up it can 
become highly resource intensive, in terms of 
equipment, staffing and support services. At some point 
it grows beyond the capacity of a single university or 
traditional research performing organisation to support 
it. The extreme examples are from physics, where huge 
international teams work at the Large Hadron Collider 
(LHC)18 at the European Organisation for Nuclear 
Research (CERN) or the Square Kilometre Array (SKA)19. 
But collaboration and team-based research have 
become markedly more common in many fields of the 
natural, medical and social sciences, as well as in parts 
of the humanities. Across all disciplines, funders and 
universities are encouraging projects that involve teams 
and collaborations.
Footnotes
16 Sociologists of higher education have (over the last two 
decades or so) switched from focusing on ‘disciplines’ to 
discussing ‘research fields’. In this book, we will use ‘discipline’ 
and ‘disciplinary’ to apply to all research fields, regardless of 
their position in the universities.
17 Wikipedia page on the origin and development of Big Science: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Science. It also provides an 
overview of and topical guide to Big Science: https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_Big_Science
18 https://home.cern/science/accelerators/large-hadron-collider
19 https://skatelescope.org/ 
29Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action The shaping and organisation of research
The emergence of collaborative research means that 
human resources have to be mobilised differently. It 
raises questions of management and resourcing, as 
well as the division of labour and the attribution of 
credit. The use of complex equipment and the needs 
for data storage, sharing and analysis have led to 
growing needs for support services and staff. Managing 
these support needs has become complicated, and 
often the choices are not driven by a business analysis 
but by local conditions (such as the availability of 
personnel or even how internal management systems 
support or make particular choices difficult).
A collective action framing suggests that these resources 
strengthen boundaries that could be around the whole 
team, or internal to it. Questions arise around the need for 
critical mass to deliver sufficient capacity in terms of 
infrastructure and resources. At the large-scale end, this 
leads to shared facilities, which in most cases now are 
multi-national or regional. Different communities can be 
more or less effective at making the case for these kinds of 
facilities. Often the size of a university, and competition 
between universities, limits the scale of these efforts. 
Multi-university research collaborations remain challenging, 
with one organisation normally being the dominant partner.
This has resulted in an increasing set of internal university 
support functions being formalised, including analysis  
and computational facilities and also the training and 
knowledge capacities for Open Scholarship, often 
provided by university libraries. In turn arguments over the 
internal pricing of access to these facilities are common, 
with perverse incentives often arising (eg it is cheaper to 
buy a new instrument on a grant than to use the existing 
instrument in a shared facility).
At the same time as members of research teams 
collaborate, they are also individually (and as groups) 
involved in competitive striving for prestige (to get the 
next job, prize or grant); and the universities as 
employers are also competing with each other to 
improve their standing. Organisations within a 
collaboration are also often competitors and 
communities are competing with each other for  
prestige and resources, particularly where large-scale 
projects or facilities are involved.
The players, goods and markets in  
academic communities
There are many forms of capital in play within research 
communities. These include prestige and reputation, 
alongside other forms of social capital that can be used 
in various settings to gain financial capital. In turn, 
financial resources are used to conduct research, which 
(when valued) enhances the social and prestige capital 
of those who carried it out. In some communities, 
particularly those with reasonably large scholarly 
societies, these may be linked to funding in the form of 
grants or prizes, but communities themselves do not 
generally engage in large-scale financial activity per se.
A few research communities aggregate around 
significant direct funding, with the most extreme version 
being large-scale infrastructures such as CERN. Such 
large collaborations have strong group identity and 
codified shared practices for data sharing, authorship 
and the attribution of credit.
Most community organisations, however, are funded 
through some combination of membership payments, 
philanthropic income (eg bequests, endowments, or 
grants), and trading income (usually publishing 
revenues, but sometimes event organisation or the sale 
of branded souvenirs). Publishing revenues may come 
from internal publishing operations or from third-party 
service providers that run those operations on behalf of 
the community. Such service providers range from 
mission-driven organisations (for example, university 
presses) to profit-oriented commercial publishers.
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Supporting communications: publishers 
and publishing
There is a long history of a mixed economy in the 
circulation of knowledge, combining sharing between 
personal acquaintances, publishing for public sale and 
publishing subsidised by patrons or sponsors20. This 
mixed economy continues to this day, and the different 
elements of it overlap and interconnect. As we seek to 
share more complete records of research, and more 
complex objects, the sets of players involved and  
their interactions have become correspondingly  
more complicated.
Publishing: for public sale, or subsidised,  
or a combination…
Printing was, for centuries, the only way of creating 
large numbers of copies of an essay or book for 
circulation. Authors were very rarely (if ever) printers, so 
this involved coming to an agreement with a printer and 
publisher and bookseller. That raised questions of who 
would pay the costs of printing. Either, a publisher 
needed to be convinced that there was sufficient public 
demand (so that sales would cover costs), or another 
source of funding was needed (e.g. an author's own 
funds, a patron, an advance public subscription).
Scholarly books are older than scholarly journals (books 
since 1460s; journals since 1660s), but since the mid to 
late 19th century, journal publications have become 
increasingly significant for generating research prestige. 
It can be argued that books have remained more 
effective at communicating research among wider 
audiences. Books and journals also have very different 
histories of financial support. For books, public sale was 
the original means of funding production, with forms of 
philanthropic subsidy emerging later. For journals, 
philanthropic subsidy was key to the long-term success 
of early journals, and income from public sales only 
became a significant income stream in the second half 
of the 20th century.
Books in certain fields of natural history, geography, 
travel and anthropology had commercial potential, but 
many scholars found it more difficult to address their 
research to a wider audience. By the late 19th century 
university presses, with a mission for scholarship and 
some level of support or subsidy from their home 
institutions, became increasingly important publishers  
of research books but, in certain fields, commercial 
publishers continued to play an important role.
From the 1970s and 80s the consolidation of the 
publishing industry has meant fewer, larger commercial 
players in research monograph publishing with less 
willingness to take on the risk of books that look unlikely 
to be commercially successful. Some publishers have 
shifted towards textbook/reference book publishing  
and some have moved out of research monograph 
publishing altogether.
Publishing journals
Scholarly periodicals emerged in the late 17th century. The 
successful serials of the 18th century were supported by 
learned societies or academies (eg Royal Society, 
Académie des sciences etc). Such scholarly organisations 
had funds to support the publishing and circulation of 
knowledge, and also a mission to do so. The research 
they published had usually been presented (literally – 
gifted) to the society, not purchased in a transfer of 
copyright. These periodicals were largely circulated by 
exchange and gifting (to individual scholars, to other 
societies/academies/universities), though they might also 
be available via public sale. Low levels of sales meant that 
they were financed by patrons (eg the French crown), or 
members of a society, or through endowments.
Footnotes
20 There is a growing literature on the history of publication. Some 
useful points of reference include (Baldwin 2015; Fyfe et al. 
2017; Csiszar 2018). 
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As the scale of scientific research output grew in the 
later 19th century, this subsidised model of journal 
publication became increasingly difficult to sustain. 
Alternative sources of funding had to be found.  
For instance, by the 1890s, the Royal Society was 
administering UK government funding to support the 
publishing operations of various learned societies (this 
continued until the 1950s).
Commercial players entered the journals market in the 
very late 18th century, but until the 20th century they 
rarely generated a profit (though they might be useful 
loss-leaders for the parent publishing firm). Throughout 
the 19th century it was a common complaint that 
scholarly journals were so expensive to produce, and 
the audience for them so small, that it was impossible 
for them to be profitable. These commercial journals 
followed the already-existing norms of the learned 
societies, by not paying authors and providing  
free offprints.
After 1945, a new breed of commercial publishers 
(Pergamon, Elsevier) found a way of making the 
commercial model of journal publishing sustainable. 
Their new business strategy depended on selling to 
institutions such as university libraries at higher prices 
than the rate for individuals, and targeting an 
international (rather than national) market, particularly by 
creating English language journals. They also did very 
well by focusing on, and in many cases developing, the 
newly emerging sub-fields and specialist disciplines that 
were not yet provided with journals by the existing 
societies or university presses. For a few decades – 
Fyfe et al call the 1950s and 1960s a 'golden age for 
commercial publishing' – this model worked well for 
publishers and for scholarship since it catered to  
new specialisms, and it did a good job of circulating 
research internationally.
But it depended on the existence of institutions such  
as university libraries with sufficient, and increasing, 
funding to subscribe to a growing portfolio of journals 
with more and more content. Since the cutbacks in 
university and research funding in the 1980s, this 
condition has no longer been met. The difficult situation 
for subscription-based journal publishers has 
encouraged publishers to seek economies of scale,  
and to diversify their operations.
Just as book publishers have merged and consolidated, 
so too have journal publishers. This has occurred both 
through the merger of publishing companies and by 
successful efforts to buy or create more journals. Five 
big international conglomerates now publish more than 
50% of the global scholarly literature (Larivière, 
Haustein, and Mongeon 2015); and in certain fields their 
dominance is even greater (notably the social sciences, 
where the big five account for over 70% of  
all articles).
A desire to diversify, coupled with a trend towards 
acquisitions and mergers, has resulted in many major 
journal publishers being part of international 
conglomerates which also provide a variety of other 
research services, such as bibliometric databases and 
research information systems.
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The digital transition
The advent of digital technologies has transformed the 
work of editing, producing and distributing research 
publications, and radically changed the economics of 
production and consumption. The overall effect on the 
political economy of scholarship is less clear. In some 
areas, digital technologies have enabled new scholarly 
groups to manage the circulation of knowledge. But  
in other respects, the cost of digital innovation has 
consolidated the influence of existing, well- 
capitalised publishers.
Among the new players in the digital publishing world 
are organisations that provide services to publishing 
companies. The majority of publishers do not control 
the end-to-end systems that manage their workflows, 
outsourcing both on the input side (submission 
systems, particularly for journal articles) and on the 
output side (digital production, layout, server platforms 
and printing). Many of these technology platform areas 
are oligopolies (Manuscript Central, ScholarOne and 
Editorial Manager for submission systems; Atypon, 
Silverchair, HighWire for platforms).
Currently there is a tense process of consolidation going 
on in these markets as the largest publishers purchase 
the technology platforms they, but also their 
competitors, use. For instance, when Elsevier 
purchased Aries, provider of Editorial Manager in  
2018, it bought not only its own editorial platform  
but also, ironically, that used by the Open Access 
publisher PLOS.
The digital revolution has also affected the circulation of 
knowledge in other ways. There are new media options 
in the communications ecosystem, in addition to those 
options that are the digital equivalents of paper-based 
publishing. Researchers have much easier access to 
audio formats such as podcasts or audio books, video 
formats such as recorded TED-talks and interactive 
formats such as digital learning environments or 
platforms. Some of these are extensively used in 
collaboration between researchers, but are not (yet) 
recognised within the traditional systems for accruing 
prestige for reward and recognition in academia.
In what is sometimes presented as a return to their 
roots, digital technology and its economies have also 
enabled the creation of new academic- or community-
led journals and platforms. These include early 
examples such as arXiv (arxiv.org) and more recent 
efforts such as Open Library of Humanities: 
(openlibhums.org/) the Public Knowledge Project’s Open 
Journal Systems platform (openjournalsystems.
com) and ‘insurgent’ publishers with a strong focus on 
a specific radical mission such as Punctum Press 
(punctumbooks.com). These work with knowledge 
products that are based on printed format (ie 'papers' 
and ‘books’), but they are produced and circulated in 
very different organisational contexts with very different 
business models from those of traditional legacy 
publishing companies.
Players, goods and markets in publishing
The classic analysis of goods and markets in the 
publishing space is of a market in content, supported 
by communications technology services. Generally this 
is presented as a two-sided market, with authors 
exchanging content for services from publishers, and 
publishers aggregating that content as a service to 
subscribers (Schonfeld 2008; Gans 2017). Often this is 
presented as a story of market failure (Houghton 2002; 
Gans 2017), either through non-substitutability of 
content, bundling, vendor lock-in, network effect, 
oligopoly or other issues.
However, the role of non-content goods such as prestige 
and attention is often not well described by market 
models. An alternative is to describe the publication 
objects themselves (journals primarily, but the analysis can 
be extended to books or book series) as clubs, which act 
as coordinators of service provision, run by and for the 
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authors, reviewers and editors who are members of those 
clubs. In some models it is also helpful to see those clubs 
through the lens of networks and related economic 
models (Potts et al. - '(Potts et al. 2017); Hartley et  
al. 2019).
Current analyses of the financial economics of 
publishing tend to start and end with prices and the 
scale of content, rising out of the reach of research 
libraries. The golden age of commercial publishing 
ended with the slowing of university expansion and 
flattening library budgets. Such analyses reach the 
conclusion that the market is broken in some sense, 
without going much further. The more sophisticated 
analyses provide a diagnosis of what specific market 
imperfections exist but tend not to provide clear 
answers as to how to fix them. A case can be made 
that library funds should be seen as a common pool 
resource of the scholarly community, and need to be 
analysed and managed through different – and yet to  
be developed – mechanisms.
Universities and the emergence of an 
academic job market
Shifting our analysis from one focused on prices  
and financial transfer requires us to include an 
understanding of the wider ‘economics’ of the system. 
This includes questions of social dynamics, prestige 
and community structures. In the academic and 
scholarly landscape these issues are connected to our 
assumptions about what success looks like, including 
career pathways, and how gatekeepers manage access 
to those opportunities. As with publication, the 
development in universities of scholarship as a  
career with required qualifications is quite recent.
Until the professionalisation and institutionalisation of 
research in the 19th century, research was not a career. 
Mediaeval and early modern universities were primarily 
teaching institutions, and it was not until the late 18th 
century in Germany (and later elsewhere) that research 
skills came to be seen as desirable features  
of a potential professor. Nor were there many jobs for 
researchers outside universities. Monarchs, princes  
and aristocratic patrons might recognise the value of  
an individual and act as a patron to specific eminent 
scholars, but there were limited institutional options  
for academic career paths.
Researchers would either have their own resources or 
might be lucky enough to find a patron. Patronage 
could be based on the prestige value of having a 
specific person on the payroll, or on specific technical 
skills or knowledge that they brought. In this sense, 
scholars would occupy a similar place in society to 
artists. To the extent there was a market, it was one in 
people or in the accruing of prestige through the 
acquisition of talent or the connection with a patron.
The research university emerged during the 19th 
century. The parallel timeline in the development of 
disciplines, journals and scholarly societies is not 
accidental, these institutions building on each other.  
By the end of the 19th century European states were 
beginning to recognise the value of funding for scientific 
research and broader scholarship. Industrial research 
was also on the rise. These developments meant that 
by 1900 researchers were operating in a job market.
Scholarship as a job
The period of massive expansion in research after World 
War II was followed by a contraction in the growth rate 
of universities and funding in the 1980s. This has led the 
research job market to become increasingly competitive 
over the last 40 years or so. Universities compete 
among themselves for the best researchers. This is 
particularly the case since the creation of league tables 
and government research evaluation exercises from the 
1980s on. In certain fields, universities compete with 
industry to appoint and retain researchers as well as 
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qualified research infrastructure and support function 
staff – especially in the field of information technology.
On the other side of this market, the competition for 
permanent academic research positions is intense. 
There are not enough permanent academic research 
positions for all the PhD students who graduate. By 
some accounts, fewer than 5% of graduating PhDs 
obtain such permanent academic positions. The 
percentage who remain in research is a relatively small 
proportion, raising questions about the scale of training. 
And among those who do succeed in staying in 
academia, there is ongoing competition between 
researchers to gain access to the opportunities that  
will allow them to generate the prestige that is 
convertible into promotions, grants and prizes.
The economic role of the university
Framing the role of a university in economic terms is  
not straightforward. Universities are not only employers 
(and educators) of researchers. They are also providers 
of a set of platforms, services and resources to their 
researchers. Being professionally associated with  
a university (and especially with a well-resourced 
university) brings significant advantages for a researcher.
Until the academicisation of research in the 19th 
century, carrying out research was heavily dependent 
on personal resources available to individual researchers 
or their patrons. Buying books, journals or equipment, 
or travelling to undertake fieldwork, were all easier if you 
or your patron were rich.
Universities typically provide their researchers with  
desk and laboratory space, access to libraries and 
proprietary databases and technical equipment. They 
also provide analytical and technical services. However, 
locating research within universities has come with 
disadvantages as well. As with the previous two 
sections the second half of the 20th century saw 
increases in the number, heterogeneity, size and global 
distribution of universities. This has led to an increasing 
administrative burden of managing large teaching and 
research institutions and to the need for top-slicing of 
funding to support coordination costs. The combination 
of roles with requirements for teaching, administration 
and other duties reduces the time available for research 
even as the provision of support systems should make 
that research more efficient. National governments have 
grown concerned about transparency and efficiency, 
leading to an increased requirement for auditing across 
this larger set of universities and a further increase in  
the internal costs of reporting and coordinating.
Efforts to address this have their own problems. The 
increasingly toxic effects of casualisation, in which 
teaching and, increasingly, research are delegated  
to staff with limited term and part-time contracts, has 
been widely discussed. On one level, this is a natural 
business decision driven by business and market 
analysis emphasising the value of the division of labour 
into greater specialisation. However, in terms of 
providing a well-resourced community with shared 
goals that are engaged in scholarly work, it is damaging. 
In many countries there is increasing divergence,  
or perception of divergence, between the interests  
and motivations of scholars, support staff and  
university leadership.
The role of the university as a platform on which a 
scholar is able to pursue their own curiosity, which 
developed most strongly in the phase of government 
investment in the first half of the 20th century, has 
faded. The notion of a university as a community is  
also under threat with individually focused assessment 
and rewards breaking down the interest in working 
collectively. Understanding this shift in economic  
terms may become crucial for universities to  
understand themselves.
The players, goods and markets in universities
Universities are significant organisations that require 
sustainable financial models. Significant direct financial 
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revenues are required to support teaching, research and 
development. Depending on the national or regional 
funding context for research, universities may be 
competitively funded based on specific projects, or there 
can be substantial general public funding. Teaching may 
be funded by the state, through tuition fees or a mixture of 
both. Industrial funding for research in the form of 
sponsorship may be significant, alongside gifts and 
revenue from reserved capital, such as endowments.
Universities often have substantial capital, although this 
may not be in the form of liquid assets. Property and 
buildings will form a large component of the assets of a 
university, particularly those in wealthy cities. Alongside 
potential investments in shares, this makes financial 
markets potentially highly significant to universities. Many 
universities also have significant debt, which may make 
credit-rating and debt markets significant. In many places 
building programmes are funded through debt or through 
public-private partnerships. Both of these approaches are 
relatively recent. The donation of resources for building  
has a much longer history. Finally, in some areas 
universities have a substantial exposure to future  
pension commitments.
Alongside these financial assets and obligations, prestige 
and social capital are significant assets for a university. 
Brand value and the ability to convert that into teaching and 
research income is key, and is a significant part of the 
attraction for both students and researchers, who in turn 
provide further financial income.
Since the 1980s, universities have become increasingly 
keen to commercialise the knowledge produced by their 
researchers, eg through technology transfer offices that 
facilitate spin-out companies. Institutional policies (in 
tandem with employment contracts) gave universities 
full or partial ownership of the intellectual property in 
their researchers' outputs, but this has been more 
forcefully applied in the case of patents than copyright 
in published works where many universities have – until 
recently – waived their rights.
Conclusion – history has shaped a  
complex system
Overall, the above shows that the situation is complex. 
A meso-economic analysis of the kind we have 
proposed requires us to recognise both the plethora  
of organisations in play and the complexities of their 
interaction. It requires us to recognise that some  
players operate exclusively in the scholarly economy,  
while others see scholarship as just one part of  
their operations. It requires us to understand the 
relationships between players and also the roles of 
individuals within their organisation. And, to be usable, 
our analysis needs to enable us to focus on the part of 
this complex ecosystem that is specific to the question 
of greater openness.
A pattern that is important to observe is that the current 
set of important meso-actors (as well as the role of 
funders as macro-actors) are a product of the mid-19th 
to the mid-20th century. That pattern has come under 
increasing strain over the past 50-70 years with 
economic and technical change, globalisation and the 
related scaling-up of scholarship across the world. The 
system of communities, organisations, communication 
and coordination that evolved for (and in) a different 
world holds the scholarly community together but also 
imposes a set of constraints that hold change back.
To understand what we need to preserve, and what ties 
we can afford (or need) to cut we need frameworks that 
help us organise the players, both those that have a 
formal existence as organisations and those that are 
less formal collaborations or groups. This will aid us in 
dissecting their internal economies as well as the 
economics of their interactions. As we will see in the 
following chapter, it is precisely these interactions and 
the complex webs of incentives, motivations and needs 
for coordination that they create, that we need to 
understand better. 
Chapter 4
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In the previous chapter we focused on the interests, development and 
resources of three sets of meso-level actors. Our ultimate goal is to better 
understand the interactions between them. That analysis will be the focus of 
the later chapters in this book. In this chapter we will prepare the ground for 
that discussion by examining four cases where meso-level actors clash. 
These clashes are what led to many of the barriers to Open Scholarship 
introduced in the previous chapter.
When values and motives clash
These clashes arise out of the differing values, histories, 
incentives and cultures of different meso-level actors. 
Universities and publishers are not simply made up of 
different people. They have different revenue models, 
value systems and cultures, and these will respond to 
changes in different ways (David 2003). Businesses, for 
instance, may see Open Access as a threat to existing 
revenue sources, while community-led groups may see 
it as an opportunity for public engagement. More subtly, 
a disciplinary community will value different things 
(publishing in conference proceedings, for example) to a 
university, or university department (which may prefer 
books or journal articles). Individuals may, of course, be 
members of more than one community or organisation. 
The head of department demanding one thing of staff 
may be the same person privileging the value of 
something entirely different in a disciplinary community 
context. This means that an institution’s values and 
motives towards Open Scholarship will also be affected 
by the practices of the other institutions to which its 
individuals do (and do not) belong.
This leads to situations in which organisations and 
communities are trying to resolve and negotiate  
internal differences in values and motivations while 
simultaneously seeking to communicate and negotiate 
with other meso-level actors in a constantly changing 
landscape. The mixture of overlapping groups, internal 
inconsistencies and disagreement over shared values 
leads to a complex and messy situation. Motives and 
values seem to clash everywhere, and this in turn 
hinders the agreements required for adoption of Open 
Scholarship practices. If we can’t agree on what 
outputs signal good scholarship then it is very difficult to 
agree on how we might adapt and change our priorities 
on outputs to support Open Scholarship.
To provide some structure to this complex set of 
interactions we will divide our discussion into two main 
types of clashes:
 ` Responsibility clashes: where values are at stake 
there will be disagreements over who has the rights 
and responsibilities to rule on how values are 
expressed. Open Scholarship can involve new kinds 
of work and systems and new roles to support 
them. Disputes can arise both from too many actors 
wanting to take control and from actors not being 
able to agree who should take responsibility
 ` Revenue clashes: a revenue clash will arise when 
there are differences in the financial interests of 
meso-level actors who are in contact with each 
other. In some cases these will be resolved by well 
functioning markets that support negotiation. 
However, the shift to Open Scholarship involves 
changes to established business models. The 
potential for loss of revenue, or even viability, is a 
major contributor to clashes that we can see within 
the context of Open Scholarship
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Responsibility clashes and revenue clashes differ in  
their character and it therefore makes sense to  
interpret them as different categories. In order to  
solve responsibility clashes, a common vision and 
development of shared values will be required. They will 
be solved by a division of labour that is perceived as 
just and justified by the actors involved. Solving revenue 
clashes requires the construction of markets or 
negotiation spaces in which there is a shared 
understanding of what academic goods are being 
exchanged, how this can be managed fairly and what 
the goals of exchange are. Responsibility clashes will 
frequently revolve around the ‘what’ while revenue 
clashes revolve around questions of ‘how’. In the 
remainder of this chapter we will discuss a series of 
examples building on the interactions between actors 
discussed in the previous chapter.
Responsibility clashes: who does  
what work and where?
One of the main motivations of the Open Scholarship 
movement is to share more of the outputs and process of 
scholarship with the goal of making research more 
collaborative, participatory and transparent (Friesike and 
Fecher 2016). This may mean developing new types of 
research output, sharing more of the outputs we have 
and more effective and broader sharing of outputs that 
are already part of our dissemination processes. All of this 
requires new kinds of work. It also frequently involves 
wider and deeper collaboration and cross-institutional 
collaboration is a driver of success (Lee and Bozeman 
2005). New outputs, forms of sharing, kinds of work and 
breadth of collaboration also require new supports in the 
form of infrastructures, both technical and social. It is 
therefore helpful to distinguish between responsibility 
clashes that relate directly to the work and responsibilities 
of researchers, and those that relate to the responsibility 
of providing supporting infrastructures. In this section we 
discuss the responsibilities of researchers as authors and 
reviewers, and the support of curated databases as 
examples of these two types of responsibility clashes.
Responsibility clashes in the activities carried  
out by researchers
A major objection of researchers to Open Scholarship 
agendas being driven top-down by macro-actors is that 
they demand more work. Sharing a wider range of 
research outputs, such as data, is more work. In 
addition to this, the interaction of these newly shared 
outputs with existing systems and assumptions can 
create further work in ways that can rapidly spiral out of 
control. Data sharing provides a good example. For 
researchers not already embedded in Open Scholarship 
discussions the idea of sharing may start from an 
assumption that all formal outputs are peer reviewed. If 
data is to be published, they reason, then this will 
substantially expand the work of peer reviewers. The 
response may be, and frequently is, that it is 
unnecessary for this data to be peer reviewed. There 
are therefore two responsibility clashes in play: whether 
a new responsibility needs to be taken on at all, and if 
so, who will take it on.
Similarly, post-publication review presumes that 
academics will keep revising and updating their 
manuscripts. It also implicitly assumes that someone 
(the editors? the reviewers?) will continue to monitor 
those revisions and updates to ensure that they occur. 
Expectations of public engagement and social media 
create additional workloads and additional clashes over 
what standards and expectations from our more 
traditional systems apply, and in turn who is responsible 
for monitoring them. In the context of the professional 
scholar and their position in the meso-institutions such 
as universities and research institutions that pay their 
salaries, the question arises about what responsibilities 
are connected to the researcher’s job. What are they 
actually paid for?
The roles of professional scholars in their workplaces is, 
and should be, changing. It has also become more 
heterogeneous. While, a generation ago, researchers 
were primarily concerned with teaching and publishing, 
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the job profiles have expanded and diversified 
considerably in recent years. New fields have emerged, 
research activities have become much more 
differentiated and the rise of team-based research 
makes it challenging for a meso-level organisation to 
compare the works of individual scholars. However, this 
has not been effectively addressed through changes to 
established recruitment and promotion practices.
Authorship provides a good example of this. There is an 
increasing range of skilled contributors to research who 
support and publish with different teams. They may be 
involved in many publications but would rarely be 
recognised as a primary author, and may not be 
regarded as authors at all. As a result, a highly skilled 
group of workers does not have the correct ‘currency’ 
to achieve progression in a conventional scholarly 
career. In some areas new disciplinary formations arise, 
as might be the case for fields including ‘digital 
humanities’ and bioinformatics in those cases where 
new research centres are formed or core facilities are 
supported within universities. In others the valuation 
given to a specific technical skillset is degraded to make 
its practitioners ‘mere technicians’. In both cases 
universities frequently fail to develop career paths for 
them and funding agencies often regard them as the 
further development of laboratory assistants. Funders 
do not regard it as their responsibility to provide new 
career structures. Scholarly communities seek to 
protect the boundaries of what is considered ‘proper’ 
academic work in their own spaces, and universities do 
not feel they have the funding or flexibility to create new 
systems. Shifts generally come when single actors or 
philanthropies donate a large sum to a university for the 
support of a ‘new activity’, meaning there is limited 
strategic thinking across the multiple stakeholders 
involved. This pattern has played out across a  
wide range of technical skillsets that contribute  
to scholarship.
All of these clashes of responsibility, values and 
assessment can contribute to a degradation of trust 
between scholars and their employers and within 
groups of scholars. That in itself can block progress 
towards Open Scholarship, which depends on trust 
between individuals and groups. In addition, confusion 
over what responsibilities exist and how they are to be 
distributed also hampers progress. Together they can 
create enormous inertia. Where there is limited trust and 
limited agreement on shared goals, it is much easier to 
support the status quo than to effect change. To reap 
the benefits of Open Scholarship practices we need a 
cross-institutional understanding for an increased 
diversity of what constitutes academic work. This 
diversity needs to be reflected in career paths and 
funding opportunities that individuals can trust will 
continue to exist.
Responsibility clashes in the development and 
maintenance of research infrastructure
The shift towards Open Scholarship creates extra work 
for scholars, or at any rate the perception that extra 
work is required. One means of addressing this is the 
provision of new and improved support services and 
infrastructures that reduce this burden. There is 
widespread consensus that novel systems and 
platforms need to be built in order to reap the promised 
benefits of Open Scholarship. That is, however, where 
the consensus ends as there is little agreement on who 
exactly is responsible for the development and, above 
all, the maintenance of these systems and platforms:
 `  Research organisations hardly acknowledge the 
work their academics put into the creation and 
maintenance of systems and platforms. Their 
evaluation criteria are, for the most part, still 
concerned with counting formal research outputs 
like papers and books
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 ` Research funders see their main purpose in funding 
innovative research. In general, this might be the 
development of systems and platforms but seldom 
their maintenance. That leads in many cases to 
situations in which critical research infrastructures 
lack a long-term survival plan
 ` For-profit organisations see a value in digital 
platforms and systems but, to them, they are 
primarily a key future revenue stream. This, for 
instance, explains why publishing houses have over 
the last decade heavily invested in academic 
infrastructure providers such as Mendeley 
(mendeley.com), Figshare (figshare.org)  
or SSRN (ssrn.com)
To illustrate the consequences of this clash we will turn 
to the example of ‘curated databases’. The transition 
from paper ledgers and card index systems to online 
databases has made it easier for research data to be 
consulted by a wider range of people or re-analysed  
for purposes not originally anticipated. The development 
of these valuable tools has not, however, been 
accompanied by the development of a shared 
understanding of how they are sustained  
and supported.
Universities have a long tradition of curating and 
preserving collections of physical objects (geological or 
zoological museums, botanic gardens, manuscript 
archives). Yet the shifts towards digital, collaborative 
and co-located research make it much more difficult to 
decide what responsibility a university has towards a 
digital database created by its academics. These have 
the same needs for ongoing curation, maintenance and 
preservation as physical collections. However, unlike 
physical collections, they serve a community that is 
beyond the walls of a single institution. How can such 
digital collections be maintained after the project 
funding that created them runs out? The sustainability is 
a constant issue between universities, funders and 
research communities. A particular problem arises when 
a platform or system is of general use to a community 
and too big for any single institution to support. Only in 
a few cases has it been possible to overcome this 
clash, either by successful collaborations between 
existing institutions or when a community has effectively 
organised to seek the support of many institutions in 
the form of subscriptions. A good example is Phoenix 
Bioinformatics as the home of the Arabidopsis 
Information Resource (Reiser et al. 2016).
Revenue clashes: who pays, who gets 
paid, and how much?
It should come as no surprise that clashes arise over 
changes to the revenue that supports organisations and 
communities. Organisations fear the loss of cash flows, 
and alignment with the goals of Open Scholarship as a 
principle may not survive an examination of the 
practicalities of keeping an organisation afloat. We will 
examine two clashes that arise out of changes to 
revenue flows. Firstly those that arise from the simple 
reproducibility of digital files with a focus on the history 
of ‘offprints’ (or reprints). Secondly we will examine the 
challenges faced by scholarly societies that are 
dependent on legacy publishing revenues as an 
example of clashes that are caused by a proposed 
change in fundamental payment flows.
Revenue clashes that arise from the technical 
possibilities of digital reproduction
Academia needs to address the same technical 
possibilities of digital reproduction that have 
transformed the music, entertainment and news 
industries, for good and for ill. There is, however, a key 
difference. In most (or at least many) cases the authors 
of scholarly research do not have a direct financial 
interest in the revenues related to their distribution.  
The publishers do. The author’s primary concern is the 
dissemination and attention that their work receives 
and, as a result, they have little interest in limiting 
distribution to those who pay, in the way that for 
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example trade fiction authors or professionally 
distributed musicians may. On an institutional level,  
this leads to a clash in motives and values. This is 
exacerbated by the shift from print-analogue to online-
digital production and dissemination but also predates 
this transition.
Offprints of papers in research periodicals have 
circulated through personal sharing networks in the 
scholarly community since the 18th century. They were 
produced alongside the process of publishing a 
periodical, but were often available more quickly than 
the full volume in which the paper would ultimately 
appear – somewhat like 'online first' today. They offered 
a way for researchers to build their community and 
claim their identity through connections to those they 
shared with. By the early 19th century, learned society 
publishers had begun offering authors a limited number 
of offprints for free. In the context of learned society 
publishing, offprints were seen as a means of improving 
scholarly communication, and thus a valid use of 
society funds. In contrast, when commercial journal 
publishers offered free offprints (from the mid-19th 
century, copying the learned societies), it seems more 
likely to have been a form of in-kind payment to authors 
(because it had become an expectation among 
authors). The modest circulation of free offprints  
(around 50 printed copies) does not seem to have 
raised any concerns that it might hurt sales of the 
published volume.
The relationship between scholarly sharing and journal 
sales has become more complicated now that offprints 
are digital. Authors continue to receive offprints (often as 
PDF files) for sharing among their personal networks. 
Unlike paper offprints, digital offprints are an unlimited 
resource (ie they can be copied and distributed without 
reduction), and their distribution is inexpensive. The 
ease and scalability has brought to the surface the 
revenue clash that existed all along, that distribution of 
free copies by authors could reduce, or be perceived to 
risk reducing, the sale of print copies or subscriptions 
by publishers.
As the clash has become more obvious the trust 
between authors and publishers has in part broken 
down. Authors generally have no interest in the 
profitability of publishers, even though they may have an 
interest in their continuing sustainability. Researchers 
adopt new means for distributing free copies of their 
works: via email, through social media, uploading them 
to a wide range of general and specialist sharing 
platforms, making them available on their own websites 
or pointing users to illegal but reliable sources like 
Sci-Hub (sci-hub.tw). Publishers, on the other hand, 
are anxious to limit the free copies. They take legal 
action against ResearchGate (researchgate.net) or 
Sci-Hub, while running the risk of upsetting researchers 
and their institutions.
It is instructive that publishers have targeted the 
platforms, and the platforms have in a number of cases 
responded by notifying authors. It is not strategic for 
publishers to make authors too aware of this clash as 
the goodwill of authors is a key asset for them. Directly 
engaging authors would further degrade trust with the 
likely consequence of authors turning further to parallel 
sharing pathways. All of this means that partial solutions 
to the immediate problem are adopted rather than 
addressing the core issues, that there is a mismatch  
of interests in the dissemination of scholarly work 
published under a subscription business model. The 
clash itself, as well as the lack of a resolution, hampers 
progress towards Open Access as one component of 
Open Scholarship.
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Revenue clashes that arise from changing the 
business model of publications
One area where researchers are frequently more aligned 
with the interests of subscription publishers is where 
they have a significant involvement in publishing within a 
scholarly or learned society. Learned societies and 
subject associations usually see their mission as 
supporting or promoting their field of scholarship. 
Typical activities include organising meetings and 
conferences for members, offering grants to support 
early career researchers, issuing a newsletter or website 
to circulate news among members, and acting as 
advocates for their discipline (and its members) in wider 
society. These activities are traditionally supported by 
membership fees, philanthropic donations and (in  
some cases) endowments.
But some societies and associations are also publishers 
of one or more journals or book series. The selection 
and publication of research is seen as an important part 
of the scholarly mission, and traditionally (pre-1950) was 
financially supported in the same way as other activities. 
But, with the development of the subscription-based 
model of journal publishing in the mid-20th century, 
publishing became a source of income. This has 
transformed the way societies think about their 
publishing activities. Rather than being a direct benefit 
to the scholarly community, publishing a journal became 
a way of financing other activities (e.g. conferences or 
grants for postgraduates). If publishing comes to be 
seen as a source of money, rather than part of the 
scholarly mission, then the potential transition to Open 
Access becomes a means of reducing income and 
decreasing the range of scholarly activities, rather than 
a good thing to do. And this, in turn, raises the question 
of how a society or association can reconcile its 
commitment to circulating scholarship with its desire to 
generate income to support its members.
This revenue clash may be internal to a scholarly society 
or association, a debate on how to move forward in 
balancing its different roles and financial sustainability 
issues. It also may be external, placing scholarly 
societies at odds with funders and others advocating 
change. Some scholarly societies have taken a 
progressive leadership role, directly advocating for 
change. Others have taken much more conservative 
positions, frequently associated with having a significant 
publishing revenue. Others are effectively large 
corporations that disburse revenue to member activities 
rather than shareholders. Each of these categories has 
different perspectives and motivations. The clashes that 
result are driven from different prioritisation of the goals 
and needs of the organisation.
Conclusion – understanding the 
interactions of institutions is crucial
Open Scholarship can be seen as a shift from 
established research practices. While many 
stakeholders in academia agree that Open Scholarship 
is, in general, desirable we see that motives and values 
clash when we investigate the transition towards Open 
Scholarship in detail. We further see that these clashes 
are only in part due to changing financial models. It 
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would be a misguided simplification to assume that the 
commercial publishers prevent Open Scholarship on 
their own, while academia itself does everything it can 
to implement it. We see that institutions of scholarship 
can have diverging interests themselves. Moreover, the 
responsibility clashes illustrate how difficult the scholarly 
system finds it to adapt to changing roles and tasks. 
Finally, we demonstrated that the way today's activities 
are performed and appreciated is heavily influenced by 
the past.
Our examination again highlights the complexity of the 
scholarly economy. Complexity in itself is a contributor 
to inertia, as many institutions struggle to define 
internally how they would prefer to design the transition 
towards Open Scholarship. The moment we add 
interactions with other institutions to these struggles we 
get the ‘messy situation’ we are currently confronted 
with. While the clashes we outlined hinder the academic 
system from adopting Open Scholarship practices 
quicker and more holistically, there are still some key 
messages that emerge from this chapter:
 ` Institutions are not monolithic entities with a clear 
strategy in regards to Open Scholarship. Rather, 
they are complex structures with multiple revenue 
streams and different value systems within 
themselves. Some of these value systems may be 
financial, while others may be accounted for by the 
institutions’ history
 ` The history of our academic institutions is a key 
ingredient in the clashes we witness. With Open 
Scholarship we are at a point where institutions need 
to revise the paths they are on. This, however, is 
exactly what our institutions struggle with. No 
institution in the scholarly landscape is an isolated 
actor – boundaries are blurry and permeable – and 
things get even messier when institutions need to 
communicate, translate complex ideas amongst 
themselves and interact
 ` To further make sense of how institutions in the 
academic economy interact, it is indispensable to 
look at adequate economic models. The following 
chapter will do exactly that and, together with an 
understanding of the clashes that hinder a transition 
towards Open Scholarship, it might equip policy-
makers with a set of lenses that will, hopefully, prove 
to be important in the development of policies
Chapter 5
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One central challenge for enabling Open Scholarship is finances. How will it 
be funded? To what extent, and in what ways, do the changes in practice 
implied by Open Scholarship align with, or oppose existing economic 
systems? Where we identify ‘blocks’ and ‘inertia’ can we understand the 
extent to which they are only financial issues, or is there more at stake? By 
pushing for change do we risk undermining the sustainability of communities 
and groups, or even threatening their identity? Our goal here is to better 
understand the barriers to progress and to identify more precisely how they 
differ and how to tackle the different issues. Beyond this we need to 
establish sustainable economic structures that support the practices of 
Open Scholarship as the new status quo.
Analysing scholarship with 
economic models
In Chapter 4 we saw that the motivations that underpin 
clashes between meso-level actors lead to a range of 
competing interactions. In this chapter we apply 
established economic models to investigate the extent 
to which they can help us understand and analyse 
these interactions. The chapter focuses on three 
specific examples: Open Access publishing, research 
data services and identifier services. It seeks to analyse 
them through a range of economic models. We will find 
that, although these micro-economic models can help 
us to understand why change is difficult, they do not 
usually provide a clear guide as to how to address this.
Some of the challenges are due to the nature of the 
markets in which the transactions between scholarly 
actors take place. Others are due to the changed nature of 
the goods and services in an increasingly digital world. The 
primary focus is on interactions of micro-level actors 
– researchers, research support staff and citizens, used as 
examples in Chapter 2. However, as the chapter proceeds 
we will see that it is essential to also consider meso- and 
macro- actors. However, including these high level actors 
complicates any simplistic economic analysis significantly.
The changing nature of the  
scholarly environment
Part of the argument of this book is that there is an 
opportunity for better, more efficient and more inclusive 
scholarship. Because some things are easier, or 
cheaper, or in some sense more effective, we can do 
better. These are all economic arguments at heart. 
Equally we argue that some of this change is hampered 
by issues including lack of resources, community 
resistance to change, or a lack of coordination  
between actors. These can also be framed as 
economic arguments.
‘Economics’ is not easily defined. It is too easily 
reduced to being merely a question of finances, or too 
tied to particular political ideologies. It is not infrequently 
attacked for making unjustified and simplistic 
assumptions, and as a result too often resulting in 
simplistic proscriptions as to the optimal action. 
However, at its best it provides a range of frameworks 
for categorising and analysing how individuals and 
groups interact when exchanging things, and how the 
characteristics of those goods in exchange affect the 
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ways in which they are, and can be, exchanged. 
Therefore our first point of introduction is to identify 
which goods are important in the scholarly landscape.
There are at least three broad categories of goods that 
we need to consider:
 ` Directly financial 'goods': money, and access to it
 
 ` Concrete goods such as digital and physical 
content: publications, data and software, including 
control over them through monopoly rights such as 
copyrights and patents
 ` More abstract goods and capital such as 
researchers' time and 'prestige'
The economic literature notes that goods have two 
important characteristics that determine how they can 
be produced and exchanged. The first of these 
characteristics is whether a good is ‘rivalrous’ or 
‘depletable’. This is defined by the degree to which 
using, or taking, the good reduces it. An apple, a tree 
from a forest and a physical book are all rivalrous. Once 
taken they are no longer available. By contrast a digital 
book is not taken, only copied. It is therefore almost 
purely non-rivalrous or non-depletable.
Figure 5.1 - Ostrom’s division of goods
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The second characteristic is ease of exclusion, meaning 
how easy is it to prevent access to the good. A physical 
book in a sealed vault is excludable, but so is a digital 
book controlled by an access system that restricts reading 
to subscribers. These two characteristics, rivalry and 
excludability, are frequently combined into a four-part 
classification (Figure 5.1) of goods with different 
characteristics21 (Ostrom 1991, Governing the Commons). 
A significant amount of economic work has shown that 
different classes of goods are produced by different kinds 
of economies and markets, and require different kinds of 
management and governance to be sustained.
In general, digital scholarship radically changes the 
economics of knowledge goods. They become less 
exclusive and shift from being largely or entirely rivalrous 
(either I have them or you have them) to being largely 
non-rivalrous (can be copied without loss). Our systems for 
funding and producing these goods were in many cases 
dependent on exclusion. This can be more challenging in 
a digital world (eg digital piracy is impossible to completely 
prevent). At the same time the digital transition can lead to 
greater control over goods. For example digital knowledge 
goods, such as books and journal subscriptions, are 
generally rented rather than purchased. The right to re-sell 
a purchased physical book or journal copy is protected 
under ‘first sale rights’ – ie the right to sell a purchased, 
physical copy of a content work – but equivalent rights for 
digital copies are not clear. Regardless of the legal rights it 
is often technically possible, and not costly, for a publisher 
to revoke digital access with the flick of a switch.
This shift of goods from private to public is one of the 
major themes of ongoing economic change in the 
scholarly landscape, and, as we shall see, a driving factor 
behind the challenges of using simple economic models. 
The next step is introducing some of the systems in which 
goods are exchanged, and the use of markets as good, or 
poor, tools to provide certain types of goods.
The exchange of goods in markets
Goods are exchanged in many ways and for many 
purposes. They may be transformed into new goods, 
utilised by their holders, hoarded for future gain or future 
use, or even destroyed. A market is any system in 
which goods are exchanged. It is a technical term which 
is also used in common language and as a result can 
easily be confusing. Within the scholarly community you 
may often hear arguments based on the presence of a 
‘well-functioning (or non-functioning) market’ as well as 
arguments against ‘marketisation’. These arguments 
are of two types. The first, based on the idea that a 
properly functioning market is necessary to deliver 
certain kinds of optimisation, uses ‘market’ to refer to  
a market with particular characteristics (see below).
The second is an argument against particular kinds of 
governance that are driven by financial considerations, or 
‘market-logic’. Sometimes this kind of conceptual 
framework is also referred to as ‘neo-liberalism’. In this 
book we use ‘market’ to mean any system or form of 
exchange. We use ‘competitive market’ or ‘market 
competition’ to refer to the specific class of markets that 
are based on self-interested interactions between 
individual actors and where concerns of ‘market failure’ to 
deliver some sort of overall optimum are most common. 
We focus on whether the markets we have in practice are 
predicted by economic frameworks to lead to outcomes 
that align with the goals of Open Scholarship. We intend 
that economic understanding be a tool to guide 
interventions, not to limit our scope to imagine possibilities.
Having introduced the concept of different types of goods 
we can now move over to consider how markets are 
shaped around provision of these goods. In economics a 
distinction between four different market conditions is 
usually made:
Footnotes
21 (Ostrom 1991, Governing the Commons) 
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1. Pure or perfect competition is a theoretical market 
structure in which the following criteria are met: all 
firms sell an identical product (the product is a 
‘commodity’ or ‘homogeneous’); all firms are price 
takers (they cannot influence the market price of 
their product); market share has no influence on 
price; buyers have complete or ‘perfect’ information 
– in the past, present and future – about the product 
being sold and the prices charged by each firm; 
resources such as labour are perfectly mobile; and 
firms can enter or exit the market without cost.
2. Monopolistic competition is a type of imperfect 
competition such that many producers sell products 
that are differentiated from one another (eg by 
branding or quality) and hence are not perfect 
substitutes. In monopolistic competition, a firm  
takes the prices charged by its rivals as given, and 
ignores the impact of its own prices on the prices  
of other firms.
3. Oligopolistic competition is a market structure in 
which a few firms dominate. When a market is  
shared between a few firms, it is said to be highly 
concentrated. Although only a few firms dominate, it 
is possible that many small firms may also operate in 
the market.
4.  A monopoly market is characterised by a single  
firm, price maker, barriers to entry and possibly  
price discrimination.
One thing that is obvious from this categorisation is  
that each of these is a theoretical set of conditions  
that will never be met in practice. Nonetheless, by 
understanding such categorisations we can ask how it 
is that actual conditions in scholarly ‘markets’ differ from 
these conditions, and therefore how theoretical models 
of these systems may break down. Similarly it should be 
clear that our neat division of goods into binary 
distinctions is also false. There are no purely public or 
purely private goods, and the complexities of common 
pool resources and club goods are even greater as 
excludability can be hard to pin down.
The interaction between market conditions 
and the goods they can produce
If the point of economics is to understand how, and 
under what conditions, goods are produced and 
managed effectively (or not) then it follows that these 
different forms of market would be expected to produce 
different categories of goods. The simplest example of 
this is the theoretical prediction that a well functioning 
competitive market, one that is near the conditions for 
‘perfect competition’, will efficiently support the 
production and management of private goods, even  
if this is a complex process. That is competitive 
exchange, where each micro-actor self-interestedly 
works to maximise their own benefits and is good  
at generating and managing goods which are both 
excludable and rivalrous.
The converse prediction of classical economic theory is 
that these kinds of competitive markets do not produce 
public goods. Shared systems – including functioning 
legal institutions, public roads and the air we breathe 
– will not be produced by markets and will not be well 
managed by markets driven by the self-interest of 
individual actors. In theory at least, self-interest prevents 
the individual actor from contributing to goods that 
anyone can use. This means, again in theory, that the 
rational, self-interested actor will merely use such goods 
but not contribute to their creation. Because all actors 
are supposed to be rational they will all become non-
contributors or ‘free riders’, and the public good will not 
be produced or managed optimally. The conclusion of 
economic theory is that these ‘shared goods’ need to 
be provided and funded through some form of 
compulsion. The provision of public goods, which often 
take the role of infrastructures in one sense or another, 
is therefore dependent on actors that can compel a 
system to both contribute and provide such goods. 
49Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action Analysing scholarship with economic models
These are mostly actors that take on the role of 
government. In our analysis they can be equated with 
those actors we describe as macro-actors.
Those goods that are neither perfectly private, nor 
perfectly public, fall between these two extremes. 
Common pool resources and club goods are predicted 
not to be efficiently provided by markets of self-
interested micro-actors. But nor are they well managed 
by ‘the state’ or macro-actors. The critical work of Elinor 
Ostrom on common pool resources and Buchanan on 
club economics show that these kinds of goods  
are best produced and managed by groups (ie meso-
actors) 22. 
Because they are ‘collective’ in the sense of requiring 
contributions from more than one micro-actor they 
require collaboration that markets made of micro- 
actors cannot provide. 
But at the same time macro-actors like the state do  
not have the local knowledge and trust that is required 
to successfully build these systems, at least not as 
effectively as a group can. Thus common pool 
resources and club goods are best managed by 
meso-level actors.
Most of the things we care about in scholarship fit into 
this middle category to some degree. Goods in this 
category include grant funding (rivalrous, but intended 
to be ‘open’ to competition to at least some extent and 
therefore partly non-excludable), digital subscription 
content and data (non-rivalrous but excludable), 
scholars’ time and attention (rivalrous but challenging to 
exclude) and knowledge itself, which is non-rivalrous 
but in the form we produce it, still quite exclusive (see 
Figure 5.2). The digital transition makes content 
potentially less exclusive but many aspects of rivalry 
and exclusion remain. At core, the goals of Open 
Scholarship are to make knowledge goods more 
‘public-like’, both less exclusive and also less rivalrous. 
However, as the discussion above shows there are no 
clear lines here, but degrees of exclusion and rivalry, 
combined with groups and organisations at different 
scales, some with sufficient power to appear to be 
macro-actors to the small meso-actors that depend on 
them. This is a complex environment and difficult to 
analyse with simple models.
Footnotes
22 The work of Buchanan and Ostrom will be referred to in more 
detail in Chapter 7, paragraph ‘The governance of scholarly 
common pool resources.’ 
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Examples of scholarly goods and markets
In the remainder of this chapter we take the rather 
theoretical categories and characteristics we have 
discussed above and apply them to a series of examples in 
scholarship. In each case, to sharpen the discussion, we will 
show how change, focusing on the digital transition, has 
disrupted the existing market conditions. This can occur 
through changing the types of goods, as is the case in 
scholarly publishing. It can occur through new opportunities, 
which are the underlying driver for research data services, 
where communication and dissemination networks create 
new opportunities for sharing and re-using data. Finally  
all of these challenges and opportunities create new 
requirements for shared infrastructure, both social and 
technical. In the remainder of this chapter we discuss each 
of these examples, drawing out the importance of networks 
and networking as opportunities and the investments 
required to fully exploit them.
Open Access publishing
The debates around the financing of scholarly publishing are 
well known and widely reported. Increasing subscription 
Figure 5.2 - Scholarly goods are not always easy to place into one of the four  
categories of goods.
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costs, the challenges of the shift to Open Access alongside 
industry consolidation and challenges to the viability of small 
publishers encouraged a wide range of economic analyses. 
The clashes described in Chapter 4 are classically 
supposed to be resolved through competitive markets of 
micro-actors and many of these analyses reach a 
conclusion that this market is not functioning properly. A 
significant challenge to applying simple market models is 
the complexity of the sets of actors, goods and services 
that are engaged in a range of different exchanges.
The standard market analysis perspective of scholarly 
publishing is that it constitutes a ‘two-sided market’, 
where two interrelated spaces for competition exist. In  
a classic subscription-based journal market, journals 
compete with each other for the best research 
manuscripts from authors. The second of the ‘two 
sides’ is a competition amongst publishers for 
subscription or other revenue sources, primarily from  
a limited number of libraries who have often been 
treated as a captive market. Both of these markets 
show behaviour that is partly monopolistic. Publishers 
provide different content from each other that is not 
exchangeable for content from other publishers. 
Authors provide different content (and prestige) to 
publishers. Greco (Greco 2015) describes how the 
actions of scholarly publishers can be interpreted 
through economic theories such as product 
differentiation, perfect price discrimination and 
economic rent.
Product differentiation refers to the non-substitutability 
of journals and the articles published within them, 
meaning competition is imperfect at best and effective 
monopolies may exist in practice. Perfect price 
discrimination is when a seller is able to adjust the 
pricing individually for each customer, thus extracting 
the maximum that each customer is willing to pay and, 
by extension, the entire market. This has long been the 
norm for libraries and consortia negotiating individual 
agreements with publishers under no disclosure clauses 
where customers are not aware of what other 
customers are paying for the same offering.
Economic rent refers to the excess income above 
production costs generated by inelastic demand and 
market imperfections created by exclusivity, prestige,  
or scarcity of the provided goods. In the case of digital 
journal articles published under a subscription model 
the scarcity created is artificial (non-rivalrous goods) and 
the exclusivity and prestige are strong influencing 
factors due to the wide-scale use of outlet-based 
research evaluation as a proxy for evaluating individuals 
and organisations. Even disregarding the desirable 
benefit of having research publications open for 
everyone to read, market theory provides evidence that 
the subscription-based system is as a whole not a 
cost-efficient use of resources for its primary funders  
(ie universities and their libraries) due to the high  
profit margins extracted by dominant commercial 
journal publishers.
The transition to Open Access publishing as a value 
brings with it new opportunities to develop alternate 
economic systems for financing publishing services. 
Several models have emerged where alternate markets 
or different services are provided. The most commonly 
discussed is financing publishing services through 
author-side business models, where the author’s 
institution is charged for services, generally in the form 
of an article (or book) processing charge or APC (or 
BPC). If we think of authors as pure rational actors we 
can not expect them to suddenly start choosing to pay 
for the same publishing service that they have 
previously received for free.
Of course the situation is more complex than this. 
Authors have often paid colour and page charges in the 
past and the services offered with Open Access 
publishing are not the same. One of the intentions 
behind the APC model was that authors would become 
more aware of the quality of services they were being 
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offered. The dysfunctional two-sided market with its 
complexities and hidden exchanges (eg voluntary 
peer-reviewing, non-financial rewards such as reputation 
and prestige, and incentives such as ‘invited’ or 
arranged submissions which receive lighter or faster 
peer review in exchange for the authors’ prestige) was 
supposed to become simplified to a more transparent 
one-sided market that better approximates perfect 
competition for APCs (or BPCs). This would focus 
attention from one side on the quality of services and 
their relation to pricing, while focusing the attention of 
publishers on restraining pricing due to competition.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence emerging of 
competition either on quality of service or on price. 
Recent evidence (Siler et al. 2018; Khoo 2019) is 
consistent with the opposite, rising prices that are 
unconnected with the precise services being offered 
and much more strongly connected to the identity and 
brand of the journal. This can be analysed through price 
sensitivity and demand elasticity, the extent to which 
buyers (in this case authors) change their behaviour in 
response to pricing changes.
The failure of market theory to correctly predict the 
behaviour of the APC market is not necessarily a failure 
of market theory itself. It may be due to a 
misunderstanding of what goods are actually 
exchanged. There are two complementary approaches 
to this, applying classical economic models.
The first of these is based on an observation of information 
asymmetry, even in the context of a completely transparent 
market. Authors do not have much information, nor do 
they seem to care about the details of the services that 
publishers provide. In contrast, publishers have substantial 
information on the authors that submit work to them, and 
can make a strong inference as to how much attention a 
given article or book will receive. In combination with a 
strongly brand-driven market, where the good in play is 
not services or knowledge but is the prestige associated 
with a publishing venue, this creates perfect conditions 
for a luxury good market or ‘separating equilibrium’.
In a functioning competitive market prices should reach 
an equilibrium defined by the capacities and interests of 
buyer and seller. The market acts as a way of optimising 
the price to the benefit of both parties. In a luxury goods 
market, such as for high-value watches, sports cars or 
fine wine, the producer successfully links the brand and 
prestige of the product to its price. That is, price becomes 
seen as a proxy for the 'quality' of the product.
If a significant community in the customer base is 
seeking prestige and sees price as a proxy for this 
prestige, then instead of prices being constrained they 
can actually competitively increase. If publishers 
successfully link price in the researcher's mind with 
prestige, we may see a runaway price increase. The 
linking of APC pricing with the journal Impact Factors in 
the Springer Nature IPO (initial public offering) Documents 
is a potential example of this. The failure of the IPO itself 
is an interesting counterpoint to this.23
An alternate view of the situation is to reconsider the 
nature of the goods being created and focus on the 
groups engaged in that. Potts et al. - (Potts et al. 2017). 
Examine the idea of treating a journal as a club in 
economic terms. Starting from an ideal perspective, 
based on a scholarly society publishing a single journal, 
they come to a clear conclusion. The investment of the 
community around a journal should be seen as not 
generating articles, copyrights or ‘knowledge’ in some 
abstract form but as building and defining the 
community itself.
Footnotes
23 See The Scholarly Kitchen article: Why Was Springer  
Nature’s IPO Withdrawn? https://scholarlykitchen.sspnet.
org/2018/05/15/springer-nature-ipo-withdrawn/ 
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Club economic models are built around understanding 
how the optimal size of the club is determined by the 
‘club goods’ that are being produced and by congestion 
in access to that good. In the case of a journal Potts et 
al suggest that the important goods are access to the 
community itself and its attention on critiquing and 
refining knowledge products. This explains why in part 
the digital transition makes less difference than 
expected; expert attention remains expensive.
In analysing the growing complexity of journals, 
publishers and publishing systems Potts et al. - '(Potts 
et al. 2017).' also note that one possible transition is 
from a ‘knowledge club’ or an expert community to  
a ‘social network market’ in which the goods being 
pursued are prestige and membership of ‘the club  
of people published in X’. In this sense the analysis 
parallels that of a luxury goods market, reaching a 
similar conclusion.
Alternative financial models for publishing
While much attention has been focused on author-side 
business models, and nearly as much attention on 
pointing out that too much attention has been paid, 
there are alternative models. These are covered in more 
detail in Chapter 7. All of these approaches involve a 
move away from market competition as the mechanism 
for cost management. They can involve local subsidy, 
such as the provision of support for infrastructure on 
which communities can run publication venues. 
Libraries providing hosting services for Open Journal 
Systems software is an example of this. They can 
involve collective subsidy arrangements, where a range 
of actors agree to cover the costs, presumably seeking 
a separate benefit for themselves. Open Library of 
Humanities is one example. The two approaches (local 
subsidy, actors agreeing to pay the costs) may also be 
combined through collective funding of infrastructure 
systems, both technical and social24.
The challenge is that all of these involve collaboration 
and coordination that are not predicted amongst purely 
self-interested actors. Even on the national levels it has 
been hard to coordinate, or even gather relevant 
information about financial flows from the scholarly 
community to academic publishers (Lawson, Gray, and 
Mauri 2016). Such ‘social infrastructure’ would be key 
to collective organisation to effectively manage 
subsidies. Initiatives such as OA2020 (oa2020.org) 
have been instrumental in creating increased collective 
international pressure for libraries and national consortia 
negotiating contracts with publishers, but this is going 
far beyond the micro-level of economic analysis and 
into strategic meso-level collective action.
Moral hazard in shifting markets
This analysis raises an important question. Are 
decisions being taken by the right actors, and do those 
actors have the necessary information to reach the right 
conclusions? There is a ‘moral hazard’, or information 
asymmetry in researchers selecting services that are 
paid for by other parties, including libraries. The goods 
in play are not simply articles, or specific services, or 
money, but also questions of identity and community 
and prestige. Authors choose publication venues 
without knowledge of the costs incurred. Author 
choices are driven by benefits they gain in reaching a 
specific audience, and being seen as part of that 
community, as well as the prestige that can help in 
gaining a job or promotion in their institution.
Changing the evaluation of individuals at the institutional 
level, by reducing the importance of outlet-based 
metrics through efforts such as the DORA declaration 
(https://sfdora.org/read/), aims to change the micro-
Footnotes
24 This example is featured in Knowledge Exchange publication 
'Insights into the Economy of Open Scholarship: A Collection 
of Interviews’ 
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economic behaviour of individuals. Such a change 
would theoretically support a more competitive 
marketplace among journals. However, individuals are 
also engaged in their disciplinary communities, with 
their own concepts of which publications gain 
recognition and prestige. There is more going on  
than can be captured in any simple model.
A simple micro-economic analysis based on the 
motivations of micro-level actors in competitive markets 
can guide us to an understanding of why change is not 
occurring, but it provides little guidance on what to do 
about it. We can see that competitive markets are not 
sufficient to generate the desired shifts, but not what 
form of governance might. The transition from 
subscription-based publishing to Open Access 
publishing is therefore a collective action problem 
(Wenzler 2017) where progress is slow or non-existent if 
no concerted action is taken.
Two examples are shown (see Fig 5.3 below) to illustrate 
different processes. The shift from print to digital makes 
primary research outputs less rivalrous, they are more 
easily shared without loss, while making it slightly harder 
to exclude access to them. If we change a subscription 
access digital output to an open access output we are 
primarily making it less exclusive and therefore 
excludable, without making it a completely public good.
Figure 5.3 The nature of goods shifting through digital scholarship.
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Research data services
An aspect of the transition to digital networked 
scholarship that illustrates both the opportunities and 
challenges of economic provisioning is the sharing and 
re-use of digital data. It is particularly instructive as we 
see that two quite different shifts were required. First, 
the shift from analogue to digital data recording, making 
data copyable and more consistent. Consider the trace 
of a pen on a chart recorder vs a digital representation 
of the position of the same pen. The latter can be 
replicated perfectly25 and creates an incentive to use a 
standardised format to ease comparison and analysis.
The ease with which we can transmit, collate, compare 
and analyse digital data is a triumph of innovation. At the 
same time it is also one of the most frustrating aspects of 
Open Scholarship, because we still fall far short of the 
potential, and the financial challenges of creating high 
quality reusable data have tended to lead to enclosure 
rather than to opening up of those created resources.  
For example, the Protein data bank '(rcsb.org)' existed  
in digital form as a set of tapes that were physically 
transported, long before it went online. The real revolution, 
and the motivation towards standardisation and 
consistency on a hitherto unimaginable scale, came when 
those data could be easily copied to anywhere in the world 
with an internet connection.
 
To maximise the preservation, curation, discovery and 
re-use of data requires the provision of high quality 
curated data resources that are fully open and 
appropriately support their relevant scholarly 
communities. These are both technical systems 
(indexing, platforms, technology, storage) and also 
human systems providing curation, quality assurance 
and ongoing development.
However, we find challenges in balancing the need for 
repositories with ensuring their financial sustainability. 
For some repositories that want to move to a fully open 
footing, it is difficult to find a method of underwriting the 
risk of that transition. Erway and Rinehart (Erway and 
Rinehart 2016) present an initial review of the various 
funding strategies that research data management 
services can pursue, demonstrating that existing 
funding structures are often not enough to ensure 
sufficient funding for long-term preservation. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Global Science Forum26 also 
considered the possible sustainability models in a 2017 
report (OECD Global Science Forum 2017).
For data and software, the markets and service 
providers are less homogeneous. In some disciplines 
there are longstanding and highly effective providers of 
data curation and management services. The scale of 
data being managed and the resources being deployed 
in these areas can dwarf those being used for 
document communication. In other disciplines, this is  
a very new area that is not well supported. The 
institutions in question range from projects within 
research organisations, through community governed 
organisations, to for-profit organisations providing a 
fee-for-service offering. Data collection arrangements 
vary significantly between disciplinary areas. For 
instance, arrangements at the Large Hadron Collider  
at CERN18,19 differ greatly to those for the Square 
Kilometre Array, let alone for the Arabidopsis Information 
Resource (Reiser et al. 2016). Partly this is a question of 
different needs for the data, but it is also a question of 
the history of the development of those services.
There is a pattern in the development (and failure) of 
these infrastructures that can be understood through 
Footnotes
18 https://home.cern/science/accelerators/large-hadron-collider
19 https://skatelescope.org
25 To a first approximation. Consider this a pragmatic not an 
absolute description.
26 oecd.org/sti/inno/global-science-forum.htm
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the lens of group level economics (Neylon 2017). The 
initial development, based on specific community 
needs, is usually boot-strapped with limited resources 
or described as a project. Initial success depends on 
community building, which may have an explicit 
membership model.
However, many such services and infrastructures fail  
to make the transition to sustainability, due to (a) lack  
of effective financial instruments to transition from a 
project base to an infrastructure and (b) lack of 
community support systems that can support effective 
membership models. As these services grow and 
become important to wider communities they become 
more public-like, challenging the capacity of meso-level 
actors to support them.
Crucial to this is that most complex data resources have 
been developed during the digital age, whereas digital 
publication systems carry the legacy of the paper-based 
systems that had existed for centuries. These systems 
have externalities and the facilities they require have 
economies of scale. These facilities are very rivalrous  
as they are scarce. This means that the implicit 
assumptions around data management led to 
conditions where these could not be provided by 
competitive markets, but needed to be provided by 
macro-level actors.
The market analysis offers a range of explanations. 
While there are some data for which a competitive 
market based approach to provision can be found, 
there is an adverse selection problem: only the data that 
is profitable will be preserved or collected. For our 
purposes, we cannot predict what data that will be or 
how we might value it in the future. In addition, the pure 
public good nature of digital data creates clear free-rider 
problems for existing repositories with a subscription 
model and seeking a transition to more open access. 
While we can understand and diagnose the issues, 
market mechanisms seem unable to provide the 
solution here. But simply expecting macro-actors to 
step in will not scale to support the wide range of 
interested communities. A solution will therefore require 
action by communities that can be sustained over the 
longer term.
Identifier services
Our examples have moved from the concrete financial 
challenges around the transition to Open Access, 
through to the large-scale sharing of data. Key to the 
promise of digital networked scholarship is the idea that 
the flexibility and comparability supported by these new 
systems allow us to create, handle, critique and 
manage more knowledge than ever before. In many 
ways the goal of Open Scholarship is to realise  
that opportunity.
That scale combined with flexibility is a challenge. Scale 
requires consistency but flexibility requires that 
consistency to be broken. The power of the web and 
networked digital information more generally is that it 
provides the means to achieve this, if certain conditions 
can be met. At their core those conditions require one 
thing. If you want to combine large scale data sources, 
you need to be able to identify when records in those 
disparate sources refer to the same thing.
The consequence of building such a highly populated 
networked system is a need to be able to tell what is 
what in a consistent way. Such scale of objects requires 
a shared infrastructure. At the very root of this is being 
able to unambiguously identify objects persistently, 
including research outputs (data, articles, software, 
even physical objects) and actors (people, 
organisations). As might be predicted from the 
argument in the previous section, because these 
infrastructures are very general in their application, they 
are very near to perfect public goods. However, their 
initial development is usually by interested (and 
sometimes self-interested) groups.
57Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action Analysing scholarship with economic models
There have been, and continue to be, a range of 
overlapping and competing identifier systems for 
scholarly objects and actors27. The earliest focus was 
on objects and content with Handles, Archival Resource 
Keys (ARKs), Persistent URLs (PURLs), and Digital 
Object Identifiers (DOIs) being developed by different 
organisations and communities. These have experienced 
different challenges and levels of success. The dominance 
of the DOI system (doi.org) developed initially as a 
membership model for publishers but now seen as a de 
facto requirement for credible journal publishing 
services, provides a clear indication of how group level 
and collective action economics can help to analyse 
these histories (Neylon 2017).
The more recent history of developing identifiers for 
individual scholars and for organisations is also 
instructive. There was a clear market opportunity and 
need for a service providing unique identifiers for 
scholars and a number were built, most notably 
ResearcherID by Thomson Reuters (ResearcherID is 
now owned by Clarivate Analytics)28. The consumer 
market, consisting of researchers and libraries, showed 
strong resistance to a commercial operator controlling 
such a coordinating system. This could be interpreted 
as a product of risk analysis by consumer groups. 
However, there was no such coordinated risk analysis 
and an economic analysis also predicts that this kind of 
coordination amongst a large set of stakeholders is not 
feasible. Notably in the case of other systems such as 
the adoption of Current Research Information Systems 
(CRISs) by universities, organisations have often 
purchased such products and services from 
commercial players (Bryant, Dortmund, and  
Malpas 2017).
Nonetheless the challenges of adoption for ResearcherID 
as a product led to a community initiative to build a 
shared infrastructure. ORCID (The Open Researcher 
and Contributor ID) (orcid.org) was founded on a set 
of principles that were intended to provide confidence 
and trust amongst stakeholders. While publishers, 
particularly amongst the oligopoly, were quick to 
engage and support the new initiative, the financial 
engagement of funders and libraries as members was 
slower to follow. Arguably, the adoption process of 
ORCID can be perceived as a classic collective action 
problem, where the adoption process focused on 
providing targeted benefits to individual stakeholder 
groups so as to facilitate engagement (Fenner, Gómez, 
and Thorisson 2011). The process that lead to 
Thomson Reuters opening up control of ResearcherID 
as a facilitator also warrants further analysis as it 
represents a rare case of a powerful first mover being 
unable to achieve product adoption and therefore 
market control.
ORCID is now seen as a model, both inspiring a set of 
principles for the governance and management of 
infrastructures (Bilder, Lin, and Neylon 2015) and 
providing an exemplar that is being followed by  
the Research Organisations Registry (ROR)  
(ror.community) a community initiative that builds on 
the capacities of the major existing identifier providers 
Crossref (https://crossref.org) and DataCite 
(datacite.org) to provide a community infrastructure for 
identifying meso-level organisations. The collective 
action problem to identify the actors that need to 
address collective action problems is being addressed 
by other meso-level actors combining to share their 
experience of solving similar, collective action problems.
Footnotes
27 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persistent_identifier
28 In April 2019, ResearcherID was integrated with Publons, a 
Clarivate Analytics owned platform. See https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/ResearcherID 
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Conclusion – change requires moving the 
debate beyond ‘broken markets’
We have described the transition to Open Scholarship 
in economic terms as the reduction of exclusion  
for scholarly goods. In the context of the digital 
transformation, we might expect markets to provide a 
means of driving this transition. The transformation from 
physical to digital has allowed our scholarly goods  
to become non-rivalrous, and the costs for making 
traditional outputs less exclusive have dropped. In 
addition, digital technologies make it possible to create 
new value through the dissemination of objects that 
would previously have been difficult or impossible to 
share, such as data or software.
Market economic models based on competition between 
individual actors predict that many of the goods we see as 
important in and for scholarship will not be efficiently 
produced. While political debate often revolves around 
whether markets are ‘functioning’ or not, one conclusion is 
that this may not be the central issue at all. In the context 
of the shift to Open Scholarship, with its changing goods 
and interactions, this may be even more true. The 
decrease in the private-like nature of goods in play makes 
interventions beyond market competition more important.
In each of our three examples we can note a series of 
common themes. The increasingly public-like nature of 
the goods creates challenges. Existing players can have 
substantial influence and power, particularly in markets 
characterised by some form of oligopoly. Change is 
often hampered by existing systems and assumptions.
The power of existing players by default led to a 
disadvantage for the transition to Open Scholarship as 
monopolists and oligopolists have substantial power. 
This might include the ability to bundle goods or 
services or to dictate prices. This is negative in a 
market-competition focused sense as it reduces 
competition and therefore innovation. But there are also 
cases, such as shared infrastructures for identifiers and 
data services, where such centralisation and control can 
help guide change. But how would we tell where this is 
the case?
In examining some of the markets and economies 
relevant to scholarship, we see that many are imperfect 
markets with issues of monopolies and oligopolies 
being quite common. We can use these analyses to 
diagnose problems and identify some of the reasons for 
inertia in the transition to make scholarship more open. 
In many cases, these diagnoses are helpful as an 
analytical tool that helps us (and all stakeholders) to see 
the problem. But in most cases, they do little to provide 
solutions. The common thread is that the solutions lie 
outside a pure market analysis. They are collective 
action problems.
Chapter 6
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In the previous chapter we discussed the limitations of a market analysis of 
the political economy of scholarship that is focused on micro-economic 
actors and self-interested decisions. While we saw that such approaches 
can be helpful in diagnosing the presence of problems, they are generally 
not useful in guiding us towards the shape of solutions or interventions.
Analysing action at the community level
At one level this is the standard problem of ‘bounded 
rationality’, meaning that actors chase immediate 
returns leading to premature optimisation. This supports 
the status quo instead of finding a more global 
optimum. The solution to this problem will be found  
in community intervention, developing or adapting 
institutions that support collective action that can 
extend over time.
In addition to premature optimisation we also saw the 
critical importance of groups, prestige, desire for 
membership and advancement as drivers of behaviour. 
The value of being part of a group, community or 
organisation is significant to scholars. This also 
supports the status quo, because change led by 
individual actors in a networked system is constrained 
by their existing ties. Again, this points to the need for 
acting as groups, communities or organisations, and 
building institutions that support processes of change 
over time.
In this chapter we will examine the challenges for 
groups to address these problems and identify the 
characteristics of solutions. In particular, we will see that 
there are broadly two failure modes, one in which we 
rely too much on bottom-up emergence of solutions, 
and the other in which we allow control over systems to 
be dominated by top-down, through environmental 
factors or network effects. Both of these challenges are 
connected to the transition to networked digital 
scholarship. In the first case they are driven by the 
increasing public good character of digital scholarly 
goods, and in the second by the network effects that 
arise with the massive scaling up  
of connectivity combined with returns to capital. In both 
cases the answer lies in empowering groups to act 
effectively through collective action.
Public good features of digital  
knowledge goods
We have emphasised the shift towards a more public-
like nature of knowledge goods driven by the transition 
from a print-based analogue world to one of digital 
networked scholarship. It is also worth noting that the 
idea of knowledge as a public good has deep roots. It 
underpins the justifications for monopoly rights such as 
copyright and patents, which in their original form were 
intended to encourage the dissemination of knowledge. 
It has deep roots in the culture of western scholarship.
That these values are never fully followed in practice 
does not make them unimportant. Indeed the 
compromises that have limited their expression, the 
technical limits on dissemination, the institutionalisation 
of scholarship, professionalisation, careerism and all 
that is attached to that are at the centre of our narrative. 
The ongoing tension between dissemination of 
knowledge and exploitation and control over the value 
created by its application is part of the motivation for 
seeking an economic analysis. The sudden shift in the 
rivalry and exclusion that has resulted from the shift to 
online digital scholarship has only brought these issues 
more clearly into view.
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Competitive markets and self-interest are, or at least 
seem to be, an inevitable characteristic of human 
interactions. As the goods in play in scholarship 
became less rivalrous and less exclusive it was therefore 
inevitable that existing systems of markets, organisations, 
clubs and communities would falter in their ability to 
deliver an acceptable compromise in the production of 
these public-like goods. In particular, the fudges and 
compromises through which we linked the production 
of knowledge as a public-like (but still in practice rather 
exclusive) good to the financial systems that support it 
were inevitably going to be challenged.
In truth, markets never solved these problems. A 
combination of institutions, clubs, communities and 
processes of training and membership that supported 
them did. The idea that market competition could ever 
solve this problem illustrates both how radical the 
reshaping of our institutions has been, and how blinded 
we are to systems, rules and restrictions in which we 
operate. Merton (Merton, 1973) identified this clearly, 
well before the economists caught up, showing how our 
institutional systems and our desire to be a part of them 
led to the cooperative behaviours and collective action 
that made scholarship operate in the first half of the 
20th century.
The challenge is, therefore, how to build new institutions 
that support our collective action where self-interest will 
not deliver. In a world in which the rivalry and excludability 
that aligned well with content and access subscription 
models is decreased, systems that rely on that revenue 
need to change. This change may be quantitative or 
qualitative in nature. At the same time, access to goods 
that are becoming less rivalrous, such as the attention and 
time of expert editors and referees, needs to be carefully 
considered. Market competition cannot be expected to 
solve the problem of supporting communities of curators.
Alongside this, the new technical world with its large-
scale networks requires new infrastructures to work 
efficiently. Again, as public-like goods, these will not be 
provided by market competition. The underlying 
structure of our dissemination networks, once based on 
physical transport of books to a relatively small set of 
defined places, now allowing nearly cost-free movement 
from and to trillions of locations, requires new kinds of 
supporting infrastructures that are more public-like and 
more ‘infrastructural’ than they have ever been.
In turn these new infrastructures have supported a 
substantial increase in inclusion and equity. More actors 
from more places can engage with scholarship. This in 
turn put those existing systems, journals, communities, 
under strain as dropping exclusion leads to congestion, 
precisely as classical club and collective action 
economics predict. Peer review is under strain. 
Publishers are concerned about the technical issues 
and bandwidth required to support machine readability. 
Universities and scholarly communities continue to 
struggle with issues of diversity and inclusion. The 
consequences of this strain, congestion in access to 
the club good, previously controlled through exclusion, 
lead to increasing rivalry.
Increasing equity and access are core values of Open 
Scholarship. Our naive market analysis of the costs of 
digital production and dissemination has led to 
assumptions about a reduction in costs that aligns with 
these goals. Opening up access to resources increases 
the potential usage of those resources, and hence 
increases the risk of potential overuse. Making club 
goods less exclusive at the same time can make a club 
good rivalrous. A transition towards a more open 
model, then, requires provisions to prevent overuse and 
associated collective action problems, also described 
as the tragedy of the commons. The solution to this is, 
as Ostrom (Ostrom 1991) described, institutions and 
community governance that manage these depletable 
and excludable resources effectively.
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Network externalities and capital
The previous section positioned communities and 
institutions as the solution to the failure of market 
competition to provide increasingly public-like good. But 
the networks that define communities and institutions 
can also cause problems. First, the complexity of these 
networks and the nature of interconnections tend to 
favour the status quo. Scholars dedicate a large portion 
of their time to making these connections, and choosing 
to change individual practice can break them. The web 
of connections can tie us down. The solution to this 
issue is collective action amongst meso-level actors. 
That is, a coordinated shift in the position of the  
network centres.
The digital network transition also causes a more subtle 
but more serious issue. This is arguably not a market 
failure but the success of market competition to 
accumulate value. The scale and complexity of the 
network leads to a counterintuitive effect. Institutions 
that have an initial advantage in connectivity, either 
through innovation, history or the application of available 
financial capital, can exploit that position to increase 
their advantage. This ultimately has exponential 
feedback effects. Metcalfe’s Law29 states that the value 
of a network scales with some exponent of the number 
of connections. In practice that value is asymmetrically 
captured by those with more connections, creating a 
network effect. Many web services harness this 
'network effect’. The more users they have, the more 
value they create for each user, and the more value they 
capture for themselves. They therefore tend toward 
gravitational hubs. Obvious examples include 
Facebook, ORCID and ResearchGate, as well as the 
behaviour of publishers and researchers around top-tier 
journals, as discussed previously.
The literature notes two kinds of network externality – 
direct and indirect. The examples above are of direct 
effects, where the increased value accrues directly to 
the service concerned. Indirect effects occur where 
value accrues both to complementary services (for 
example, connected products from the same supplier) 
and, thereby, also back to the first service. Such indirect 
effects can lead to incremental vendor lock-in, where 
each of a series of procurement decisions can 
increasingly favour connected products from a single 
company (such as Mendeley, Pure, Scopus and SciVal 
from Elsevier; Dimensions, Figshare and Symplectic 
from Digital Science; in the future perhaps Microsoft 
Academic, Office etc or Google Scholar, Google Docs 
and other Google Enterprise tools).
The value accrued via network effects can benefit users 
as a result of both their own use, or of the use of the 
service by others. This means that network effects are 
especially strong in scholarship because of the prestige 
associated with knowledge circulation – not only books 
and journals but also, increasingly, data and software. 
The value to a researcher of engaging with, say, a 
journal or data archive (as an author, reviewer or user of 
the knowledge) is more than simply the result of the 
functionality, visibility and reach available. It is also the 
result of the level of prestige that a particular channel 
may connote in the culture of a discipline or scholarship 
more widely.
An important aspect of these network effects, 
particularly as they connect to financial capital, is that 
they are ‘flattening’. The network value, as expressed in 
financial terms, has little connection with the myriad 
local forms of value, community identity, expertise and 
knowledge. Instead, it drives homogeneity and 
instrumental behaviour driven by simplistic shared 
quantitative measures, with money at the top of that list. 
Footnotes
29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metcalfe%27s_law
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These shared measures damage communities and 
institutions because they destroy context. Researchers 
are expected to publish in journals according to some 
external criterion, not to choose the most effective 
venue for communication to target audiences; 
infrastructure systems are judged on their usage, not on 
what value they create for communities. Most seriously, 
researchers are judged more by how much grant 
funding they bring in than by the impact or value of their 
research, their engagement with students and 
colleagues or their contribution to communities.
One of the biggest challenges we face in economic 
terms is the way in which central network actors 
support the status quo. The services they provide 
abstract, summarise and prioritise based on existing 
conventional assumptions of what is ‘best’. In turn the 
meso-level actors that could resist this find it easier to 
align themselves with these outside definitions of 
‘quality’ and ‘excellence’ than to defend their own 
internal views of what makes good research. This is a 
challenge for scholarship itself if it is to preserve 
heterogeneity and diversity internally. It is an even 
greater challenge for Open Scholarship, as it turns the 
technological changes supposed to underpin change 
against the actors at the meso-level that might work to 
drive that change. The solution, once again, is collective 
action by meso-level actors to work together against 
these ‘gravitational’ tendencies. The problem here is 
that it is exactly those actors whose incentives are 
being shifted in an adverse direction.
Rebuilding institutional capital
The previous two sections bring us to the very heart of 
our economic analysis of scholarly practice and the 
transition to Open Scholarship. Because the knowledge 
goods that are both the product and the inputs of 
scholarship and its application are not private goods 
they will not be efficiently generated by market 
competition amongst micro-actors. But because they 
are not perfectly public goods they will also not be 
efficiently and effectively produced through the actions 
of macro-actors. As Ostrom (Ostrom, 1991) noted, 
meddling in the details of production by macro-actors, 
in her analysis mostly national governments, damaged 
the local institutions that were managing common pool  
resources and club goods, such as local community-
governed fisheries.
The economic challenge is two-fold. First, supporting 
the meso-level actors that support the generation of 
knowledge. Second, encouraging and improving the 
processes of ‘public-making’ that support openness in 
scholarship and achieve the societal goals of knowledge 
production as an activity that is good for the public, 
even if it never achieves the ultimate goal of being a 
perfect public good in economic terms.
The effective role that macro-actors can take to guide 
change is to support and guide institutions that reduce 
the cost of this public-making and enhance the benefits 
of meso-actors in engaging in public-making. The 
effective role that micro-actors, as well as smaller meso-
level actors, can take is to organise. This reduces the 
complexity of the collective action problem by reducing 
the effective number of players in the negotiations of 
how to act together. Both of these involve the building 
of institutions in the (technical) political economy sense; 
shared sets of rules, systems, culture and practices that 
enable groups to work together. Achieving that goal 
requires building institutional capital.
As we have noted throughout, the Open Scholarship 
agenda is a response to (and is hampered by) the 
changes being experienced in the scholarly academic 
system. the online shift has magnified network effects 
and driven an accumulation of both financial and 
cultural capital to powerful institutions that drive 
behaviour across a much larger population than 
previously. This has been matched by an emphasis on 
quantitative assessment and individual competition that 
has reduced the cultural – and to some extent financial 
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– capital of community groups in favour of simplistic 
individual assessments. The role of communities in both 
identifying high quality work and organising for change 
has been degraded.
The networks that reduce the costs of dissemination, 
that enhance the potential for inclusion and create the 
opportunities for Open Scholarship are also the ones 
that are exploited by centralising actors for financial 
gain, and that create the incentives systems that reduce 
progress to Open Scholarship. The scaling up of the 
scholarly production system, which is a desirable goal 
for Open Scholarship, makes it increasingly difficult to 
allocate resources thoughtfully and fairly. This leads us 
to reach for simpler and more general metrics of value 
and quality, but in doing that we apply the same 
standards across too many actors and communities, 
driving competitive interactions down to the micro-level. 
This not only reduces the production of non-private 
goods but increases the costs for groups to engage in 
making their collective goods (common pool resources, 
club goods) more public-like.
Examples of market competition failures 
and network effects
To make these discussions more concrete we will now 
turn to some specific examples where competitive 
markets have failed to deliver solutions and where 
network effects and capital have driven concentration  
of control. These examples will be more complex as we 
seek to tease apart the series of interactions and 
tensions in play. In many cases the question of whether 
these examples are ‘failures’ will be one of perspective, 
illustrating the different perceptions and interests 
involved. In all cases there are multiple different ways to 
view the issues and in all cases we can debate the most 
promising solutions. All of this illustrates the challenges 
in building coalitions of meso-actors that can negotiate 
a shared view, and therefore a pooling of institutional 
capital, to facilitate change.
Preprint repositories and the missing link between 
economic and cultural capital
One of the challenges to changing practice is the 
structural power and institutional capital of the existing 
publication system. The technical possibilities of using 
the internet, and later the web, as a parallel 
dissemination platform were identified by many early 
pioneers of online scholarly communication. Indeed 
earlier cycles of similar innovation were also driven by 
new technical capacities, including a largely forgotten 
experiment in the distribution of research manuscripts 
through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the 
1960s (Cobb 2017). The opportunities to disrupt the 
institutional capital of incumbent publishers was also 
seen early on, not least by publishers who acted to 
squash these initiatives, often successfully (Kling, 
Spector and Fortuna 2004).
An early and well-known success was the development 
of the physics preprint arXiv (https://arxiv.org/). This 
was the first major success in developing a parallel 
mode of dissemination using the internet. Building  
on a culture of sharing manuscripts and an existing 
community engagement with the new online 
technologies, Paul Ginsparg30 built a system that rapidly 
came to be the heart of a community work-flow and 
practice for a growing range of communities. The 
centrality of particle physics to this community is 
significant as it is a highly networked community, with 
existing large-scale meso-actors in the form of national 
and international research facilities.
Footnotes
30 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Ginsparg
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Central to the success of arXiv was Ginsparg’s ability  
to leverage the available technology, platforms and 
infrastructure to scale up the effort at low cost, including 
the effective subsidy of using the cutting-edge 
computing and network infrastructure at Los Alamos 
National Laboratories. The limit to growth of arXiv was, 
in fact, the human scaling issue required by performing 
a basic check of the appropriateness of submitted 
articles. It is notable that Ginsparg was opposed to the 
addition of new functionality, due both to the costs of 
implementation and also to the value of doing one thing 
well, adopted from the design philosophy of Unix 
systems. Multiple efforts to add functionality, particularly 
that of commenting, failed, primarily due to network 
effects. There was no reason for people to visit the 
commenting sites when the network and institutional 
capital was at the central site.
Following the move of arXiv to Cornell in 2001 and the 
assumption of running costs by the Cornell University 
Library the increase in the scale of its use did bring 
costs to significant levels. In terms of collective action 
economics the unilateral action by one community 
member could no longer be sustained (Cartwright 
2010). The current financial model is an oligopoly with 
major university users contributing to running costs with 
additional funding from a philanthropic funder, the 
Simons Foundation. It has also proven challenging to 
shift existing funding streams from journal subscriptions 
to arXiv funding, even when these are for the same 
community. Partly this is due to the prevalence of big 
deals but also because the institutional capital tied up in 
publishing as a practice remains significant.
There are strong parallels and important differences with 
the history of the Social Sciences Research Network 
(SSRN) (ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/). SSRN was started 
with similar goals, to enable social scientists to share 
working papers, again an aspect of existing disciplinary 
culture for some communities. A key difference is that 
SSRN was formed as a for-profit entity with the intent of 
it being viable as a business. This, alongside the more 
business-oriented background of its founders, is likely a 
key reason for SSRN more rapidly finding a stable and 
sustainable revenue model. However, like arXiv it 
reached a point where an injection of capital was 
required to enable a substantial technical overhaul and 
enhancement of the systems. Unlike arXiv, after a 
significant period looking for investors the founders 
ultimately sold the company to Elsevier for an 
undisclosed sum. From one perspective this is a 
success story. An innovative company generated 
significant returns for its founders and value for its 
community, and was able to gain the capital investment 
required for further development (Gordon 2016). From 
another, the enhanced network effects gained by 
Elsevier, the ability of capital to control and restrain the 
market and the lack of control of the user community 
over that process, appear as serious issues (Nagel 
2016). One response is to demand that scholarly 
organisations have legal forms that prevent them being 
sold. However, this reduces their opportunity to raise 
capital. Another is to observe that, with a very small 
number of organisations controlling a very large 
proportion of the free financial capital in the system, 
such patterns of purchase and centralisation  
are inevitable and will feed on themselves  
unless challenged.
The solutions are not obvious but, with the rise of 
interest in preprints in other disciplines (Tennant et al. 
2018; Chiarelli et al. 2019a) as both a parallel 
dissemination mechanism intended to complement 
traditional publishing and as an adjacent innovation  
with the potential to disrupt traditional publishing,  
these issues need more understanding. The different 
governance and financial arrangements (Chiarelli et al. 
2019b) for initiatives like bioRXiv (biorxiv.org/) and 
Open Science Framework-hosted repositories 
(https://osf.io/preprints/) raise many of the same 
issues. As with arXiv the question of how community 
engagement is not coupled with financial engagement 
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and support and the challenges of raising capital for 
ongoing technical upgrades and innovation will become 
significant. More information on the place of preprints in 
the current research life cycle can be found in the 
Knowledge Exchange report Accelerating scholarly 
communication: The transformative role of preprints.31
Paying for publication
If part of the transition to Open Scholarship is a shift in 
communication and publication processes then we 
need to consider the options for how these are 
resourced and how this resourcing needs to change. 
This involves a community-level decision-making 
process about the journals to subscribe to and the 
books to purchase. One of the benefits of university 
affiliation is the club-like access to subscribed materials.
We have discussed some of the issues that arise when 
we move to a market in which authors or producers are 
involved in purchasing publishing services, most 
commonly paying APCs with the intent of making 
journal articles Open Access. Through the lens of this 
chapter we can see how the lenses of both luxury 
goods markets and social network markets reveal the 
same issues. Once price can be coupled to prestige or 
cultural capital, then an expanding network with simply 
driven incentive structures will drive increasing cultural, 
and then financial, capital to those holding it.
Due to the ‘flattening’ and scaling effects noted above the 
value of publishing in a disciplinary journal, with quality 
assurance based on local and contextual knowledge, 
cannot compete with the more generally held assumptions 
of quality driven by simple numeric indicators. We need to 
persuade communities to value a diversity of qualities, which 
will help to build a functioning market. That market could 
constrain prices via competition on those qualities if multiple 
stakeholders agree to reassess that value collectively and in 
a coordinated fashion. The San Francisco Declaration on 
Research Assessment DORA (https://sfdora.org) is a 
community initiative that is seeking to achieve this.
Another possibility for removing the connection between 
pricing and prestige is to address not the prestige, but 
the price. This would enable a return to the situation 
where authors did not see a price and costs are 
subsidised by another meso-actor. A specific example 
is the one we opened this book with, the move of the 
editorial board of Lingua (journals.elsevier.com/lingua) 
and their associated cultural capital to a new journal. 
The network was maintained, but there was also no 
change in visible pricing for authors. This can also be 
the case when research funding bodies make funds 
available for Open Access publications. These funds  
do not come directly from the author or their home 
institution, but are additionally made available  
precisely for the purpose of making a publication 
generally available.
Another mechanism for resourcing publication is to 
directly support the provision of underlying 
infrastructure, aiming to reduce costs through 
community in-sourcing. In this case funders, generally 
libraries, fund the system or infrastructure that supports 
the publication process. This might occur through 
funding of software and platform development, such  
as the Open Journal System software (https://
openjournalsystems.com) or the Collaborative 
Knowledge Foundation (https://coko.foundation/
product-suite) publishing modules. An alternative  
is to support a coordinating organisation that distributes 
resources. Models like Knowledge Unlatched 
(knowledgeunlatched.org) and the Open Library  
of Humanities operate in this way. 
Footnotes
31 Knowledge Exchange 2019. “Accelerating scholarly 
communication: The transformative role of preprints”  
https://repository.jisc.ac.uk/7525/1/Knowledge_Exchange_
Accelerating_Scholarly_Communications_Sept_2019.pdf
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Some of these initiatives move beyond traditional 
publishing such as the 2.5% initiative in the US (Lewis 
et al. n.d.), SCOSS (scoss.org), and the Core Data 
Resources for the Life Sciences (Anderson et al. 2017; 
Durinx et al. 2017) which are also intended to address 
the needs of underpinning infrastructures and data 
resources. 
The actual funding mechanisms here frequently take the 
form of subscriptions. However, the subscription benefit 
is not access to content but something more intangible: 
association with a progressive alliance, an expression of 
values, and some measure of influence over the strategy.
These models require community coordination and 
collective action. Some of these models have seen 
success, and some are still developing. Small-scale 
changes that have a clear place within existing budgets, 
such as Open Library of Humanities (Franck 2019) and 
Knowledge Unlatched (Montgomery 2015) have been 
more successful than efforts that involve radical shifts, 
such as the 2.5% initiative. However, it can be argued 
that some of these have greater long-term potential for 
transformation. Where there are effective oligopolies, 
such as is the case for the consortium of biomedical 
funders supporting the ELIXIR Core Life Sciences Data32 
Resources initiative, progress can also be made. 
Short-term project funding for new technical 
infrastructure initiatives can be obtained but, as has 
been suggested in several places, it is a challenge to 
build long-term sustainability for such efforts.
All of this, however, does not directly address the 
interests of researchers and their place in their various 
economies of status, prestige and time within their 
communities. Their social capital is tied up in community 
or group practices relating to their disciplinary communities 
and professional affiliations. Reducing the costs of 
changing practice will not be sufficient. Even if those 
collective action problems are solved, there are still 
challenges in changing the culture of research communities.
Hidden goods. Markets and exchange 
beyond money
One way to examine the complexities of scholarly 
communities, groups and organisations is to examine 
the flows of goods that are not directly related to 
money. If we want to intervene and change practices 
within the context of academia, awareness of the 
broader motivational forces that drive academic work is 
required. One expression of this is the so-called 
'prestige economy'. One prominent manifestation of the 
prestige economy in most disciplines is the importance 
of which outlets, often academic journals, a researcher 
publishes in. There is generally no direct monetary 
reward for scholars to publish in outlets regarded as the 
most exclusive (and thus often most prestigious) but 
this act of being associated with a prestigious outlet can 
indirectly influence the career development and thus 
monetary rewards of the researcher. This goes beyond 
publishing to other duties, such as being active on 
editorial boards of journals and being active in various 
communities, including scholarly societies.
This prestige economy creates inertia for changes in 
market dynamics, and complicates application and 
interpretation of pure economic theories in this context. 
It is hard for new entrants, for example, in the academic 
journal market to become established and competitive 
when there is such a strong emphasis on past prestige 
in informing decisions about where to submit one’s 
work. And as the discipline's best work is being sent to 
and published in the most prestigious journals in a given 
field, the necessity to keep subscribing to these journals 
is retained. When interpreting economic models and 
attempting intervention, awareness is needed of this 
self-enforcing cycle.
Footnotes
32 biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/598318v1
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Another form of (generally) non-financial exchange 
is the commitment of time. Researchers are generally 
time-poor but do have significant autonomy in choosing 
what efforts to contribute their time to. As we have noted 
earlier, the questions of which time is paid for by what 
organisations is a complex one. One way to understand 
this 'expenditure' is as a means of building social capital 
within particular groups that matter to the researcher. This 
speaks again to the issue of collective action and the 
community which will be the subject of the next chapter.
This attention to community building is also important in 
enriching our understanding of the concept of a 'prestige 
economy'. The question of prestige within which 
community? More particularly, how does this relate to 
status and membership? While it may seem like a simple 
exchange, we may need to consider the status granted 
within multiple communities and how that relates to the 
local and specific needs of that community.
If Open Access and, more widely, Open Scholarship are 
to become widely adopted practices, there is a need to 
be aware of these non-monetary economies and how 
they affect the behaviour of researchers. This is an issue 
in the current system, as well as in preparing for the 
future. Mandating behaviour that is not compatible with 
existing motivations and economies is likely to be met 
with non-adoption or even active resistance because 
those who have acquired a long track record in the 
established economy have more to lose than to gain by 
changing the rules of the game. Early-career researchers 
are often in a weak position to drive change and, in 
practice, are often driven to be more conservative as 
they compete for a limited number of positions.
Conclusion – disruption is an opportunity  
to build and rebuild institutional capital
The solution to the challenge of collective action is the 
building of new institutions, including infrastructures, 
culture, systems, platforms and practices that support 
Open Scholarship practice. To achieve this we need to 
build new institutional capital, both financial and cultural, 
as well as rebuilding the capital of neglected institutions. 
The current degradation of institutional capital and flux 
offers an opportunity to do this. ‘Creative disruption’  
is often seen as being tied to right wing ideologies 
based on market competition as a goal and driver of 
innovation, but Marx also argued for a form of creative 
disruption. Each ideological extreme assumes there is  
a ‘state of nature’ or ‘force of history’ that ensures that 
out of chaos arises a better system. A more pragmatic 
and historical analysis would note that revolutions offer 
the opportunity to reshape underlying incentives, but 
this rarely occurs in practice.
In our analysis we would ascribe this to the combination  
of network effects and returns to capital. The status  
quo usually wins. Seizing the opportunity for change 
therefore involves directly addressing the existing 
accumulation of capital, and building new institutions that 
challenge that. Considering the routes to how that can be 
achieved which will be the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 7
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In the previous chapters we have analysed the scholarly landscape through 
the lens of neoclassical economics, and examined community and group-
level economics as a means of addressing its shortcomings. 
Institutions and collective action
We have seen that, while market economic models are 
often helpful in diagnosing the presence of problems, 
they are not generally useful in guiding us towards the 
shape of solutions or actions to support transition to 
Open Scholarship. Solutions will be found by 
considering how groups and communities interact, 
identify and sustain themselves.
The challenge, as has become apparent through the 
last chapters, is that the opportunities and risks, 
problems and benefits are all bound up together. What 
links them all is the accumulation of capital in networks. 
This capital comes in many forms, in the form of 
institutions that provide effective community 
governance, in the form of prestige and influence, and 
in the form of liquid and illiquid financial assets. Often, 
the problems we create arise from allowing the easy 
interconversion of money and prestige without 
considering what this does to community capital.
In a world of globalisation, digital technologies and 
increasing complexities in ownership of intellectual 
property, the academic system is under constant 
pressure to adapt. Given its decentralised nature, 
changes to the system always require collective action. 
The default in a networked system will be to move 
towards closed; not closed in the sense of access 
controls, or intellectual property, or proprietary systems 
and software, but in the sense of control. Turning 
completely to the other direction is not desirable either. 
The opposite of control is not ‘open’, it is chaos. An 
open system has structures and institutions that 
support action, constraints, norms and practices that 
make work possible. We seek neither a defined system 
of rigid controls nor an absolutist freedom in the 
negative sense of ‘freedom from’ (Holbrook 2015) but 
openness in the positive sense of agency and capacity, 
both collective and individual. We seek ‘freedom to’. 
The challenge lies in finding the balance that enables it.
To steer necessary changes towards more Open 
Scholarship it is therefore important to understand how 
to organise collective action. We will use this chapter to 
explain what collective action is, why it is crucial for the 
success of Open Scholarship and which specific role 
institutions carry in organising collective action in the 
academic system. Given that many problems and 
opportunities for academia can be discussed as 
collective action problems, we can conclude that action 
towards Open Scholarship is, in general, possible. This 
action requires a deep understanding of how to make 
decisions and how to manage interactions between 
academic institutions. Therefore, a rigorous 
understanding of collective action is of utmost 
importance in the context of scholarship.
To achieve this balance, we need to engage in 
networked communities and to decide on many specific 
issues of how we can best seize the opportunities. We 
are well served by a strong body of knowledge that 
discusses collective action problems. This tells us that 
such problems are solved by institutions, either by 
strengthening existing ones or by creating new ones.
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Networks and capital. A short recap
The key to understanding Silicon Valley, the revolution 
and devolution of the web and, indeed, the issues of 
late capitalism, is the accumulation of capital. We have 
touched several times on the way in which networked 
economies can accelerate returns to capital without 
addressing this head-on.
In Chapter 3 we noted the rise of disciplines, of 
publishing as a service industry, and of the university 
being connected. We saw that these were linked, with 
disciplines, publishing venues and their recognition as 
‘scholarship’ by the academy and universities all being 
coupled together. What we did not delve into in detail is 
why these are linked, how the networks that define a 
discipline, including publishing venues, conferences and 
prestigious departments act as hubs that accumulate 
capital. We touched on history, but a great deal more 
insight will be gained through understanding how the 
staging, timing and environment in which a discipline 
comes to be created and recognised, leads to its 
character. Chemistry, a venerable and recognised 
discipline that calls itself ‘the central science’, is similar 
to physics but also perhaps to history, in a way that all 
of these differ from gender studies, or digital humanities, 
or bioinformatics33.
In Chapter 4 we saw what happens as meso-actors 
clash due to differences in motivations. What we didn’t 
discuss is how those clashes are resolved. Chapters 5 
and 6 provided a view over some of those economic 
interactions, and led us to the point that collective 
action to build and sustain institutional capital is critical. 
The question is how. But before that, the question with 
respect to Open Scholarship is – how do we take a 
principled decision about where to break down 
institutions that need reform and restructuring, and 
where do we strengthen the institutions that can help us 
to do that? To answer that, we need to dig further into 
the questions we have left along the way, to understand 
networked capital.
Gravitational hubs and the accumulation  
of capital
Scholarship in the 21st century is extensive, expensive, 
intensive and complicated. Many of the factors leading 
to complexity are accelerating. The affordances of 
networked digital technology now allow scholarship to 
be undertaken and shared in ways unimaginable just a 
generation ago. That expansion and acceleration has 
happened alongside globalisation more generally, the 
spread of the Web in particular and, contrary to the 
expectations of its original architects, the rapid 
emergence of platforms that act as central points of 
control. Dempsey (Dempsey 2005) observed that 
Amazon and Google were 'massive gravitational hubs'. 
That is a familiar qualification, and we can add the 
social media giants and cloud services, such as 
Facebook, Dropbox, Skype and many more, to these 
hubs. Dempsey also noted that
Footnotes
33 Indeed, all disciplines are different from their original progenitor 
in the western tradition, theology. The sciences are, after all, a 
subset of the humanities, not the other way around. The 
humanities, strictly speaking, are everything that is not  
the divinities.
“They are tied into the fabric of user behaviours 
and applications through an infrastructural 
tissue of lightweight, loosely coupled, webby 
approaches. They make data work hard: they 
extract as much intelligence as possible from 
growing reservoirs of data, and their services 
adapt reflexively, based on accumulated data 
about users.”
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The truth of the last sentence about data has recently 
become a notorious issue, with scandals such as the 
actions of Facebook and Cambridge Analytica in US 
and UK democratic processes34. What Dempsey 
(Dempsey, 2005) describes as ‘gravitational hubs’ is the 
result of network effects. This concept explains a mostly 
positive effect that an additional user of a good or 
service has on the value of that product. The financial 
aspects of this value have drawn capital, and venture 
capitalists, to products that offer these network effects, 
creating massive and architecturally flat systems that 
are designed to grow as fast as possible, accumulating 
as much attention and data, and as many users, as 
possible. Capital is turned to enhancing those effects, 
creating a positive feedback loop that was decried by 
Jeff Hammerbacher35 as leading to a situation where 
“the best minds of my generation are thinking about 
how to make people click ads” (Vance 2011).
The link between financial capital and network effects is 
not surprising, at least in retrospect. This is what 
competitive markets are best at, identifying value and 
bringing capital to bear on it to generate further private 
goods. What is perhaps more surprising is the way 
these network effects have also been linked to prestige. 
The academy is not simply failing to compete for the 
attention of those ‘best minds’ on problems of societal 
interest by providing less money than enhancing 
click-throughs, it has also lost its prestige, authority and 
credibility as a source of reliable knowledge. Prestige 
and cultural authority have often been connected to 
finances. The sponsors and patrons of early scholars 
sought prestige through expenditure on knowledge 
creation and the arts.
Many would argue that the loss of (perhaps largely 
unearned) authority is a good thing for the academy. 
Certainly a greater involvement with wider communities 
is part of the agenda of Open Scholarship. Engaging 
with global scholarly communities will require a greater 
respect for different kinds of knowledge and knowing. 
But equally, if scholarly knowledge is to have value, it 
must garner societal and community acceptance, even 
respect. If we discard traditional ‘authority’ based 
merely on prestige then we must earn new kinds of 
respect (which is simply prestige with a positive spin) 
and build new coalitions to achieve that.
Within the scholarly landscape the same issues play out 
at many scales, and in each of the four arenas in the KE 
OS Framework. If the above focused on the political 
and social arenas we also need to examine the parallel 
issues in the technical arena to return to the economic 
argument. As services with network effects continue to 
grow in size and improve over time (for example, as a 
result of user interface design), it becomes increasingly 
difficult for local solutions from the academic system  
to compete.
As with the Silicon Valley examples, the value that is 
being created and captured in these networked 
systems attracts those with free capital who can invest 
in enhancing them further. These are systematically 
commercial providers who combine free capital and the 
freedom to deploy it. 
Footnotes
34 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
Facebook%E2%80%93Cambridge_Analytica_data_scanda
35 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Hammerbacher
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Commercial providers are consolidating the most 
diverse services, not just offering solutions but 
developing complete ecosystems that the academic 
institutions and communities are finding increasingly 
difficult to escape. Even if parts of the academic system 
decide not to participate in these ecosystems, they 
soon realise the serious consequences of this decision. 
Those who do not participate in the ecosystem have a 
smaller reach, are evaluated less favourably and have 
fewer opportunities for collaboration: all important  
for scientists.
Consequently, researchers are dependent on 
ecosystems, which in turn empowers the operator of 
that system to systematically increase the cost of 
staying in the system and maximise the cost of leaving. 
The user-friendliness for researchers is significantly 
improved. They have digital tools that they often don't 
even have to pay for, their research has a wide reach 
and they get an extensive look at what other scientists 
produce. However, the increased cost of either staying 
or leaving established systems creates a dependency 
with no real alternative.
What is a major concern is that services founded 
without commercial interest, that have grown organically 
within scholarly communities, change ownership 
essentially overnight, and thus the value accumulated in 
the networked services can be leveraged for increased 
market control and commercial purposes. One example 
of this we have already covered is SSRN. Though the 
service is operating largely unchanged for end-users, 
giving full power and control of the service and its data 
to the largest commercial publisher ensures that the 
service policies and future development do not form a 
threat to commercial interests.
Another example highlighting that large academic 
publishers are seeking to buy up and monopolise the 
digital platforms that scholars use for their work is 
Elsevier's acquisition of US-based Aries Systems36. 
Aries Systems offers workflow tools for academics, and 
the acquisition is seen by some observers as the latest 
step in a strategy by big publishers to create an end-to-
end platform on which academics do everything from 
devising a research question all the way to tracking how 
many citations the resulting paper garners. In many 
ways, such a platform could make life easier for 
academics – but it could also lock them into a particular 
publisher’s system. If that happens, some fear, large 
publishers with a captive audience could raise prices at 
will and also gain even more power over the research 
process. Acquisitions like this can also be interpreted  
as defensive moves, where potential threats of 
emerging alternative practices are extinguished before 
they become negative impacts on the bottom line.
The challenge here is to not simply observe and bewail 
that things have gone wrong, but to ask how we can 
collectively design institutions that are capable of 
achieving scale and delivering on our aspirations for 
greater openness. It is through a rigorous application of 
our understanding of the way in which institutions can 
solve collective action problems that we will be able to 
identify the possibilities and design principles that 
preserve academic autonomy, while solving the ever-
larger problems we face in a globalised, networked world.
The institutions that make up the rich tapestry of the 
scholarly world (journals, conferences, societies etc) are 
bit by bit eroded by platforms that favour homogeneous 
services that can be used by the widest range of users. 
For example, the humanities are perhaps the discipline 
most strongly resisting the long-term trend toward 
journal articles and citation metrics being the 
homogeneous form of scholarly communication and 
evaluation, and the platforms and services that underpin 
Footnotes
36 elsevier.com/about/press-releases/corporate/elsevier-closes-
its-acquisition-of-aries-systems
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that form. In other disciplines, societies have either 
become indistinguishable from commercial publishers, 
or have contracted their journals to those publishers, 
making those journals profit centres rather than 
institutions that act in the best interest of scholarship. 
In order to deal with this, we must understand how the 
organisational structure of the academic system 
functions and what form of action is actually possible 
within it. Therefore, in the following section we will 
discuss why collective action is such an important 
method to make the science system capable of 
operating in its own best interest.
Institutional capital and the governance  
of hubs
The solution to the challenge of these gravitational hubs 
is strong community institutions that can act to preserve 
community autonomy and agency and to limit the 
accumulation of capital by non-community actors. 
There is, however, a problem here. For such an 
institution to be able to act in such a way it must itself 
have sufficient critical mass, and therefore capital, to be 
an effective economic actor. It must, in fact, be a 
gravitational hub in its own right.
If this is true, then what principled stance can be taken 
to define which of these hubs is ‘good’ and which 
‘bad’? One approach, championed by many in the 
community, is to define not-for-profit organisations as 
good, and for-profit organisations as bad, or at least to 
require that for-profit players have their areas of action 
limited. Another common argument is that small 
organisations are preferred over large ones. However, 
many of our examples illustrate that this criterion is, at 
best, a poor heuristic. It could be argued that Crossref 
and ORCID (both not-for-profits) only exist due to the 
actions of large for-profit publishers. Both are valuable 
because of their scale and domination of the identifier 
space. Both have raised concerns due to the same 
issues. In addition, examples like bepress (bepress.
com) and HighWire Press (highwirepress.com) 
– where not-for-profit operations were sold to for-profit 
operators – show that local tax status does not prevent 
acquisition. Equally, not for profit status does not 
prevent an organisation operating alongside and with 
the same motivations as for-profit entities.
These are largely well-worn arguments. A new insight 
arises out of the idea that community institutions need 
to act as pools of capital. That is, in many jurisdictions  
a not-for-profit status can prevent a community from 
investing in those institutions. While we may invest time, 
effort and attention into these institutions we are, in 
many cases, legally prohibited from investing financially 
in them. This creates an asymmetry which empowers 
financial capital, and therefore commercial organisations 
without these restrictions, to exercise greater leverage. 
The growing interest in organisational forms such as 
Benefit Corporations (USA)37 and Community Interest 
Companies (UK)38 is a response to this.
Some of the initiatives taken by Ubiquity Press 
(ubiquitypress.com/), a privately held for-profit UK 
company, to seek community trust provide a mirror  
to this approach. The development of community 
contracts and other approaches to create strong 
commitments on future strategy and behaviour, but not 
limiting investment and capital growth, are interesting  
in this respect. Hindawi Publishing (hindawi.com), 
another for-profit entity, has similarly sought to articulate 
principles by which for-profit entities can interact  
with scholarly communities, while still retaining the 
advantages of for-profit status and still being  
motivated by financial returns.
Footnotes
37 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benefit_corporation
38 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_interest_company
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Alternative approaches to creating pools of financial 
capital amongst more traditional scholarly community 
organisations are also emerging. The Global 
Sustainability Coalition for Open Science Services 
(SCOSS) (scoss.org) is one example of an organisation 
set up to enable the pooling of capital. Funding 
initiatives including the German National Research  
Data Infrastructure (NFDI) (dfg.de/en/research_
funding/programmes/nfdi/index.html), OA2020 
(https://oa2020.org), and the ELIXIR Core Data 
Resources for the life sciences initiative (biorxiv.org/
content/10.1101/598318v1) are examples of funders 
and other partners pooling capital – partly financial, 
partly social – to collectively move an agenda forward.
These initiatives are social and political institutions 
focused around governance. Some commercial entities, 
particularly smaller and less well-capitalised ones, see 
benefits in gaining greater community trust, itself a form 
of network capital, through voluntarily constraining their 
actions. Such constraints will only engender community 
trust if they are based on community-defined 
governance requirements. Such requirements are 
institutions in their own right, requiring their own 
network capital to have power.
Elinor Ostrom in Governing the Commons (Ostrom
1991) notes that the surface solution to many problems
of collective action is the existence of a supporting
institution – such as agreed governance framework
requirements. One example the Nobel Prize-winner
points to is the existence of the court system for dispute
resolution. However, such a supporting institution creates 
this form of ‘second order provisioning problem’. 
One conclusion for Open Scholarship is that, if we are 
to purposely design new institutions, we must avoid an 
infinite regress of such provisioning problems, and build 
on existing institutions, such as shared norms, existing 
pools of capital and prestige.
Even if our goal is radical change in practice, we must 
build it on foundations that currently exist.
This points us to a more sophisticated answer to the 
question of how we recognise the ‘good’ institutions. 
The answer lies in the forms of governance and the role 
of community in that governance but this can easily 
become circular. If the answer to ‘what is a good 
institution?’ is ‘one with good governance’ then we 
have simply shifted the problem to one of what 
constitutes good governance. This is also another 
example of the second order provisioning issue.
The logic of this book is to seek an answer based in 
economic analysis; one that utilises our understanding 
of markets, collective action and capital in the context 
of globalised networks of scholarship. Gravitational 
hubs collect capital and network connections to 
themselves. This is true whether they are ‘good’ or 
‘bad’. The critical question is how that capital is 
reinvested. Does it return to a community, a structure in 
the broader network, or is it extracted? This allows us, 
in principle, to judge a non-commercial vs a commercial 
institution. What is the return on investment? What 
proportion of attracted capital flows to strengthening 
network connections beyond those directly linked to the 
hub? What is the outflow to external investors beyond 
the community? Fundamentally, what value is being 
created that is meaningful to us?
Another way to ask this question is, what are the goods 
that are being created? Are they private goods? Are 
they rivalrous and excludable and therefore not 
accessible to the community that funds them? Or are 
they more public-like? In practice, as we have noted, in 
the academic landscape many of the important goods 
will fall in between these extremes, being variously 
common pool resources or club goods. The goals of 
Open Scholarship in a networked context can be 
framed as an effort to ensure that gravitational hubs are 
managed effectively as common pool resources or club 
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goods, with efforts and institutions put in place that aim 
to make them more public-like, taking full advantage of 
the reduction in rivalry in the digital space.
The governance of scholarly common  
pool resources
We have referred already to the core work on the 
governance of common pool resources, Ostrom’s 
Governing the Commons. Other important pieces of 
classical economic theory include Mancur Olson’s The 
Logic of Collective Action (Olson 1974) and James 
Buchanan’s An Economic Theory of Clubs (Buchanan 
1965). Olson and Buchanan developed the now 
standard economic approaches to demonstrate that 
large groups will not generate collective (ie non-private) 
goods. Both then examine the conditions under which 
groups can overcome this problem, Olson starting from 
an observational set of case studies and Buchanan 
working through a mathematical model.
Hardin would later sharpen the mathematical point in 
his essay The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968) 
using game theory to make the claim that collective 
property could not be successfully managed. Ostrom’s 
(Ostrom 1991) contribution, for which she was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in Economics, was to show how Hardin 
had got it wrong. In common with Olson and Buchanan, 
Ostrom’s work (Ostrom 1991) – a rich combination of 
case studies, mathematical reasoning and game theory, 
and psychological experiment – showed that the critical 
factor for the successful management of common pool 
resources was the architecture of the managing 
community and its institutions.
While we defined institutions earlier in this book, basing 
that definition on Ostrom’s, we have not (to this point) 
defended the need for what might appear to be a rather 
woolly definition, “a set of shared rules, practices and 
systems shared by a set of agents”. One of Ostrom’s 
(Ostrom 1991) key insights39 was that the shared  
rules that could successfully underpin community 
management of common pool and collective resources 
could be explicit or implicit, formalised in the existence of 
some organisation (like the Californian court system in her 
case study of ground water resources) or embedded in 
cultural practices (as is the case for several of the natural 
resource commons she described). In our framing, this 
means institutions are community capital.
Ostrom identified eight principles of communities40 that 
enabled them to successfully manage collective goods 
(such as Common Pool Resources and Club Goods, 
see page 77, Table 5.1):
Footnotes
39 In the context of knowledge creation it is worth noting that the 
root of this insight came from observing and valuing the way in 
which non-western communities were successfully managing 
resources, and many western communities were not. Hardin, 
by contrast, was a racist who ignored or discounted the 
success of what he saw as primitive societies in managing 
collective goods.
40 An updated version of these rules adopted for digital commons 
in the 21st century by German Sommerschool on the 
Commons is presented as a series of points of orientation, or 
commitments to be made, which makes a useful counterpoint.
77Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action Institutions and collective action
1. Define clear group boundaries
2. Match rules governing use of common goods  
to local needs and conditions
3. Ensure that those affected by the rules can 
participate in modifying the rules
4. Make sure the rule-making rights of community 
members are respected by outside authorities
5. Develop a system, carried out by community 
members, for monitoring members’ behaviour
6. Use graduated sanctions for rule violators
7. Provide accessible, low-cost means for  
dispute resolution
8. Build responsibility for governing the common 
resource in nested tiers from the lowest level  
up to the entire interconnected system
While we have argued that there are aspects of the markets 
in the scholarly landscape that are peculiar, there is no 
reason to expect that the extensive literature on commons 
and their successful management cannot be applied 
directly. This is because the goods in the scholarly 
landscape are not private goods, but are collective. That 
is, they are common pool resources and club goods, and 
therefore market competition is not a good mechanism 
to manage them, but approaches that are suited to these 
kinds of goods should be. The questions will relate to 
identifying how specific common pool resources and 
institutions are related, where competitive markets may be 
useful and the forms of community capital that are in play.
Not all of Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) principles are a neat 
fit for scholarly communities, or for top-down policy 
agendas. Some of them – including the first rule, to 
clearly define community boundaries – seem at odds 
with the aspirations of Open Scholarship to foster inclusion.  
It should also be noted that these are rules for 
sustainability and stability, not for managing change. 
There are, however, some clear implications for policy 
implementation that arise from these principles.
Firstly, that successful management of the production  
of collective resources happens at the level of 
communities, who need sufficient autonomy to manage 
their own processes. The role of top-down processes 
should (ideally) be to enable, to guide and to provide 
institutions that achieve these goals where appropriate. 
Secondly, that monitoring should ideally be a side 
product of what the community is doing anyway. In 
Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) work there is a great deal of 
attention applied to how the day to day use of a 
common pool resource gets coupled to monitoring the 
observance of rules. As scholars we observe, critique 
and integrate our colleagues’ and competitors’ work 
and behaviour all the time, but how can that be 
harnessed to efficiently guide us to monitor each other’s 
Open Scholarship practices?
Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) work is also a challenge for 
those who like standardisation. It is clear from her work, 
and an enormous body of work that follows from it, that 
local community processes for defining standards are 
crucial. Global standards are institutions, but for them to 
become global they need to follow a bottom-up 
adoption process. The success of FAIR (Wilkinson et al. 
2016; Mons et al. 2017) as an aspirational narrative 
provides a strong example. FAIR, standing for ‘findable’, 
‘accessible’, ‘interoperable’, and ‘re-usable’, is an 
institution. It is not an institution in terms of technical 
standard but a shared aspiration and narrative that is 
guiding the development of practice, technology and 
policy, at least in the sciences. Efforts to define a global 
definition of precisely what each term means have 
failed. So have efforts to restrict its scope to only ‘data’. 
However, community-based efforts are rallying around 
FAIR as a way to organise changes in practice and to 
develop local standards. In that sense, FAIR is acting as 
Table 5.1 Ostrom's eight principles  
of communities
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a shared institution across many parts of the sciences, 
supporting the development of local standards and 
practice that have the potential to build into hierarchical 
systems of practice and governance. If the tooling 
around local FAIR standards is part of the day to day 
work of a community then the monitoring of compliance 
with community standards will be straightforward. 
Failure to adhere to those standards will likely be 
attached to graduated sanctions: not having articles 
accepted, not being invited to give presentations, 
perhaps being publicly called out for lax practice, and 
ultimately being ejected from the scholarly community.
One implication that arises from this analysis is that it is 
important that there are appropriate mechanisms for 
dispute resolution. Arguably, our current systems for 
managing the breaching of community standards are far 
too costly and this should be addressed, while 
simultaneously seeking to build trust and reliability in 
those processes. Clearly there is a tension here.
Again, perhaps the most challenging implication for those 
of us who would like to see strong global standards 
imposed is a clear signal that the implementation of FAIR 
needs to be carried out at the local community level. The 
question that we have not resolved in quantitative terms is 
precisely what that level is.
Managing for change
As we noted above, Governing the Commons provides little 
guidance on how to manage change. Olson’s (Olson 1974) 
work helps us to identify ways to agree on processes of 
change. In particular, The Logic of Collective Action provides 
three examples of how groups can act to generate a 
collective good even if they are too large to act collectively in 
a simple analysis. These approaches have been discussed 
in the context of data infrastructures previously (Neylon 
2017) so will only be covered in outline here.
In essence, there are three approaches that enable 
action. In one, the collective good is provided as a side 
product of generating a private good, so standard 
market analysis driven by the competitive self-interest of 
agents is sufficient. Relatively little attention has been 
focused on mechanisms by which we can couple 
self-interested behaviour of actors in the scholarly 
landscape to greater public-making of scholarly goods. 
The second approach is enabled where there is a small 
number of large players amongst the group. In the 
scholarly landscape publishers provide an example of 
this. An effective oligopoly of between five and eight 
players dominates the market, enabling this group to 
act collectively to create public-like goods. The 
development of both Crossref and ORCID provides 
examples of this.
The final approach is compulsion. At one level this takes 
us back to the role of government and taxation in the 
generation of truly public goods. We defined macro-
actors as those with sufficient power to compel such 
behaviour. However, Olson (Olson 1974) notes a 
different route, observing examples where groups 
voluntarily agree to bind themselves to contribute to the 
production of a collective good. As Crow (Crow 2013) 
has noted, this has distinct similarities to the development 
of ‘assurance contracts’, a form of agreement where 
individual agents sign up to contribute to a collective 
good, if a sufficient number of other agents agree to do 
the same. Kickstarter (kickstarter.com) and Patreon 
(patreon.com) are examples of such assurance contracts41. 
There has been relatively little effort, beyond crowd-
funding of some research projects on a relatively small 
scale, in examining how these approaches might be 
scaled up.
Footnotes
41  Another example is the collective agreement of some US states 
to assign the electoral college votes from their state according 
to the national vote share for presidential candidates. Several 
states have enacted legislation that only comes into effect if  
a specified number of other states enact similar legislation.
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More generally, the lesson that a community can agree 
to bind itself to be compelled to certain action, provided 
the community as a whole signs up, is an important one 
for our analysis. We know of examples where such 
agreements have failed. The original Public Library of 
Science (PLOS) (plos.org/) petition was signed by 
28,000 people who pledged not to publish in venues 
that would not allow them to deposit copies of their 
work in PubMed Central (ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/),  
but the evidence is that few of the signatories actually 
followed through on that commitment. Again, we can 
turn to Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) observations on 
monitoring and sanctions, and Olson’s (Olson 1974) on 
the structure of the commitment at a community level, 
to provide at least part of the explanation.
Fundamentally Olson’s (Olson 1974) lesson combined 
with Ostrom (Ostrom 1991) is that change needs to be 
negotiated by small groups who are empowered to 
make decisions. By empowered we don’t simply mean 
that they hold power over the communities that they 
represent but that they are trusted. This means that the 
individuals at the table hold networked capital. In a 
commercial setting such networked capital may simply 
be financial capital, or perhaps market share, but will 
also require seniority within the organisation they 
represent. Anyone who has negotiated an agreement 
amongst technical staff only to have it overturned by 
more senior strategic staff has observed this distinction. 
In a community setting that capital will be less clear, 
harder to measure and demonstrate, and easier to lose. 
Where these come together the risk of motivational 
clashes being compounded by clashes in different 
forms of capital is significant.
We can’t state with confidence what scale is 
appropriate, or where we can be confident that a 
community leader or representative has the confidence 
of those that they represent. We don’t know in detail 
how capital interacts across the different types we have 
noted. These interactions, and the non-fungible nature 
of the assets and goods in play, go beyond classical 
economic analysis. What we can say with confidence is 
that the institutional forms of community representation, 
both for professional academics and for other key 
stakeholders including professional staff, wider publics 
and others, have been weakened by the concentration 
of capital driven by network effects.
Change can be led through encouragement, through 
strong narrative, and by well-designed support 
mechanisms. It can also be compelled. But compulsion 
requires high levels of coordination, monitoring and 
ultimately sanctions. Both approaches can be applied, 
but the fundamental message is that the process will be 
messy. Building up communities of practice will take 
time and changing culture is slow. The balance between 
compelling change and encouraging it through strong 
institutions, such as funding rules, is not clear. The 
problems are not technical, they are political and social, 
but economic analysis and economic approaches have 
promise in helping to bring the opportunities, costs and 
challenges together for analysis.
Consequences for stakeholders
While there are limitations in what our analysis can tell 
us about the specific actions that will best deliver 
change, we can describe the consequences the 
principles articulated by Ostrom and the analysis of 
Olson and others have for specific stakeholders. Some 
of these are obvious, and some are radical. Most 
involve some rethinking of the roles that specific 
stakeholders, both meso- and macro-level, take on  
in creating the supporting structures for scholarship.
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Scholarly and professional communities
Considering Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) principles in the 
light of the role of communities, both those defined by  
a formal organisation and more informal ones, the 
importance of community definition becomes clear. 
Stable communities will have clearly defined group 
boundaries, including those formalised through 
membership requirements. They will also be sustainable 
clubs, generating collective goods that members benefit 
from. Successful communities will act to maintain a level 
of local control over the rules that govern the production 
and use of those goods and ensure the rule-making 
rights of the community are respected. They will also 
provide community mechanisms that ensure those 
affected by those rules can participate in modifying and 
evolving them. There is a clear tension here between 
clearly defined communities and those seeking to 
question boundaries, including interdisciplinary research, 
research from the perspective of disadvantaged groups 
including most of ‘area studies’, and the development 
of new fields and approaches. There is a significant 
literature on the challenges of building new research 
communities and supporting interdisciplinary research 
that might gain from being seen through the lens of 
collective action and political economy.
In the context of publishing activities this may mean 
regaining control over the options and choices available 
to the community. Where community policy has been 
driven by the business requirements of existing 
publishing models there is a clear potential clash 
between the business imperatives and the community 
needs. The community goal is communication but 
business needs have (at least in the past) tended 
towards restricting access. This is true whether 
publishing services are an in-house operation, for 
example as found in the American Chemical Society 
(acs.org/content/acs/en.html) and the Royal Society  
of Chemistry (rsc.org), or whether they are sourced 
from a third-party provider as is the case for many other, 
usually smaller, scholarly societies. If the capital and 
financial flows of publishing are outweighing the voice of 
the community itself then that is an issue regardless of 
the organisational form. More than this, it is possible for 
the community to become dependent on, and not 
infrequently defensive of, specific forms of financial 
flows to support community activities.
Another point of guidance from Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) 
principles is collective action amongst the meso-actors 
of scholarly and professional communities. Principle 
eight states that responsibility for governance of 
collective resources should be built into nested tiers. 
The organisation amongst scholarly and professional 
communities to develop a stronger voice in change will 
be an important goal. Currently it could be argued that 
large societies, many with a dominant income from 
publishing, have a stronger voice than the many smaller 
societies that exist. National Academies do seek to 
articulate a voice for scholarly communities but building 
structures that allow groups of societies, for instance in 
the humanities and social sciences, to come together at 
national or regional levels to identify common ground 
will be valuable.
Equally, scholarly and professional communities will 
have to engage effectively with the changes required by 
our changing world and demanded by the changing 
societies that fund them. We need to note the 
concerns, that ‘stronger’ societies may lead to greater 
conservatism and rigidity due to their significant financial 
interest in preserving the status quo. There is certainly a 
correlation between scholarly societies’ reaction to 
Open Access and Open Scholarship more generally, 
and their dependence on traditional publishing income 
to support activities. What systems and institutions 
would balance the conservatism that is necessary for 
clear community definition with incentives to change 
and innovate that deliver new communities and  
new institutions?
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Publishers
In many debates around Open Scholarship there is a 
tendency to conflate ‘publishers’ with ‘commercial 
service providers’. Our analysis shows that there are 
two distinct activities here; one that involves publishing 
as community building (setting standards of peer review, 
quality assurance and defining identity) and, separate to 
this, the provision of services that support these 
activities. As we noted in Chapter 3 these activities 
became combined in the entities we call publishers 
during the 20th century.
Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) analysis challenges this 
conflation of community building and generic service 
provision. Community building involves clearly defining 
the boundary of the community. In turn this means 
defining the set of actors that are subject to the 
governance of the community. There is a strict ‘in or 
out’ binary and those who are ‘in’ are subject to the 
rules, norms and sanctions of that community. Those 
who are outside are not subject to the rules. The 
purpose of market-driven services, provided by self-
interested actors, is to set up conditions where those 
who are not subject to those rules, norms and 
sanctions have opportunities to create value. That value 
may be purchased by the community but it does not 
make the provider part of the community. Such a 
service provider cannot simultaneously be a member of 
the community. This damages the community by 
reducing the strength of the rules of membership. It 
reduces the value of the market by overly restricting the 
range of action of the provider.
One conclusion of this analysis, therefore, is a need to 
define carefully which parts of the publishing process 
are community activities, which are appropriate to be 
left to a market of service providers, and what the 
relationship between those should be. This is a  
complex question. It is not enough to ask whether 
an organisation is ‘part of a community’. Groups of 
commercial service providers may also have their own 
communities, including the provision of their own 
collective goods. Scholarly community members may 
also have roles within commercial service providers. 
This complex overlapping set of communities makes it 
critical for the scholarly community to clearly define its 
boundaries and scope of governance, rules and norms.
Another conclusion is that the expectation that 
‘publishing’ is a consistent activity across the scholarly 
community is an illusion. ‘Publishing’ and ‘peer review’ 
may be shared institutions that many scholarly 
communities see as important, but the rules and norms 
that govern them are, and should be, matters for 
specific communities to govern and adapt. These 
communities may be disciplinary, geographical or have 
other common factors. At high levels of granularity we 
need mechanisms for negotiating what is shared and 
what is different but, as the many groups who have 
tried to regularise and describe the myriad variations  
of peer review have found, any attempt to describe the 
entire space and define a universal quality standard is 
doomed to failure.
Commercial service providers
If scholarly communities are to gain the most from the 
ability of third party providers to innovate, raise capital 
and provide competitive services, those potential 
providers need clarity and consistency on the service 
requirements, the appropriate space for competition 
and the terms of engagement. In many ways this is 
simply an application of best practice in procurement; 
clear definition of requirements, clarity on the process 
for selection, and transparency and trust in the probity 
of the process.
Little of this is the responsibility of providers, current or 
future, but of those that wish to procure services – 
generally funders, research performing organisations or 
scholarly communities. Deliberate efforts to foster 
competition and innovation, and to support the ability of 
providers to raise capital through providing stability and 
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predictability, are required. Close attention needs to be 
paid to how purchasing arrangements play a role in 
enhancing market competition where appropriate. 
Current publishing service arrangements are an 
example where, as we have seen, the current state of 
the market would require radical change to foster a 
competitive service-based market. Indeed, the ideal 
arrangements to create a functional market are far  
from clear.
A significant part of the challenge is the mismatch 
between a potentially global market for services, 
national and regional policy and funding arrangements, 
and the number and diversity of universities and 
research performing organisations that make actual 
purchases. Clear frameworks for engagement and 
market relations between commercial providers and 
‘the scholarly community’ require that community to 
have clarity on common norms and structures, as well 
as purchasing arrangements. Once again, of course, 
this is a collective action challenge.
Universities and other research- 
performing organisations
Universities emerge at the centre of our analysis as 
long-standing formal institutions (in the Ostrom sense) 
(Ostrom 1991) that organise scholarship and provide 
many of the key platforms that coordinate the activities 
of actors. They are important gravitational hubs that 
collect a range of capital. It seems likely that they 
compete productively with scholarly communities, both 
formal and informal, creating a balance that prevents 
either from becoming too powerful.
At the same time universities are numerous and 
heterogeneous, making it difficult for them to act 
collectively. Many of the stories throughout this book 
can be told from the perspective of universities as a 
group failing to act due to the challenges of 
coordination amongst such a diverse group. 
For universities, a critical result of our analysis is the 
necessity to work more effectively together, through 
coalitions and alliances, mission groups and regional 
associations. These groupings, the ‘nested tiers’ that 
govern collective resources, need to be themselves 
coordinated. Identifying how this can be achieved, while 
not raising regulatory issues, will be crucial.
Within universities a challenge is supporting the diverse 
internal communities that they hold. There has been 
much discussion of the problems of the ‘neoliberal’ or 
‘new public management’ university. The guidelines we 
discuss above emphasise a role for universities and 
research-performing organisations as platforms for 
activities that are not managed and controlled, but 
supported. At the same time, effective support creates 
challenges of appropriate resource allocation and 
consistency. Centralised decision-making is necessary 
for consistency and effective deployment of limited 
resources. Such decisions impose limitations on the 
freedoms for the communities that comprise the 
university. Balancing that tension internally, while forging 
alliances externally (which will in turn raise similar issues 
of alignment and common ground), is clearly a 
significant challenge.
Funders and other ‘macro’ actors
Throughout this book we have generally described 
funders as macro-actors and treated them as part of 
the environment in which meso-actors operate. 
However, at the beginning we also noted that this 
wasn’t a clean distinction. Smaller funders are more 
properly seen as meso-actors and even national and 
regional funders need to collaborate with other agencies 
and communities to make change. The distinction is 
perhaps clearest when we consider ‘business as usual’, 
where funder systems and policies are most clearly part 
of the environment in which others operate (macro), 
compared to their efforts to drive change in research 
practice, such as towards Open Scholarship, where 
persuasion and collaboration are critical (meso). 
83Open Scholarship and the  need for collective action Institutions and collective action
Arguably, one of the significant challenges we face  
is that policy design often bridges these two roles  
without sufficient consideration given to the different 
approaches in communication and persuasion, versus 
control and compulsion, required for each phase.
Applying Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) dictums to funders, in 
their role as macro-actors and proxies of government, 
suggests that their role should be limited. They should 
provide mechanisms for dispute resolution, support the 
nested tiers of governance, and will have an important role 
at the severe end of a system of graduated sanctions. But 
they should also enable those affected by rules to make 
them as far as is possible, and ensure that the rule-making 
rights of communities are respected by outside authorities, 
not least the funders themselves.
But funders are also the main instruments for changing 
scholarly practice. Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) conception 
of community governance of common pool resources 
(of which research funding can be considered an 
example) is evolutionary. A conservatism of the 
communities in the various nested tiers is part of the 
model. In several of the case studies in Governing the 
Commons it is noted that those communities are not 
always able to deal with rapid change. Funders play a 
critical role in many places as the main institution that 
protects the rights of scholarly communities to make 
their own rules against short-term interventions by 
government, particularly in democratic and market-
oriented systems. In turn, they do this by mediating 
demands from government, and ultimately from society 
at large, to make changes in scholarly practice. In this 
role funders are more properly seen as meso-actors, 
and as one tier in the set of governance arrangements 
for scholarship.
However, that mediation requires a balancing of roles, 
including taking a leadership position, articulating 
aspirations for change and guiding communities 
towards it. It may involve horizon-scanning and strategic 
analysis to prepare for future changes, including 
political, technical, economic and social change. In 
these roles as peak bodies funders would be serving as 
macro-actors.
In their role as meso-actors, funders are part of the 
broader scholarly community, negotiating with other 
meso-actors to enable change and preserve continuity. 
But as macro-actors they necessarily sit outside it. This 
complexity of the role underpins many of the issues that 
funders face and many of the arguments between 
funders and other stakeholder groups result from the 
potential confusion that arises. Issues over policy are a 
good illustration. Funders will seek to make policy as 
part of an aspiration for change. The response to such 
policy change may be antagonistic because it is seen 
as changing the environment in which other micro- and 
meso-actors need to operate. From the perspective of 
meso-actors policy looks like law, whereas from a 
funder perspective it may be intended as  
direction-setting.
Policy can, in fact, have at least three roles. One is to 
articulate aspiration and seek to create a narrative. This 
is direction-setting or signposting. The second role is to 
enable or support change, often through resource 
allocation or the setting of guidelines, and sometimes 
through monitoring of progress. The third role, which is 
quite distinct, is to maintain standards through formal 
rule-setting and limitations. A significant problem in our 
space is that we use the same instruments in all three 
roles and there is often confusion about the intention 
and design of specific policy instruments. Internally and 
externally it would be helpful to articulate clearly which 
role is connected to any specific action, alongside a 
clear framework for how they relate to each other.
From the perspective of funders, other stakeholders 
may seem to ignore direction-setting statements until 
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such time as they are tied to resources or compliance 
measures. Other stakeholders often complain that 
funders (and other macro-actors) move too quickly in 
setting new frameworks and requirements. Frustration 
on both sides can frequently lead to the middle step 
(supporting and collaboration on change) being 
forgotten. As will have become familiar by now, this is  
a collective action problem, requiring frameworks and 
systems that support negotiation, while enabling 
funders and macro-actors to modify the economics  
of the environment in a planned way so as to  
enable change.
While it may be possible to envisage an ideal state in 
which a set of systems and institutions balance these 
tensions, we also need to deal with the real work. Some 
path dependencies are very deep, and some system 
risks can become acute. Frameworks and systems that 
support negotiation can be used as barriers to change. 
In the end, funders act as guardians of the system as a 
whole and may find it necessary to drive more rapid and 
urgent change. We may argue about whether this 
directional and regulatory role should be coupled to the 
disbursement of funding, but in practice the power that 
the funding role creates makes this a natural place to 
locate that role.
In the final part of this chapter we will explore an 
example of this through an analysis of the changes 
involved in Plan S.
Plan S through the lens of collective action
The development, motivations for, responses to and 
implementation of Plan S provide an excellent example 
to illustrate the use of collective action and collective 
good governance. Plan S is a policy initiative, supported 
by an international consortium of research funders 
called cOAlition S (coalition-s.org), originally from a 
set of European funders to accelerate progress towards 
full and immediate Open Access to formal research 
publications. Firstly, Plan S is an example of collective 
action amongst funders as meso-actors. It was 
supported by a coordinating institution, Science 
Europe (scienceeurope.org), through which a range of 
European funders collaborate. The existence of such  
a coordinating institution is an important part of how 
those funders worked together.
The original funders are a group that have worked 
collectively together over a long period and have 
similarities in scale and motivations. They are the 
European funders that have set the strongest Open 
Access policies in the past. An important part of the 
motivation behind Plan S has been a frustration amongst 
these funders about the pace of change. With respect to 
Olson’s (Olson 1974) modes of achieving collective 
action, this is an example of a small group that seeks to 
have the influence and capital to drive action by others. 
Collectively, by coordinating policy and implementation 
they seek to both accelerate change within their own 
fundees, and more importantly, perhaps, to draw in 
additional funders to their agenda. The question of how 
rapidly progress is made may depend on the extent to 
which the funders could be thought of as an oligopoly in 
their space. While they do not control the majority of 
global or even European funding they could be argued to 
have significant prestige capital and influence, and within 
specific countries (most notably the UK) Plan S 
signatories do amount to an effective oligopoly on 
project-based funding.
It is not an accident that Plan S started in Europe. The 
central coordinating role played by Science Europe and 
the greater coordination amongst European meso-
actors more generally play an important role in 
supporting collective action. The existing policy agenda 
set out through the Commission and its funding 
programmes has created conditions where there is a 
broad alignment on pursuing an Open Access agenda. 
By comparison, coordination in the USA is generally  
not amongst agencies but driven by top-down  
policy agendas. 
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This is exacerbated by various key US funding  
agencies being located in quite different government 
departments. Existing coordination institutions that 
support negotiation are an important contributor to 
collective action and the difference between those 
institutions in each location has significant effects. In 
Europe these include Science Europe, the European 
Commission and European Union, and various 
university groupings including the League of European 
Research Universities (LERU) (leru.org) and the 
European University Association (EUA) (eua.eu). In the 
US, the National Academies and mission groupings such 
as Ivy+, Big 10 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Ten_
Universities), Association of Land Grant Universities 
(ALGU) (aplu.org) and others play similar roles.
Responses
From the perspective of collective action the more  
than 600 responses to the Plan S implementation 
consultation (cOAlition S 2019) are also interesting. 
Firstly, essentially every response starts with an 
affirmation of support for Open Access. This is a 
substantial shift in the narrative from a time when many 
organisations would have been dismissive of Open 
Access as an agenda. Open Access is mainstream, 
even inevitable, and the Plan S announcement played  
a significant role in driving that shift.
Secondly, virtually every response follows up its support 
with a ‘but’ and it is of course these objections where 
the majority of the implementation challenge lies. A 
detailed analysis of those responses is out of the scope 
of this book but it is helpful to note that challenges are 
broadly divided into technical (arising mostly from 
repository providers and advocates), financial/economic 
(arising from those with significant financial stakes in the 
transition, primarily incumbent publishers and publisher 
income-dependent organisations), and social (usually 
describing concerns around ‘quality’ from organisations 
with social and prestige capital, primarily scholarly 
societies, or concerns about career paths and how 
shifts in practice might play into perceptions of quality 
and how they relate to funding and appointments, 
mainly from early career researcher groupings).
These concerns are generally expressed at the meso-
level, in terms of the sustainability of an organisation or 
community of practice, or in terms of the resourcing 
needed to achieve these goals. Strategic and system 
level (ie macro-level) responses are relatively rare.  
These primarily focus on the question of infrastructure 
provision, funding, coordination and therefore on 
collective action.
The collective action challenges of  
implementing Plan S
Achieving the kind of cultural change that Plan S aspires 
to requires many things to shift in a coordinated way. 
The challenge and opportunity for a coordinated 
initiative like Plan S (and many initiatives for Open 
Scholarship) is the disparate communities that need  
to be aligned. Focusing purely on disciplinary 
communities, it is clear that some are already very 
engaged in Open Access, and Open Scholarship more 
broadly, and receptive to increasing the pace of change. 
Some disciplinary communities are resistant, in both 
passive (not engaging with their options for Open 
Access) and in some cases active (objections to  
specific aspects of the implementation plan such  
as licensing) ways.
Other communities, including incumbent publishing 
services providers, may be interested in either 
channelling implementation into specific pathways (such 
as APC-based services), or simply slowing 
implementation down. The latter puts them precisely  
at odds with the funders seeking to drive change as 
rapidly as possible. Scholarly societies that are 
dependent on publishing income, as we have noted, 
have a tension to resolve if they are to both be 
representative of their scholarly communities’ interests 
and to maintain their financial sustainability.
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The argument around Plan S, and Open Access more 
generally, has a tendency to devolve to one of simple 
dichotomies: green vs gold, APCs vs subscriptions, 
invest in publishing services or in ‘infrastructure’. A 
collective action framing suggests a different model for 
deciding on investment. Success ultimately depends on 
communities (disciplinary, geographical, stakeholders) 
deciding for themselves to adopt an Open Access 
agenda. This means investing in enabling systems, but 
also with limited resources it may mean selecting those 
communities that are strategically positioned to lead 
change. Investment in systems and institutions that 
support a broad range of communities (for instance, 
national or regional read and publish funding 
agreements, or technical platforms for publishing) may 
be useful but such systems will need to be 
infrastructural (ie invisible to end-users) or a case will 
need to be made that these are relevant to the broad 
range of communities they are intended to serve. A 
significant problem with many of these institutions, 
including repositories, publishing platforms and various 
types of funding arrangements, is that they have  
been (rightly or wrongly) rejected by a range of 
disciplinary communities.
A logical tactical response to this situation is for those 
wishing to slow down implementation to make a case 
to such communities that ‘one size does not fit all’ and 
that ‘systems from the sciences are no use to 
humanities and social sciences’. Viable responses to 
this tactic include making a strong case for seeking to 
engage fully with these disciplines, and also actively 
investing in projects and systems that support those 
communities that are working for change in otherwise 
unengaged disciplinary groupings. One advantage of a 
focus on humanities and social science disciplines is 
that these remain tight communities that are small 
enough to reach and support through change, and the 
relevant scholarly societies are not as dependent on 
subscription publishing income. This makes those that 
are, or can be, convinced of the value of a shift towards 
Open Access better placed than many groupings in  
the sciences to plan and coordinate the collective  
action necessary.
A final consequence of the collective action view is  
to see the implementation process as a negotiation.  
The implementation will not be easy or comfortable,  
and it is unlikely to go smoothly. Those actors with  
an interest in derailing or controlling the process will 
seek to amplify the challenges as collective action and 
coordination are easy to block. The necessary response 
is a tight tactical focus on communities that are well 
placed for change and laying the groundwork to make 
change for a broader set of communities easy in the 
future. The global aspirations for Plan S are a challenge 
to delivering collective action. At the same time the 
expansion of the narrative and aspiration beyond 
Europe is important for many European scholarly 
communities. This line may be challenging to tread  
and communicate effectively. Alliances with other 
regional initiatives may be valuable here, mirroring  
again Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) prescription for nested 
hierarchies of governance.
Conclusion
A collective action framing offers no neat and clean 
solutions to the challenges of implementing Open 
Scholarship. It focuses our attention on what appears  
to be a contradiction. To make change we need to 
recognise that communities are different, while seeking 
to bring them into alignment. It does offer explanations 
for why many of these changes are hard. It can also 
help us to understand why some groups seem more 
able to enact change than others.
A collective action framing guides our attention to the 
importance of coordinating institutions. This can be 
community or missions groupings, loose networks or 
collaborations, or shared sets of rules and practices. At 
the highest level, peer review and publication are two 
such coordinating institutions that we share across the 
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scholarly landscape. Changes to these pose substantial 
challenges because the local differences in practice 
amongst scholarly communities are the bedrock of how 
those communities define and identify themselves. 
Culture change is therefore hard and requires evolving 
our existing institutions and – where necessary – 
building new.
Amongst the weakest collective actors are universities. 
They are effective perhaps at blocking change, but not 
generally at enacting it. Acting effectively both financially 
(for instance with respect to negotiations with publishing 
service providers) and politically (for example in 
addressing the challenge of collectively shifting 
evaluation criteria), will require strengthening of mission 
groups, national and regional groupings and 
international coordination. As we have noted, for 
scholarly societies to act in a more coordinated and 
progressive fashion, rather than being defensive, will 
require coordination mechanisms that are currently 
weak or non-existent.
There is also an element of realpolitik to be addressed. 
If our communities are disparate, they will nonetheless 
sometimes need to change faster than is comfortable. 
This requires coordinating institutions with a role, and 
the power, to drive change. We have suggested that 
funders, and particularly publicly supported funders, 
should consider a role that is more enabling than 
driving. But as the intermediaries between government 
and society, and as the holders of purse-strings, they 
are also appropriately placed to take this role where 
necessary. This is not new in itself. What perhaps is 
new, is the implication that such actions will create 
damage that will need to be addressed, and that  
trust for these kinds of actions will need to be built  
and rebuilt.
Chapter 8
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'We started this book with three stories about communities, publishing, 
infrastructures and their support. Does what we have discussed in the 
course of this book answer the questions they raised? 
Understanding the landscape
The final story raised the question of third party 
suppliers providing the platforms through which data 
and software are shared. Is this sustainable? Is it safe?
From our discussion we can see that the shift to  
digital tools and data has changed the economic 
characteristics of research outputs. These are collective 
goods with public-like characteristics. They are largely 
non-rivalrous. But they are also somewhat exclusive, 
only usable by specific communities with specialised 
knowledge. Platforms like GitHub (https://github.
com/), Mendeley (mendeley.com) and Zenodo 
(https://zenodo.org) enhance their public-like good 
characteristics, reducing exclusivity and making them 
more easily discoverable by broader communities.
These platforms can act as gravitational hubs, 
enhancing network effects, and this is part of their 
benefit. At the same time, the motivation for commercial 
providers of these platforms to enhance those network 
effects is not necessarily aligned with that of the 
research community. But smaller and more localised 
hubs focused on research community needs will not  
be able to attract the same levels of investment in a  
market setting.
If we choose to gain the benefits of these third-party 
platforms we can take three routes. The first is to 
accept the benefits alongside the risks, including the 
loss of content or future enclosure. The extreme risk is 
the complete removal of players with knowledge of the 
scholarly landscape from service provision, or 
disintermediation by global corporate players. This 
approach tends to be our default. The result of doing 
nothing is to accept the consequences of those risks. 
We could invest properly in community infrastructures, 
including a capability to ingest content from third-party 
platforms for appropriate preservation. But based on 
history this is unlikely. Because this is a default position 
of doing nothing, it is equally the case that intentional 
mitigation of the risks will also be missing. The level of 
investment required is challenging to obtain, based on 
the past investment in these efforts.
The middle ground involves setting community 
standards and norms and requiring third party providers 
to reach them. This may involve requiring guarantees on 
preservation (which will require investment in platforms 
to back it) on sustainability and on the ability to access, 
examine and re-use content. It may require guarantees 
on adoption of community standards of interoperability, 
or place requirements for community governance over 
some aspects of the service provision. Setting such 
requirements is a collective action problem on its own, 
but similar to ones that research communities have 
solved in the past.
Key questions to ask are how are these third parties 
leveraging external investment, what promises are they 
making to those investors, and how can the non-
financial value that the research communities need 
access to be maintained while enabling external players 
to recoup their investments? Ironically, it may be the 
very largest players, for whom the research market is 
relatively unimportant, that are the easiest to work with. 
The relatively smaller players, who need to recoup their 
investments from the research community, may be 
more challenging.
The second story, which sought to identify the optimal 
level of investment in underpinning software 
infrastructures that enable transparency, reproducibility 
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and the re-use of code, remains hard to answer in 
quantitative terms. However, we can reframe the 
problem. The challenge is supporting more transparent 
analysis and communication of research claims. That is, 
we are investing in the infrastructure of ‘public-making’, 
converting club goods into more public-like goods.
While we do not yet have the quantitative apparatus to 
generate numbers we can ask how this underpinning 
investment in infrastructure, of re-usable and accessible 
software systems, supports that process. What new 
communities gain access? How valuable is that? Is 
code actually being re-used across projects, across 
groups or across disciplines? What are the critical 
pieces of the software infrastructure that support that 
code? What are the costs of research that cannot be 
validated and therefore the benefits of research  
that can?
But it is the first story where we may have made the 
most headway. We can understand that the incumbent 
publisher seeks to be a gravitational hub, holding the 
intellectual property of a journal masthead as a core 
value. We can also see that the decision of the editorial 
board to exit and set up a new journal was a collective 
action problem. In this case, that problem is solved 
through a small group, holding the respect and prestige 
of a community taking the authority to act, and being 
granted the authority to act by their community.
But on top of this we see the critical role of 
infrastructure. Firstly, the availability of a low-cost 
platform that reduced the risk of failure for the editors 
and the community they represent. But also the 
presence of intellectual property (IP) law and contracts 
that would be respected by both sides and that 
substantially clarified the nature of the disagreement. It 
is likely that, without the institutions underpinning the 
legal frameworks that made up the old journal, the 
decision to part ways, and the arguments over how that 
was to occur, would have left both parties bogged 
down, possibly leading to the failure of both journals. 
This is Ostrom’s (Ostrom 1991) seventh principle, 
‘provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute 
resolution’, in practice.
For both the new journal and the old we have a  
clearer view of what has been lost and what must be 
recaptured to achieve success. Glossa carried the 
asset of the community with it but not the name 
recognition and records of registration; these would 
have to be made anew. Lingua maintains the prestige, 
at least in terms of outward metrics, but would need to 
create a new community and sense of purpose to thrive 
as a journal. But not necessarily to continue to deliver 
as a financial asset. As part of a broader journal 
package it is unlikely that library subscribers will seek to 
recoup their subscription costs for the single journal, 
and as a contributor to the page views and page counts 
that justify those subscriptions its value continues. 
Different assets, different roles, different targets.
Perhaps the critical question for progress to Open 
Scholarship is what we can learn from this transition. 
We can see that this specific scholarly community has 
made a successful transition, even without control over 
the intellectual property of the journal. This shows such 
a transition is possible provided the conditions of the 
community and the provided infrastructure are right. 
The crucial role of a low-cost publishing infrastructure, 
including initial subsidies and credible long-term funding 
arrangements, meant that Glossa could appear as 
simply a continuation of Lingua under a different name.
For policy makers, funders, and others seeking change 
the message is quite clear. The infrastructure that 
enables communities to choose to shift is the key. 
Particularly in the social sciences and humanities – 
where communities remain strong, relatively small and 
well-defined – the constellation of infrastructures, 
motivation and opportunity provide a template that  
can work.
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Turning this into detailed quantitative analysis, and 
understanding how the very different values placed on 
particular goods by different stakeholder groups can be 
understood and compared to predict outcomes, 
remains a challenge. But the models presented here, 
and the cases examined, provide examples of 
successes and, indeed, failures.
Where next?
In some ways, the analysis of this book has led us  
to conclusions that we already knew. Academic 
communities will need to act together if we want control 
over our processes and systems. Markets on their own 
will not support the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge. The structures that define scholarly 
communities matter, and the infrastructures that 
support them are important.
But in some ways it is radical. If we take seriously the idea 
that important parts of our community are not well served 
either by markets or by top-down regulation, then we 
need to reconfigure our relationships with external players. 
We may need to question the roles of funders, and 
perhaps most controversially draw a bright, sharp line 
between actors that are part of the community and those 
third parties with which we have a market-based 
relationship. Where our meso-organisations contain 
internal ‘markets’ we may need to ask whether they 
function effectively and, if so, whether such bright lines 
need to be drawn internally as well as externally.
Core to our analysis is that groups matter, and that the 
messiness of these groups is important. If capital and 
prestige accrue around the ‘good’ gravitational hubs that 
represent community-governed institutions and we need 
these to counter the natural accumulation of capital and 
control by ‘bad’ gravitational hubs – those outside of 
community control – then we need much greater collective 
responsibility, alongside new systems that provide the 
freedom to groups and communities to develop their  
own rules.
If the role of macro-actors requires some re-balancing 
to set aspirations and provide support for change, then 
we may need to radically reconsider the way in which 
policy is designed and implemented. Indeed our entire 
politics of change in the academy may not be fit for 
purpose. The part that depends on a multicentric world, 
with the gravitational hubs representing scholarly 
communities and research performing organisations, in 
a kind of continual competition for attention, allegiance 
and capital, may need to accept that it is the tensions 
between these different centres that provide the checks 
and balances that a complex system needs.
At the same time, if we are to build a system that is 
capable of change in response to the needs of the 
societies that support us, we need mechanisms and 
institutions that build consensus for that change. This 
needs to be timely and responsive to (but not 
completely in train with) our changing societies. 
Certainly it is no longer acceptable for scholarship to 
change ‘one funeral at a time’. We also need actors that 
will drive necessary change when ‘we’ won’t do it 
‘ourselves’. The position of funders as gatekeepers of 
the flow of resources makes them a logical holder of 
this role. Their role as mediators between the ultimate 
funders of research, government and society, and 
scholarly institutions strengthens this case. But do we 
have the configuration and separation of roles right?
The institutions of western scholarship, in particular 
universities and scholarly societies, are old. Most 
modern nation states host a university older than 
themselves, and there are universities and societies that 
are older than most corporations. Age tends to make 
the institutions of scholarship conservative, but it also 
makes them survivors. The university as an institution 
has changed radically over the millenium or so in which 
those institutions have existed. Yet, dramatic revolutions 
have been rare. Slow change and belated reform have 
been more common.
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During the 20th century the old institutions of 
scholarship had to adapt to the needs and priorities of 
new nation states, and new institutions of scholarship 
have sought to find a niche for themselves. For the 
older institutions, learning to compromise with 
governments – and public funding bodies – has 
sometimes been uncomfortable, but has had clear 
benefits for universities. Accepting research funding 
represents a pact, implicit perhaps, that somewhat 
constrained the actions and freedoms of universities.  
As Olson (Olson 1974) would show, one solution to the 
collective action problem is for members of the 
collective to agree to bind themselves to a set of rules, 
provided all the other members agree.
The agenda here is therefore both radical and 
conservative. Radical in seeing a need for change, for 
new institutions and new systems that can support 
timely and efficient reform to guide the transition to 
Open Scholarship. Conservative in that it recognises the 
value of institutions and systems that are already in 
place, and that change will be most effective and most 
sustainable if it is based on evolution and not revolution.
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